that puts on great performance will never need the dictionary to explain it.

As a third point, I think more businesses are learning that by the very act of stating their purposes, they greatly encourage their own effort to achieve them. This involves what I call giving hostages to performance. When you commit yourself to the public plainly, for all to read or hear—well, you are committed. You are out on a limb. You have to stand or fall, and that is a wonderful discipline.

Unhappily, most instances of climbing out on a limb now occur in disputes of various kinds and involve demands made on others. What I am speaking for here is that we make more demands on ourselves, and make them in public. The words we use to do this might even be the most important in all business communication.

Finally, just a word about communication and agreement. Some people I talk with seem to think these are two sides of the same coin. I don't think so at all. I agree that communicating means to listen as well as to talk, but the name of the game is not "Me, too." After all, one of the main purposes of communication is to make clear when you disagree, and why.

I make this rather obvious point because I hope the theme of this meeting will not carry any of us off into dreamland. We surely need, in this country, broad unity of purpose. But we shall never arrive at it by pretending to agree when we do not. We shall get there only by continuously testing and prodding each other—by a continuous dialog, as the intellectuals call it. And what I am saying here tonight comes down essentially to this:

First, business needs to do all it can to improve its part in the dialog; and second, the foundations for success in this effort must be, as they have always been, good purposes, good will, good faith, and good works.

To the national business publications I say again, for myself and equally for my associates in the Bell System—we are deeply grateful for this award. We shall try our best, with your valued and important help, to contribute usefully toward solving problems of communication, in every sense of the word.

Thank you very much.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

THURSDAY, MARCH 21, 1963

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

Dr. G. Willard Collins, evangelist, Church of Christ, Nashville, Tenn., offered the following prayer:

Our Father, we thank Thee because Thou hast revealed to man the meaning of love and sacrifice through the gift of Thy Son. Today we thank Thee for all the men and women who have worked with Thee to carve upon the soil of this land a fruitful nation and people. Our God, we pray that the Members who assemble in this House may recognize their power and responsibility as our leaders, and we ask for Thy guidance to them in this day's activities. May we believe enough to trust Thee; may we obey Thee that Thou might bless us; may we serve Thee and our neighbors that all men may know that we are Thy people. In the name of Christ. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The Journal of the proceedings of Tuesday, March 19, 1963, was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate, by Mr. McGown, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment bills of the House of the following titles:

H.R. 212. An act to amend section 904, title 38, United States Code, so that burial allowances might be paid in cases where discharges were changed by competent authority after death of the veteran from dishonorable to conditions other than dishonorable; and

H.R. 2085. An act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide that the deduction for child care expenses shall be available to a wife who has been deserted by and cannot locate her husband on the same basis as a single woman.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed, with amendments in which the concurrence of the House is requested, a bill of the House of the following title:

H.R. 1597. An act relating to the tax treatment of redeemable ground rents.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed a bill of the following title, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 1089. An act to authorize the sale, without regard to the 6-month waiting period prescribed, of cadmium proposed to be disposed of pursuant to the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act.

"A REPORT ON U.S. FOREIGN OPERATIONS IN AFRICA"

Mr. JONES of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on House Administration, I call up Senate Concurrent Resolution 29 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the concurrent resolution, as follows:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That there be printed, with illustrations, as a Senate document, a report entitled "A Report on United States Foreign Operations in Africa", submitted by Senator ALLEN J. ELLENDER to the Senate Committee on Appropriations and that four thousand additional copies be printed for the use of that committee.

The concurrent resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

REFERENDUM ON THE NEW WHEAT PROGRAM

Mr. JONES of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend my remarks, and to include an editorial.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

Mr. JONES of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, as the result of conversations which I had with several farmers who were in Washington this week on a tour sponsored by the Missouri Farm Bureau, I am led to believe that many of the farmers of this Nation are being given advice which is based upon a false assumption, and that if they follow this advice it can only result in irreparable damage to their own interests.

I am talking about the advice which some of these farmers have received from those who are recommending that they vote against the new wheat program which is scheduled to go into effect in 1964 if the referendum carries in the election, to be held in the late spring or early summer.

After I had explained to the group the importance of approving this new program, I pointed out that in the event two-thirds did not approve the program they would then revert to the basic law under which there would be maximum supports of 50 percent of parity only for those who planted within their base allotments. This, I said, would mean a support price of about $1.25 a bushel for those who restricted their plantings, but the market price would in all probability be less than a dollar a bushel, this estimate being made on the theory that without restrictions the overall planting would be increased with no limits on acreage.

Then, some of these farmers replied:

If the referendum results in a vote against the program, then the Secretary of Agriculture will be forced to ask Congress to enact a new law, for he cannot afford to let the basic law go into effect, especially with an election year coming up in 1964.

Mr. Speaker, I do not profess to be an expert on agriculture, and I do not pretend to have the solution to the farm problem, but after 12 years of sitting on the House Committee on Agriculture, I think I have learned a few things. One of them is this, and I am willing to stake my reputation on this prediction. If this new wheat program is not approved by the two-thirds vote in the forthcoming referendum, you are going to see some mighty sick and disappointed farmers throughout this land of ours, and the most surprised bunch will be those who are banking on the Secretary of Agriculture and the Congress—at least the House Committee on Agriculture—coming up with some alternative proposal to "pull their fat out of the fire."

If the referendum fails, I am predicting that you will see good wheat selling for less than a dollar a bushel in 1964, and the warehouses will be filled with loan wheat on which the farmer has received only $1.25 a bushel.

Mr. Speaker, I commend to my colleagues the reading of the following editorial, taken from the March 6, 1963, issue of the Des Moines Register:

[From the Des Moines (Iowa) Register, Mar. 6, 1963]

WHEAT FACT AND FANCY

The Farm Bureau is conducting a major drive to defeat the new wheat program which will go into effect in 1964 if two-thirds of the growers vote in favor of it in a referendum

in June of this year. The bureau says the basic issue is "whether the farms of America are to be managed by farmers or by a Government bureaucracy." It says a favorable vote would "give a great boost" to the administration's efforts to expand "supply management" to other commodities, but a "no" vote would be interpreted as a sign farmers do not want additional compulsory supply management programs.

This view of the wheat referendum seems unduly apocalyptic.

If farmers vote for the program, they will not be committing themselves to it for all time to come, but only for the 1964 wheat crop. If the program proved in practice to be as bad as the Farm Bureau says it is, surely this would be apparent to farmers, and they could reject the program on the next vote. And Congress could change it. What farmers are voting for in the referendum is not a new direction for all farm programs, as the Farm Bureau says, but a trial of a new plan for wheat.

The Farm Bureau is sounding dire warnings about the wheat controls which Charles B. Shuman, president of the organization, says are the "tightest, most restrictive ever proposed for any farm crop." That is extreme language, and it is careless language. Many kinds of controls have been proposed since 1920. The wheat controls are no tighter than those which have been in effect for tobacco and cotton for years and are not as tight as the controls for sugar. The Farm Bureau consistently backs these programs.

If two-thirds of the farmers vote in favor of the program, every wheat grower will be required to comply with his acreage allotment. He can grow as much wheat as he is able to grow on the allotted acres, but he will receive the full support (about $2 a bushel) only on a number of bushels to be determined as his share of the national supply used for domestic food consumption plus a portion of exports.

There are no more "controls" on the farmer than in the case of any crop where mandatory acreage allotments are in effect, as they have been in wheat for years. The main difference in the new program is that the price support will be a two-price deal: The grain not eligible for the top price support (probably about one-seventh of production) will receive a lower support comparable to feed grain supports, about $1.25 a bushel. Growers also will get a land-retirement payment for acres taken out of wheat.

The Farm Bureau correctly says that this new program will result in some decline, probably small, in the total net income received by wheat growers (but not in average income, because the number of growers is dropping). The two-price support plan results in a lower blend price support for wheat.

But rejection of the new plan would mean a much larger drop in wheat income. Price supports for all wheat produced would drop to 50 percent of parity, about $1.25 a bushel.

It is hard to see how the Farm Bureau leaders can get so wrought up about "compulsion" and dictatorial controls which do not go into effect unless two-thirds of the producers vote to accept them. What the Government is saying is that, if two-thirds of the producers favor the controls, then everyone who chooses to grow wheat will have to go along. Every business has regulations, governmental or private.

It seems not unreasonable that the Government ask farmers to cooperate in limiting production if they want a guaranteed price for their product. If they don't want to comply with acreage allotments in return for a higher price, well, that settles that. But it isn't an issue of Government management of farms, nor is it setting the course of farm policy forevermore.

EARNED INCOME LIMIT FOR THOSE UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY

Mr. RHODES of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

Mr. RHODES of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I am introducing today a bill which would increase to $1,800 the annual amount of earned income a person may receive without having his social security benefits reduced.

My bill would liberalize present social security requirements that retirees under 72 must have $1 of social security benefits withheld for every $2 of earnings between $1,200 and $1,700 per annum, and $1 withheld for every $1 of earnings in excess of $1,700.

I am pleased to join Senator HUMPHREY, who has introduced an identical bill in the Senate, and other House Members in proposing this legislation which will give older citizens an opportunity to receive a more adequate income to meet the heavy costs of living.

This is the third major amendment to the Social Security Act which I have proposed so far this session of the Congress.

My other bills, H.R. 2107 and H.R. 2685, would increase minimum social security benefits from $40 to $50 per month and lower age requirements for full social security benefits to 60 years for both men and women.

These bills are designed to strengthen our economy at the base. They would put needed purchasing power into the hands of those who need it most. They would bring a measure of social justice to individuals and families and those 35 million of our fellow citizens—including many in the Sixth District of Pennsylvania which I am privileged to represent—who are denied the opportunity of a decent livelihood in the midst of great national surpluses and prosperity.

I hope that the amendments to the Social Security Act which I have introduced will be carefully considered and that they will be approved by this present Congress.

INTERPRETATION

Mr. AVERY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?

There was no objection.

Mr. AVERY. Mr. Speaker, last night's issue of the Washington Star carried a story by George Sherman, a staff writer, commenting on the recent visit of President Kennedy to Costa Rica. The article goes on in this manner:

Both in private and public, U.S. officials are hailing Mr. Kennedy's meetings with the six Presidents of Central America and Panama as a major landmark in U.S. policy in the hemisphere.

In view of the testimony taken in the Moss committee in the last 3 or 4 days I think that most Members of Congress and certainly most taxpayers are going to have their tongue in their cheek and take a hard look at the final result. We have learned that "managed news" does not necessarily reflect what has actually taken place. But the point I want to make further is that apparently we are committed to another foreign aid program in Central America, because further down in the story it states that the prestige of the President was going to be thrown with full weight behind a new program which is described as a new Fund for Central American Economic Integration.

I would only conclude, Mr. Speaker, by saying that those of us who have cast an unpopular vote in our district for mutual security and foreign aid are finding it increasingly difficult to go along. We find another program that is announced for the first time, not in the United States, not requested from Congress, but perfunctorily announced from a place out of the country. I recall that the Alliance for Progress was announced first in Uruguay and we found out that U.S. credit was committed for $10 billion.

I think we have four programs already working in Central America and I certainly hope that this program will be screened very carefully by the House before any binding commitments are made.

DISARMAMENT AGENCY SPOKESMAN STATES INACCURATE TEST-BAN FACTS

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD and include two tables.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, on the Voice of America's "Press Conference, U.S.A.," broadcast worldwide on Tuesday, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's Deputy Director Adrian S. Fischer inaccurately charged the big 2½-million-square-mile hole for Soviet undetectable test ban cheating under the administration's new test-ban treaty proposals does not exist. The big hole was revealed Monday by the Republican Conference Committee on Nuclear Testing.

Mr. Fischer's statements to the world simply are not factual. If he had been on commercial radio selling health pills as phony as the big hole test-ban treaty proposal he would be landed on by the Federal Food and Drug Administration like a ton of bricks and charged with misleading advertising, failure to label deleterious ingredients, and peddling a product dangerous to public health and safety.

Fischer denies existence of the big hole by alleging signals equal to a 3-kiloton shot in alluvium—that is, a 3 bury signal—beyond a distance of 1,240 miles are larger than the size signal for distances 620 to 1,240 miles used by the

conference committee to illustrate the big hole. Table 1 shows the situation for the 620 to 1,240 distance where the size of the seismic signal is 4 millimicrons. Table 2 shows the situation for distances beyond 1,240 miles where the size of the signals goes back up to about 10 millimicrons, their size at 480 miles or about 800 kilometers. What table 2 illustrates is that even if, with this larger size signal, there is a marginal detection capability, the signal still is not sufficiently larger in size than background microseismic noise to permit identification of a cheat test shot, or series of them, from among thousands of small earthquakes of similar size occurring annually in the U.S.S.R. Without this identification capability, the big hole still exists. Paint it black for the future U.S. national security.

Fischer complains that the 3 bury signal—that is, signal equivalent to a 3-kiloton shot in alluvium—used as a measuring yardstick in the conference committee's report do not establish the big hole because there is relatively little dry alluvium in the U.S.S.R. His argument is specious because the dry alluvium equivalent is merely an expression of measurement, a yardstick. Units on this yardstick are now called a "bury" to eliminate such confusion. There are many other geological formations in the U.S.S.R. which may have an equal or greater muffling effect on the seismic shock signal of cheat tests. Alternatively, the signal may be reduced below thresholds of detection and identification merely by conducting the tests in underground cavities which decouple the shock wave of the explosion from the surrounding earth and thereby produce seismic signals of meager size. The big hole still exists, despite Mr. Fischer's misleading reasoning. Paint it black for the future U.S. national security.

Fischer further asserts the big hole does not exist because a seismic observatory at Mould Bay, Canada, has detected shots less than 3 kilotons fired by the AEC in Nevada. Again his reasoning is specious because reputable seismologists tell us Mould Bay's peculiar capability is a rare accident of geography based on the relative locations of the Nevada shots and the Mould Bay instrument. Such rare accidents can never tell us where to locate a seismic detection station in similar juxtaposition to an underground cheat shot that has not even yet been planned, let alone located somewhere within the Soviet Union's 8½ million square miles of real estate. The big hole still exists. Paint it black for the future U.S. national security.

It is hoped that the factual tables accompanying these remarks will be noted by the Member of the other body who Tuesday made disparaging remarks in the RECORD about the big hole charges. The tables are based on factual statements of a responsible Defense Department seismologist. If the gentleman will examine these tables he will possess information I believe he did not have then. These plain scientific facts of physical life have a direct bearing on the responsible evaluation of treaty proposals in context of the ability to deter a determined and intelligent cheater. He should admit this.

TABLE 1.—*Actual size (in millimicrons) of 3-bury [1] seismic signal compared with size of signal required for detection, location, and identification of "suspicious" shots at 620 to 1,240 miles (1,000 to 2,000 kilometers) distance*

Microseismic background "noise" level	3-bury [1] signal	Signal size needed for detection and location	Signal size needed for identification
5	4	10	[2] 50
4	4	8	[2] 40
3	4	6	[2] 30
2	4	[3] 4	[2] 20
1	4	[3] 2	[2] 10

[1] A "bury" is a unit of seismic signal measurement. For example: 1 bury is the equivalent of a seismic signal created by a 1-kiloton explosion where the shot is fired in alluvium formation in direct contact with the soil, i.e., without decoupling: 2 bury is the same for a 2-kiloton explosion and so on: Explanation of the origin of this unit of measurement will be found in remarks by Representative HOSMER in this issue of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, pages 4767–4768.

[2] 3-bury signal useless for identifying it as a cheat test.

[3] 3-bury signal begins to show on seismograph for detection purposes.

NOTE.—Average microseismic background level is 10 to 20 millimicrons. Table shows only "very quiet" areas of 5 millimicrons and less. 2 times background required for detection and location. 10 to 20 times background required for identification.

TABLE 2.—*Actual size (in millimicrons) of 3-bury [1] seismic signal compared with size of signal required for detection, location, and identification of "suspicious" shots beyond 1,240 miles (2,000 kilometers) distance*

Microseismic background "noise" level	3-bury [1] signal	Signal size needed for detection and location	Signal size needed for identification
5	10	[2] 10	[3] 50
4	10	[2] 8	[3] 40
3 [4]	10	[2] 6	[3] 30
2 [4]	10	[2] 4	[3] 20
1 [4]	10	[2] 2	[5] 10

[1] A "bury" is a unit of seismic signal measurement. For example: 1 bury is the equivalent of a seismic signal created by a 1-kiloton explosion where the shot is fired in alluvium formation in direct contact with the soil, i.e., without decoupling; 2 bury is the same for a 2-kiloton explosion and so on. Explanation of the origin of this unit of measurement will be found in remarks by Representative HOSMER in this issue of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, pages 4767–4768.

[2] 3-bury signal begins to show on seismograph for detection purposes.

[3] 3-bury signal useless for purpose of identifying it as a cheat test.

[4] Reduction of background noise to these extremely low levels even by installation of highly sophisticated equipment is not assured.

[5] 3-bury signal barely enters threshold of identification.

NOTE.—Average microseismic background level is 10 to 20 millimicrons. Table shows only "very quiet" areas of 5 millimicrons and less. 2 times background required for detection and location. 10 to 20 times background required for identification.

LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT ON TEST BAN TREATY

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, under date of March 18 I wrote the President respecting deficiencies of a nuclear test ban treaty his advisers state is under preparation for offer to the Soviets in the near future. The letter also discusses possible reasons for what I feel to be bad advice on the subject these advisers are giving him. I hope the President will be given the letter to read. It is as follows:

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., March 18, 1963.

Re nuclear test ban.

The HONORABLE JOHN F. KENNEDY,
President, the White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I sincerely hope this letter may reach your eyes because it contains information relating to the national security which I feel you may not otherwise receive.

Your Disarmament Agency people recently outlined to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy many of the provisions of a revised test ban treaty under preparation which they state soon will be offered the Soviets. This proposal contains a loophole through which the Soviets can move clandestinely to nuclear weapons superiority and its equivalent, Communist world domination.

According to testimony of Government technical witnesses heard by the JCAE at the same hearings, the verification system to be proposed is inadequate to detect and identify underground test cheating at yields equivalent to "3 kilotons and below conducted in alluvium formations" if cheating is carried on at least 620 miles inside Soviet borders. According to my calculations, this leaves an area of at least 2½ million square miles in the interior of the U.S.S.R.—and probably twice that size—in which significant secret Soviet underground tests can be carried on wholly without fear of detection.

This undetectability results from the inherent inability of seismographs to detect and locate signals unless they are at least twice the size of the earth's normal microseismic background noises and their inherent inability to distinguish, that is, identify, suspicious events from earthquakes unless the signals are 10 to 20 times larger than background noise.

In short, natural background noise, which averages 10 to 20 millimicrons, affects seismographs just like static affects a radio receiver—the signal's are blotted out by the noise.

This is what happens:

Assume a quiet location for the seismograph, with background noise of only 5 millimicrons. This means the signal must be at least 10 millimicrons for detection and location and at least 50 millimicrons for identification. Yet, the signal from a 3-kiloton shot 620 miles distance will be only 4 millimicrons in size—far below levels required for verification of cheating.

Even assuming special instruments could reduce the background noise to an irreducible 1 millimicron minimum, where marginal detection and location capability would appear, still a 10 millimicron signal would be needed for identification, and the actual signal will be only 4 millimicrons.

It is to be noted that signals can be held to the 4 millimicron level either by limiting test yields to 3 kilotron in alluvium or equivalent soils or by conducting larger shots in underground cavities which "decouple" the shock waves from surrounding earth and reduce the signal to the undetectable level.

The foregoing all is a matter of public record in the JCAE's hearings. Also on the JCAE's public record is testimony as to what weapons development progress can be made in this big hole undetectable cheating area. It amounts to the entire spectrum of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons except an "unsubstantial fraction" of strategic weapons—these being superyield H-bombs the U.S.S.R. already has developed anyway.

If you offer the Soviets the treaty now being drafted it will mean an offer by the United States to forgo wholly all nuclear weapons development and, as a practical matter, simply trust a Communist promise not to continue nuclear weapons development when it can be done without fear of discovery.

This is exactly what your Disarmament Agency relates it is advising you to do on the grounds the risks of not doing so are greater than those of doing so. In effect, they say it is more risky for both sides to test in the open than it is for the Communist to be given the opportunity for cheat testing while we stop progress. This flies in the face of logic if we assume we distrust the Soviets enough to spend $50 billion a year on military defense.

The advice also flies in the face of logic if a treaty with a big hole in it is an ineffective treaty, and I do not see how it could be otherwise. Secret weapons testing of the magnitude possible would drastically affect the military balance between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Further, if an ineffective treaty is concluded, it will surrender all opportunity to conclude an effective one. What happens then to the hopes and aspirations of people everywhere who see an effective treaty as one of the very few opportunities there is to achieve a less risky world?

There is no need to take my word, Mr. President, for the facts on undetectability and clandestine weapons development opportunities above related. Dr. Carl Romney, seismologist for the Air Force Technical Applications Center, can explain the inherent physical limitations on seismic detection imposed by background noise as he did to the JCAE. Gen. A. W. Betts, the AEC's director of military applications, can define for you the wide spectrum of opportunity for undetectable weapons development, as he did to the JCAE. I urge you to confer with these men.

Why do I suggest bypassing your Disarmament Agency advisers for this information?

Simply because if they have not already put this matter to you, then you should no longer have confidence in their advice. With the hopes of mankind aroused for a reduction in the world's risks by an effective test ban treaty, they are not doing their jobs advising you to enter an ineffective one. They cannot safely be relied upon if they tell you to trade the reality of an effective risk reduction device for only an illusion of effectiveness, with the eventual prospect of a nuclear Pearl Harbor thrown in for good measure.

If their advice to you is so bad, why do they give it? These are patriotic men of integrity—what, you may ask, is my answer to that?

My answer, Mr. President, does not reflect on either the patriotism or the integrity of these men. They are hard working people, intensely anxious to succeed in their jobs. It is simply that success in their jobs can only be demonstrated by the conclusion of some agreement with the Soviets. They want a good agreement, not a bad one. But they want an agreement. I am certain that this factor leads them into subconscious miscalculations of the balance of risks which overemphasizes hopes for the verification system and underemphasizes practical difficulties with it.

Mr. Foster, who heads the agency, is a former business executive, his assistant is Mr. Fischer, a former lawyer. Both receive their advice on seismology from Dr. Long, a chemist. None have been on their jobs even for a period of 2 years. Your Committee of Principals which reviews the Disarmament Agency's advice is composed of three former business executives and four former college professors. This group too has only been on the job for about 2 years.

Look at it this way: At Cape Canaveral, where "all systems are go" it means the check out of many, many components of a missile have been made electronically and infallibly before the final light is green.

By contrast, at the Disarmament Agency all components of a test ban proposal are not checked out electronically and infallibly before you receive the green light. They are checked by human beings who must make many, many individual subjective judgments as to each component before giving you a red or green light on the overall treaty package. Each of these many, many judgments is subject to a subconscious intrusion of the desire for an agreement. Constant favorable resolution of small doubt by this means, a bit by bit, piece by piece, eventually add up to one big major miscalculation.

Such miscalculation, Mr. President, I sincerely feel has occurred. It has occurred substantially in the manner I have outlined. Both you and the Nation will be its innocent victims unless prompt steps are taken, steps which can only be taken by you.

So again, I urge you to talk directly with Dr. Romney and General Betts, or others of equal knowledge and ability, who are not subject to the subconscious pressures upon Mr. Foster and his associates.

I am certain what they tell you will substantiate the proposition that an effective test ban treaty—one which will in fact cause the Soviets to stop nuclear weapons development if we do—will require manned seismic observatories inside the Soviet Union as well as on free world soil.

Again, in closing, I reiterate the danger of missing the chance for an effective, risk reducing treaty by the proposal of an ineffective, risk increasing treaty.

Sincerely,

CRAIG HOSMER,
Member of Congress.

THE STORY OF A MAGAZINE ARTICLE FIX

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend my remarks, and to include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Alabama?

There was no objection.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. Speaker, on the flimsiest possible evidence, a major national publication has sought in recent weeks to discredit southern football generally and athletic officials at the University of Alabama in particular.

In the Saturday Evening Post dated March 23, 1963, there is an article entitled "The Story of a College Football Fix" which, according to the editors of the magazine, is "shocking" and the biggest sports scandal since the 1919 World Series baseball games. The article makes charges against two men, athletic directors at their respective universities, Paul Bryant, University of Alabama, and Wallace Butts, University of Georgia.

The facts on which these charges have been based run from the ephemeral to the nonexistent. However, the facts do speak for themselves that the magazine article is "fixed" in such a way as to cause the readers to draw distorted conclusions. First, they accuse Butts and Bryant of conspiring and fixing the 1962 football game between the University of Georgia and the University of Alabama, which was played at Birmingham, saying in a prefatory note to the article:

Before the University of Georgia played the University of Alabama last September 22, Wally Butts, the athletic director of Georgia, gave Paul "Bear" Bryant, head coach of Alabama, Georgia's plays, defensive patterns, all the significant secrets Georgia's football team possessed.

The basis of this charge was a telephone call allegedly overheard by a man who admittedly knows little about football.

This is not evidence you could go into court with, or even get very many people familiar with football to take seriously. Yet the Saturday Evening Post has seen fit to put Paul Bryant and Wally Butts on trial in the court of public opinion. They are being tried in a "fixed" article with the facts arrayed in an effort to present a case against two honored and respected men.

Some of the "shocking" revelations of Butts to Bryant in the alleged telephone conversation were that Georgia did not have a man who could quick kick, that the Georgia quarterback revealed whether he was going to pass or run by the way he held his feet, and that certain other players committed themselves in advance on particular plays. Butts is also supposed to have given away offensive and defensive plays. While all of this is very interesting, there is some question that in this day of intensive scouting of opposing teams and slow motion photography the coach of one of the top teams in the country and a man voted by his peers as coach of the year in 1961 would have to be leaked information such as that alluded to in the article. It is outrageous that such a charge should be made, on the strength of statements by a convicted bad check artist. Furthermore, Coach Bryant was never even contacted by the Post to ascertain the validity of the charges or to obtain his comments. This failure to contact the victim of the charges bespeaks malice and a callous disregard for truthful, objective reporting.

Coach Bryant, in a statewide television appearance before the people of Alabama, answered these absurd charges in this way:

I have been accused in print of collusion or attempts at collusion with the athletic director of the University of Georgia to fix or rig the game we played with the University of Georgia last fall.

Our boys won the game by a score of 35 to 0.

I welcome this opportunity to tell the people of Alabama that these charges are false in every sense of the word. I want to take this time to deny them with every force at my command. Never in my life have I attempted to rig or fix any game either as a player or as a coach.

In these charges there is a statement that I had information on the Georgia football team. Certainly we did. We have information on and about every team that we play. This is scouting and research and study, etc.

The Saturday Evening Post charges that I obtained confidential, detailed plans that would affect the outcome of the game with Georgia.

It is part of the business of coaching football and is the duty of my staff and me to know as much about an opposing team as is possible. We attempt to do this, and, ladies and gentlemen, that is what a coach does the other 9 months of the year when football season is over.

We study films of other schools. They study our films. All college teams exchange coaching films. We study the movements of players, their abilities, their weaknesses, and their habits. We study the coaches and their techniques, the games that they have played with us previously, and the games they played with other teams.

Mr. Speaker, I believe it might be useful to mention at this point that last October, Coach Bryant was the subject of a previous defamatory article in the Saturday Evening Post and that he has filed a suit for libel against the magazine on the basis of the false and misleading material contained in that article. The charges brought against the University of Alabama coach in the earlier article are as defamatory as in the present one.

However, the Post is not content to defend the earlier article in a court of law—they have set out to wreck the career of a man. The present article, "The Story of a College Football Fix," constitutes their countersuit against Paul Bryant. By the skillful manipulation of facts with quotes, the article indicts two men when the facts will not uphold their contention that a "fix" was on. The only "fix" in this whole affair is the Post's article.

The alleged phone call was overheard and noted by a man who is highly questionable at the very least. First, why did he listen to a phone conversation that he was accidentally cut in on? Secondly, the Post intimates that Wally Butts' alleged motives were both personal and financial. The phone call listener is an insurance man who has had a little trouble about issuing bad checks. He was convicted on charges of issuing two bad checks, was fined and placed on probation for the offense. He admits in the article that he has always had trouble with his financial affairs. Motives? Considering the background of the accuser, his motives are the ones which should be called into question.

But motives are not the issue here. What is an issue is that the Saturday Evening Post has libeled and defamed two honored and respected men.

Mr. Speaker, Coach Paul Bryant is a man who has dedicated his life to the youth of our country and to college athletics. He has risen to pre-eminence in his field. For that reason he makes a good target for the irresponsible and the rumor mongers. The Saturday Evening Post has attempted to take from Paul Bryant what no man or magazine should ever be allowed to take from any man. They have tried to take his good name.

Mr. Speaker, this is not a new departure for the Saturday Evening Post. Over the past several months, they have time and again resorted to sensationalism and mad-dog journalism. This magazine has published in each recent issue so-called "inside dope" stories that characterize some of the worst journalism in America. Articles like "Air Crashes: Growing Peril in the Skies"; "A Vote Against Motherhood"; "Birmingham: City of Fear"; and now this scurrilous piece of reporting on "The Story of a College Football Fix," raise serious questions about the future of the Post. In the last 3 years, the Post has lost $40 million in advertising revenues while almost every other national magazine has increased its advertising income. Figures from Advertising Age show that the Post advertising revenues were $105 million in 1960. In 1961, the figure dropped to $86.5 million and dropped more sharply in 1962 to $66.5 million.

It is tragic to see a magazine with an illustrious history like the Post, a magazine in which many people have formerly had confidence, resort to this type of yellow journalism in an effort to bolster sagging revenues. One naturally cannot evaluate the accuracy of every article published in a given magazine. If a person reads an article about a subject he does know something about, and that article is full of distortions and inaccuracies, then it raises serious questions in the reader's mind about the validity of other articles.

For me, their recent article about my home city of Birmingham was such an article. Now, this attack on a renowned football coach in an article skillfully designed to cause the readers to conclude his guilt, makes me wonder if the Saturday Evening Post may not fade away into the oblivion they have suggested for Coach Bryant. Confidence once lost is hard to regain. Recent articles in the Post have caused a loss of confidence and I will not be surprised if that magazine in the near future ceases publication like the Literary Digest of the 1930's.

One facet of the case of the Saturday Evening Post is that it points to the need for review of our libel laws and regulations for publications using the U.S. mails. As the postal regulations stand now, libelous matter is mailable as long as it is not on the outside wrapper of the magazine. No reference to "The Story of a College Football Fix" was made on the outside of the Saturday Evening Post.

By the time court cases covering the libel suits come to trial, the damage caused by these articles will already have been done no matter what the outcome of the suits. Moreover, the laws and penalties for libel are obviously no obstacle to a magazine that has lost $40 million in advertising revenues in a 2-year period. The Post, financially desperate and losing revenue in the tens of millions of dollars, can regard the threat of libel judgments with indifference.

Yet let the record show first, that the University of Alabama board of trustees has investigated the charges thoroughly and has issued a statement absolving Coach Bryant; second, that a lie detector test given Coach Bryant has established his innocence; third, that the Justice Department has looked into the case and dropped its investigation; and fourth, that the president of the University of Alabama, Dr. Frank A. Rose, has issued this statement:

The rumors concerning Coach Bryant were brought to my attention 3 weeks ago. After careful and thorough investigation, including the most favorable results of a lie-detector test given by a man who is a former member of the FBI and lecturer at the Keeler Polygraph Institute in Chicago, administered at the request of Coach Bryant for Commissioner Bernie Moore and me, I have found no evidence of any kind that would implicate Coach Bryant in any way with rigging or fixing, or betting on football games.

A real injustice has been done to the University of Alabama and Coach Bryant and I am delighted to be able to make this statement at this time.

Mr. Speaker, the University of Alabama is my alma mater and it is for that reason that I rise to speak—for that reason and the fact that a fine man has been defamed by a shameless "reporter" and an irresponsible magazine. Their article has done its damage, the magazine has achieved its goal of sensationalism, and it has caused widespread comment, but all of these petty and shortsighted goals have been achieved at the fearful sacrifice of truth.

RICE AS THE STAFF OF LIFE

Mr. GATHINGS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arkansas?

There was no objection.

Mr. GATHINGS. Mr. Speaker, when you consider the world production and value of the 10 most important commodities and materials, rice is on the top of the list. More than one-half of the total world population looks to rice as the staff of life as it provides 80 percent of the food for more than 50 percent of all the people over the globe. There must be a reason for such a universal and wide acceptance of rice. It is one of the most versatile of all foods.

A well-balanced diet consists of four general classifications—the milk and dairy products, meats, fruits and vegetables, and cereals and bread. Rice is a part of two of these four great food groups, being classified in the fruit and vegetable and bread and cereal food groups. Rice works so well with all of these major classifications of foods. As main dishes it harmonizes with meats, fish, poultry, and seafood dishes. As for use in desserts, it combines with milk and dairy products as well as with eggs as an ingredient, along with sugar and starches. So rice is one of our most versatile foods which is adaptable to dishes for use in any season of the year and at every meal.

There are three principal kinds of rice—white milled rice, long, medium, and short grain, brown rice, and parboiled rice. There are many byproducts of rice, including rice flour, rice oil, rice hulls, rice polish, and rice bran.

White rice contains nutrients of the finest biological value, including protein, calcium, iron, carbohydrates, vitamins of

the B complex, and a bit of fat. Rice is wholesome, economical, tasty, palatable, as well as nutritious. It is quite easy to prepare. Boiled rice is one of the most acceptable and widely severed rice dishes. For usual servings for a family of from four to six people here is all that is required in preparation: three cups of water with a teaspoon of salt placed in a cooking vessel. Bring to a boil. Pour in 1 cup of white rice, either long, medium, or short grain, or parboiled. Place cover on vessel, turn down to low heat, and cook for 22 minutes. It is ready to serve usually with butter or margarine. To make more flavorful, a couple of pats of margarine or butter may be added before cooking.

Some of the vast number of recipes which were made available by the Washton Embassies include: From the Embassy of Turkey; dolmas—stuffed vegetables; from the Embassy of Brazil: chicken soup with rice; from the Embassy of France: entrements au riz; from the Embassy of Indonesia: fried rice; from the Embassy of Cambodia: royal rice; from the Embassy of Germany: rice a la trautmannsdorff; from the Embassy of Iran: loobia polau; from the Embassy of Italy: rice croquettes; from the Embassy of Mexico: arroz a la Mexicana; from the Embassy of Saudi Arabia: rice with lamb and nuts; from the Embassy of Israel: Palestine rice plate; from the Embassy of Australia: creamed rice with apricot sauce; from the Embassy of the Philippines: royal rice cake; from the Embassy of Japan: rice is best as is.

My favorite rice recipe, rice with mushrooms, is as follows: One cup uncooked rice; one can consommé; one small can mushrooms; one-eighth pound butter or margarine. Melt margarine in skillet. Add rice and fry until it pops or swells. Put rice in a baking dish and add the consommé and mushrooms. Cook 45 minutes in oven at 350 degrees.

Thanks to Mrs. John Cooper, West Memphis, for first introducing me to this.

The Rice Council for Market Development sponsors two major yearly rice events: National Rice Week March 17 through 23, and the October Rice Harvest Festival. It is comprised of rice growers, mills, and all segments of the rice industry in the States of Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. The council is a voluntary organization devoted to the promotion of rice at home and abroad.

The rice industry is most appreciative of the fine cooperation accorded it by Capitol Architect J. George Stewart, who operates Capitol restaurants and cafeterias, together with Mr. Kermit Cowan, who is superintendent of the House Restaurant and Cafeteria, and Mr. Robert S. Sonntag who is in charge of the Senate facilities, in serving rice to all of its patrons on Wednesday, March 20, 1963. Green rice was enjoyed by several hundred Members of the Senate, House of Representatives, press news media, Capitol Hill employees and visitors.

The work of the rice council in promotion of rice in foreign markets could not be accomplished without the cooperation and work of the Foreign Agricultural Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Rice Export Development Association. The Department of Agriculture has been most helpful to the industry in the administration of Public Law 480 consistently since its passage in 1955.

U.N. CORRECTS PROJECT: CANCELLATION BETTER SOLUTION

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend my remarks, and to include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I wish to inform our colleagues that the United Nations has agreed to correct a Special Fund project which has been the cause of concern in this House.

I am glad to see the U.N. admit a mistake and correct it. Now, I hope they will admit that this whole project is a mistake and cancel it. The project would provide radioactive isotopes to a Communist bloc nation—that is not the sort of thing Americans should be helping provide for Communists. At the very least American financial support—a planned $218,560—should be withdrawn.

The project to which I refer is that for nuclear research in Yugoslavia about which I first advised this House February 25, in the early stages of my investigation, into the foreign aid funds of the United Nations—a large measure of which American taxpayers provide.

The Special Fund of the U.N. has agreed to revise and correct the authorization for this $1.7 million project. The House will recall that the Special Fund—40 percent financed by American taxpayers—will contribute $546,400 to this project.

In a restricted U.N. document the project is called an agriculture research project. But, in fact, the proposed authorization clearly provided for research in agriculture, and also for a Federal center for general nuclear research in Red Yugoslavia.

I carried an objection about that authorization to the United Nations and to the U.S. Department of State, after I had advised the House of my concern. Today, I can report that I have been informed by Assistant Secretary of State Frederick G. Dutton and by U.N. Special Fund Managing Director Paul G. Hoffman, that the final contract for this project will provide clearly and specifically that the nuclear research may pertain only to agriculture.

However, I trust that the House will note that radioactive isotopes, once provided for this project, might be used for many purposes other than agricultural research. And, the United Nations very limited checking system on its projects makes it unlikely that it, or the United States, would ever know what the isotopes actually were used for. For instance, isotopes can be used to trace the flow of liquids and gases in pipelines, to test and measure metals, and in connection with biological and chemical warfare.

The American delegation to the U.N. and our State Department fell sound asleep on this job and would have allowed this project to have been agreed to, complete with a loophole, so that Communist Yugoslavia could have gained knowledge in a nuclear research center using U.N. aid subsidized 40 percent by American taxpayers.

Luckily, congressional inquiry stirred the bureaucrats from that snooze and dream fantasy of one-worldism, and I trust they will stay awake from now on to veto this project; and to check upon just where U.S. contributions to the U.N.'s ballooning foreign aid program go. I can only wonder how loudly they were snoring when the Fund approved that $1.2 million to aid Red Cuban agriculture—to say nothing of the 11 other U.N. aid projects approved for Cuba.

Ambassador Stevenson of our U.N. delegation agreed with me that the original Yugoslav project authorization could conceivably be misinterpreted. Mr. Hoffman said he felt the original provision was somewhat ambiguous.

Secretary Dutton, acting for the Secretary of State, informed me that the State Department—belatedly—understands my concern about the language of the original authorization. An officer of that Department informed the United Nations that the authorization was incorrect.

I hope the State Department understands equally well my opposition to the nuclear research project, in toto—corrected or uncorrected. Radioactive isotopes are critical items in this atomic age. Americans never should provide them or finance the purchase of them for a Communist nation.

Mr. Speaker, I will include in the RECORD pertinent portions of the correspondence documenting the U.N.'s project correction:

REPRESENTATIVE HALL TO MR. PAUL HOFFMAN, FEBRUARY 21, 1963

DEAR MR. HOFFMAN: I would like to ask you for clarification of the intentions of the Special Fund and the International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with a project approved but not yet started entitled "Nuclear Research and Training in Agriculture" in Yugoslavia.

I find in studying the Special Fund pamphlets on this project that it calls for a "Federal center for nuclear research and training and for the application of nuclear research to the field of agriculture. That would indicate that the Federal center is a separate facility from the agriculture research. I would appreciate receiving detailed comments about this.

DURWARD G. HALL,
Member of Congress.

REPRESENTATIVE HALL TO SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK, U.N. AMBASSADOR STEVENSON, MR. PAUL HOFFMAN, FEBRUARY 25, 1963

Mr. ———: A matter of serious concern has come to my attention in connection with a United Nations' project under the Special Fund. The project is in Yugoslavia and is entitled "Nuclear Research and Training in Agriculture."

May I call your attention to the "restricted" publication of the Special Fund dated March 22, 1962, and covering the recommendations of the Fund's managing director for approval of the nuclear research project.

In paragraph 5 of the publication under the subheading "III—The Project" I find the first sentence which states:

"The request calls for a Federal center for nuclear research and training and for the application of nuclear research to solve practical problems in the various fields of agriculture."

My concern arises from the construction of that sentence detailing the aims and goals of the project. As the sentence reads it authorizes development in two directions (1) to solve problems in agriculture and (2) to provide for a nuclear research and training center.

DURWARD G. HALL,
Member of Congress.

MR. PAUL HOFFMAN TO REPRESENTATIVE HALL, MARCH 4, 1963

MY DEAR MR. HALL: I acknowledge receipt of your letters of February 21 and 25, 1963, relating to the Special Fund project in Yugoslavia entitled "Nuclear Research and Training in Agriculture."

I wish to offer the following comments in reply to your inquiry:

1. From paragraph 2 of the Governing Council document dated March 22, 1962, and referred to by your letters, you will see that the Yugoslav Government already operates an Institute for Application of Nuclear Research in Agriculture, Forestry, and Veterinary Sciences at Zemun and that institutions applying nuclear research methods are found also at four other locations in the country.

2. Through provision of international experts, equipment and fellowships for studying abroad, the Special Fund is assisting in upgrading and expanding the Institute at Zemun, as detailed in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of the mentioned document. The Federal center mentioned in line 1 of paragraph 5 is synonymous with the Institute at Zemun mentioned in paragraph 2.

3. The phrasing of the first sentence of paragraph 5 quoted by your letter of February 25 is admittedly somewhat ambiguous. The essence of the sentence is that the request calls for a Federal center which will apply nuclear research to solve practical problems in the various fields of agriculture.

PAUL HOFFMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE HALL TO MR. HOFFMAN, MARCH 7, 1963

DEAR MR. HOFFMAN: Thank you for your letter of March 4, providing me with information about the operation of your Special Fund and answering my specific questions. It is of great value to me and to the Congress to receive cooperation from international civil servants in our consideration of the Special Fund during this time when it is being questioned in the United States and in the Congress.

With regard to paragraphs 2 and 3 of your letter may I ask if any action has been taken by your office to set straight the ambiguity that you and I both see in the first sentence of paragraph 5 of the Special Fund document mentioned as it concerns the Federal center for nuclear research. If not, might I suggest that you issue a specific directive clearing up this loophole officially by proclaiming that the Federal center is indeed synonymous with the Institute at Zemun and providing that under no circumstances is the Special Fund project to involve any nuclear research other than that involved with plant and animal agricultural research. It seems to me that action by you would clear the air and eliminate the problem.

DURWARD G. HALL,
Member of Congress.

AMBASSADOR STEVENSON TO REPRESENTATIVE HALL, MARCH 8, 1963

DEAR CONGRESSMAN HALL: I was glad to have your views on the United Nations' Special Fund for Nuclear Research and Training in Agriculture project in Yugoslavia. As a result, I have undertaken some special homework on my own and am now in a position to share a few thoughts with you.

This particular project, like 289 others currently being implemented under U.N. Special Fund auspices, was first approved by the Governing Council. This Government took an active role in the establishment of the Special Fund some years ago and, as a member of the Governing Council, the U.S. representative devotes considerable attention to each recommendation of the Managing Director. This was particularly true with respect to the Yugoslav project to which you refer.

Following a thorough review by the Governing Council, the plan was approved in May 1962. The International Atomic Energy Agency was asked to serve as executing authority. Incidentally, the Italian representative was particularly praiseworthy of Yugoslav efforts in this field and encouraged adoption of the project.

While I agree that the purpose as stated in paragraph 5 of the Special Fund document you mentioned in your letter could conceivably be misinterpreted, subparagraphs a, b, and c are, in my mind, crystal clear. You will note that following the opening statement:

"The request calls for a Federal center for nuclear research and training and for the application of nuclear research to solve practical problems in the various fields of agriculture."

The document specifies:

"The Institution will deal with the following major subjects:

"(a) Soil fertility and plant nutrition, including methods for laboratory assessment of the phosphorous status of the soil and methods of application of phosphorous fertilizers; studies of leaching of plant nutrients; study of soil moisture in connection with irrigation; grafting work in orchard and grape cultures; and studies on the absorption of plant nutrients by plants from the soil and on their movements and accumulation within the plant;

"(b) plant breeding, using irradiation as a supplement to conventional breeding methods, in order to produce mutants of agricultural crops and forest trees; and

"(c) animal husbandry, including protein nutrition studies of poultry and thyroid activity as a guide in nutrition studies of beef cattle."

ADLAI E. STEVENSON.

REPRESENTATIVE HALL TO AMBASSADOR STEVENSON, MARCH 12, 1963

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Thank you for your letter of March 8 providing me with information about the Special Fund and the particular Yugoslav project with which I expressed concern.

Since you agree that paragraph 5 of the U.N. document we discussed "could conceivably be misinterpreted," may I ask if any action has been taken by your office to set straight the ambiguity that you and I both see. I agree with you that the later subparagraphs are clear, but these subparagraphs do not change the major premise to which you and I object.

Since the major concern of the Congress appears to be the relative lack of postappropriation checking on how the Special Fund spends money provided chiefly by American taxpayers, I feel it would serve a useful purpose for the American delegation to initiate a clarification of the paragraph in question proclaiming that the Federal center is indeed synonymous with the Institute at Zemun and providing specifically and in clear English that under no circumstances is the Special Fund project to include any nuclear research other than that involved with plant and animal agricultural research. Clarification will hurt nobody and will ease the way of the Special Fund when this Congress reaches the question of foreign aid appropriations.

DURWARD G. HALL,
Member of Congress.

MR. PAUL HOFFMAN TO REPRESENTATIVE HALL, MARCH 13, 1963

DEAR CONGRESSMAN HALL: Thank you for your letter of March 7 which awaited my return to New York today.

With regard to its second paragraph, I should like to inform you that the plan of operation for the Yugoslav project is about to be signed by the Yugoslav Government, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Special Fund. I can assure you that this tripartite contract for the implementation of the project will not contain the ambiguity which appears in paragraph 5 of Special Fund document SF/R.5/Add.40. It will, on the other hand, conform to the correct description of the purpose and activities of the project as set forth elsewhere in the rest of that document.

PAUL HOFFMAN.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE DUTTON TO REPRESENTATIVE HALL, MARCH 13, 1963

DEAR CONGRESSMAN HALL: I want to thank you for your letter of February 25, 1963, concerning the United Nations Special Fund project in Yugoslavia covering nuclear research and training in agriculture which has been referred to me for reply.

I note your inquiry concerning the precise meaning of paragraph 5 of the Special Fund document covering this project. An officer of the Department has spoken with Mr. Clinton Rehling, assistant to Mr. Paul Hoffman of the Special Fund, who has informed him that the language in paragraph 5 is incorrect and that in the publication of the final project agreement the present incorrect language will be appropriately modified. The first sentence of paragraph 5 will then read:

"The request calls for a Federal center for nuclear research and training in agriculture and for the application of nuclear research to solve practical problems in the various fields of agriculture."

I can well understand your concern about the language as it stands in the original document and appreciate your inquiry which will lead to its being more accurately expressed in the final project agreement.

FREDERICK G. DUTTON,
(For the Secretary of State).

TAX CREDITS FOR ADDITIONAL WORKERS HIRED BY EMPLOYERS

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Speaker, I am introducing today a bill which can contribute greatly to the solution of our rising unemployment through the traditional American system of free enterprise. The bill which I am presenting would encourage private employment by providing tax credits for

additional workers hired by those employers who conduct our trades and businesses. The measure, which was suggested in an article appearing in the Chicago Tribune several weeks ago, has been advanced by Mr. R. Edwin Moore, chairman of the Bell & Gossett Co., a typical American business developed through the opportunities afforded by our free system. This measure would give the employer credit for each added worker over the average number of employees on the payroll during the previous 3 years. And—in the case of a 100-percent increase, the employer would be entitled to a 1-percent reduction in his corporate tax rate. This incentive would continue until a maximum of 10-percent reduction in corporate tax rate had been achieved.

This measure would encourage greater employment in private industry and would add to the incentives so necessary to stimulate our economic growth and progress. Not only is there incentive for the employer, but for the individual who seeks gainful employment and brings personal skills and talents to the labor market in return for a fair wage and the satisfaction of knowing he is earning his way. There is incentive here for the men and women to whom private employment is the American way of life and who are reluctant to participate in a "made work" program which threatens to destroy our economy and reduce this once proud Nation to a welfare state.

This is not a gimmick nor a device to be taken lightly. Rather, it is a practical and workable method of helping to resolve a national problem in a manner consistent with our American system. It avoids the theories and schemes and the alien philosophies which appear to motivate some so-called economists who have captured the ear of our President. This is a practical businessman's solution. It deserves the fullest consideration in the very serious efforts with which we are engaged—those of demonstrating the adaptability of our free enterprise system to meet the needs of our expanding population in a rapidly changing economy.

U.S. LOAN TO BRAZIL

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Speaker, Brazil and our State Department are now wrapping up a U.S. loan which may range up to $200 million. Negotiations started under a bit of a pall when it was announced from Rio that Finance Minister Dantas was coming here to get the money so Brazil could build a trade program with Russia.

At interviews here, Mr. Dantas further admitted that the money would be used to develop trade with Russia. Then the Brazilian Embassy issued a statement denying any such purpose and claimed that Mr. Dantas misunderstood the question.

The Brazilian Embassy further stated:

> Any forthcoming American credits to Brazil will be used exclusively to finance the importation of U.S. goods and services and for repayment of commitments to U.S. creditors.

If this is so, then there is no need to deliver the money to Brazil, the United States should retain it and make the payments direct to the American creditors; but if the money is delivered to Brazil, it will find its way into the Communist trade program.

One could no more keep this money separate and aloof from such Red negotiations than one could pour a glass of cream from off the top of a bottle of homogenized milk.

The American Ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, testified before the House Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee that the Government of Brazil was infiltrated with Communists. The State Department, seeing congressional opposition to the Soviet trade loan building up, issued a statement that must appear ludicrous to the rest of the world. It said that Communist infiltration of the Brazilian Government is not sufficient "to have a substantial influence on Brazilian Government policy."

Yet, 3 members of the 15-man Brazilian Cabinet are notorious Marxists, 2 others were former Communist Party members. Goulart's press secretary is a self-declared Communist. The powerful National Industrial Workers Confederation, which unites industrial unions, is under Communist control. The big oil monopoly, Petrobras, is run by an extreme leftwinger.

If the loan is to be used to further Brazil-Red trade, it should not be made regardless of the pleas that Brazil's economy is in poor condition. If the money is to be delivered to the Brazilian Government, the loan should not be made because it will find its way into the program to promote Communist trade.

ARE FEDERAL SUBSIDIES ABUSED?

Mr. FOREMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend my remarks, and to include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

Mr. FOREMAN. Mr. Speaker, we hear much today about the need for Federal Government subsidies to assist us in our various responsibilities—education, transportation, medical care, urban renewal, and others—that should be taken care of on the local level. We see, read, and hear much about dollars in the form of Federal aid, but I am fearful that we do not understand that with Federal aid we also get Federal control and regulation.

This continually growing bureaucratic control and regimentation of our lives is the greatest single enemy today against our freedom as individuals. We need to awaken again the spirit in America that individual freedom, incentive and the desire to be free are the building blocks upon which was founded the greatest country ever known in the history of mankind.

We have freedom, which sometimes we tend to take for granted, having had it so long we are not really conscious of what it is. While we have the courage and will to die for freedom, we sometimes wonder if we have the guts to live for freedom.

It is particularly refreshing to me to see those seemingly few dedicated individuals today who are living and working and fighting to preserve this precious inheritance. My friend, Mr. Ben H. Wooten, chairman of the board of the First National Bank in Dallas, Tex., is one such individual. A living example and dynamic exponent of the free-enterprise system, Ben Wooten travels thousands of miles each year speaking to Americans about their precious heritage, their freedom and their responsibilities.

We had the honor and privilege of having this free enterprise spokesman visit our west Texas area this month to speak at the annual chamber of commerce banquet in Pecos, Tex. I commend Ben Wooten for the very excellent, nonpartisan, thought-provoking message he delivered.

I would like, unanimous consent, to include Mr. Ben Wooten's remarks in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at this point:

THE WILL TO BE ECONOMICALLY FREE

(By Ben H. Wooten, chairman of the board, First National Bank in Dallas, annual chamber of commerce banquet, Pecos, Tex., Tuesday, March 12, 1963)

Anyone is honored by an invitation to talk to this outstanding group. If I were able to coin beautiful and expressive phrases at will, I could better tell you of my gratitude for being with you this evening. My mind wanders down memory lane and dwells upon my most precious possessions—friends. Friendships have been likened unto the homing ships that touch our evening shores; unto the flowers fair that sweeten the desert air; unto the stars that slip out at night and give us light after the sun has gone away.

There is a poem I like very much:

"It is always a joy in life to find,
At every turn of the road,
A strong arm of the comrade kind,
To help me onward with my load.

"And since I have no gold to give,
'Tis love must make amends,
It is my prayer that while I live,
God shall make me worthy of my friends."

I trust that God shall make me worthy of my friends in Pecos.

My subject is an abiding one, namely, "The Will To Be Economically Free." I have no apologies for the seriousness of my talk and it is completely nonpartisan.

In the din of battle with accompanying stresses and strains, men do not falter in pushing the fray even to death in order that freedom survives. Yet, history tells us again and again that in order to keep freedom, we must daily live it, embrace it economically as well as guard it militarily.

With Kipling, let us pray:

"God of our fathers, known of old,
Lord of our far flung battle lines,
Beneath whose awful hands we hold,
Dominion over palm and pine.
Lord, God of Hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget, lest we forget."

We must not forget that the economic fallacy of continuously spending more than we collect will ultimately do for us what it

has done for every people in history—namely, financial destruction and poverty. A broke United States would truly be a world tragedy. We must not forget that nations, like individuals, are financially broke when their liabilities exceed their assets. This is a simple financial and economic fact easily understood—one that cannot be circumvented.

Robert Louis Stevenson once said: "Soon or late everybody sits down to his banquet of consequences." Regardless of the amount of wealth possessed by our Nation, if we continue in our annual deficits and unbalanced payments, we will finally come to the banquet of consequences that result from further depreciation of the dollar. We, of course, will spend whether at a deficit or not any amount necessary to defend our country, but certainly, until the great danger is past, we should not adopt any new give-away plans abroad or at home.

Back in the year 1932, one of the presidential candidates said along with other things that, if elected, his party would support laws establishing a minimum wage, unemployment insurance, medical care, a 30-hour week and improved workmen's compensation. He further stated that his party would support spending $5 billion annually for relief and another $5 billion for public works. He favored Federal aid to agriculture and socialization of power. His party wanted steep increases in income and inheritance taxes and a tax on the interest of Government securities. He also asked Federal aid for homeowners who had mortgage problems. This platform was offered the American people by the presidential candidate of the Socialist Party. He did not win the office of president but his platform cast before it the shadow of coming events. It is not my purpose today to discuss the merits of any individual plank in the Socialist candidate's program; however, we must, in the light of present-day policies and laws, admit that in the main his socialistic ideas have prevailed in the United States.

I once read an article by a young man who said: "I favor private enterprise because I am poor. I would never be happy to be a mere cog in the wheel. I could never be happy were every choice concerning my life made by someone else. I would rather be poor and live under the freedom and opportunities that private enterprise offers than to be rich and live in a penthouse on Manhattan Island under the restrictions of national socialism."

Like the young man who favored private enterprise, let us remember that economic freedom is a personal thing, a precious thing to be valued much greater than subsistence security. There is no economic reason whatever for us to surrender the mastery of our individual fate to the state. We have the highest living standard in the world under our unique American system, and we should never tamper with success. Every American should keep in mind that if he becomes a ward of the state, he will no longer be a free man.

Woodrow Wilson said: "Liberty has never come from the government. Liberty has always come from the subjects of it. The history of liberty is a history of limitations of governmental power, not the increase of it."

Judge Louis D. Brandeis said: "Experience should teach us to be more on our guard to protect our liberties when the government's purposes are beneficient."

Benjamin Franklin said: "They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither safety nor liberty."

During the past 5 or 6 years especially, we have heard a great deal and witnessed the followthrough of at least one philosophy of Abraham Lincoln, namely, "You cannot further the brotherhood of man by encouraging class hatred." We do not quarrel with this statement; however, we direct attention to other admonitions of Mr. Lincoln just as important, just as vital and deserving of as much attention as the one quoted above. We regret that these admonitions appear to be ignored by a large segment of our people in authority. Mr. Lincoln gave us nine essential economic "cannots" all worthy of our deep concern. They are as follows:

"(1) You cannot keep out of trouble by spending more than you earn.

"(2) You cannot help the wage earner by pulling down the wage payer.

"(3) You cannot establish sound security on borrowed money.

"(4) You cannot strengthen the weak by weakening the strong.

"(5) You cannot bring about prosperity by discouraging thrift.

"(6) You cannot help little men by tearing down big men.

"(7) You cannot help the poor by destroying the rich.

"(8) You cannot help men permanently by doing for them what they could do for themselves.

"(9) You cannot build character and courage by taking away men's initiative and independence."

In effect, these great Americans—Messrs. Wilson, Brandeis, Franklin, and Lincoln—say that the socialist state makes beggars out of proud men, cowards of strong men, and serfs of freemen. The socialist state ultimately brings inflation through the deficit door and continued spiraling inflation always produces restrictions on personal liberties.

Inflation has long been the greatest destroyer of freedom in the world. Deficit financing is inflationary. When the value of a nation's money is lost, some kind of dictatorship usually takes hold in order to avoid complete chaos. We would be reminded that since 1946 the value of the dollar has gone down 21½ cents.

We may well ask what can you and I do about it. The antidote is a renewed faith in God, in ourselves, in the American tradition, and the principles under which we have reached the highest living standards of any people ever on earth. Let us emphasize thrift, courage, personal independence, a willingness to live for individual economic freedom, and support officeseekers that are dedicated in purpose and deed to the tenets of Americanism. Under drastic inflation the American people would suffer more intensely than the people of any other nation in history in that 90 percent of all the life insurance in the world is written in the United States. The security we have provided through insurance loses the exact amount as the dollar in circulation.

John Milton once said: "Awake, arise, or be forever fallen." This admonition was given 275 years ago, but it is applicable today to every American, so let's resolve that our individual freedoms shall not be further whittled away. We are firmly of the opinion that in the afternoon of life when the gold of the sunset has been driven away by the gray of the twilight, there will be more dignity, joy and comfort in living off what we have created for ourselves than in wondering for whom to vote in order to keep a socialistic stipend from being cut. Liberty is more precious than any governmental handout or subsidy.

We are reminded that Ella Wheeler Wilcox once wrote:

"One ship drives east, another west,
With the self-same gale that blows;
'Tis the set of the sail, and not the gale,
That determines the way we go."

It is certainly time for us to reexamine the setting of our economic sails and steer our financial ship of state into the harbor of a sound dollar and there permanently drop anchor.

An author whose name I do not know once wrote:

"Isn't it strange that princes and kings,
And clowns that caper in sawdust rings,
And common folk like you and me,
Are builders of eternity.

"To each is given a book of rules,
A shapeless mass, a bag of tools,
And each must make 'ere life has flown
A stumbling block or a stepping stone."

We know the rules of individual freedom and we have the tools to maintain and promote it. Let's resolve that we shall be stepping stones along the pathway of freedom and humbly pray that we shall have the will, the courage, and the determination to bear the personal economic risks of freedom and thus keep America what it is today—the most blessed place this side of Heaven.

LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Maryland?

There was no objection.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. Speaker, several months ago, we were expressing concern over a rash of violent crime in the District of Columbia. In the ensuing months, that rash has become a virulent fever. It is in a critical stage. I am not one who believes that crime can be prevented, or even abated, solely by rigid police methods. But law enforcement is an important and essential factor in securing the peace and guaranteeing the safety of citizens as they go about upon their lawful occasions. The Congress must not neglect to provide the legislative tools for law enforcement.

On March 15, 1963, the practice of investigative arrest in the District of Columbia was terminated by administrative order. I did not condone the practice and do not mourn it. Every reasonable man must be concerned, however, with the legal void created when the suspension of investigative arrest was not coordinated with the substitution of some constitutional alternative.

In fairness to the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, it is generally known that they did seasonably prepare a recommendation for authorizing judicial officers to require the giving of evidence relating to crimes. The Commissioners draft has not been offered as a bill, allegedly because it is the subject of an extended constitutional debate in some pigeonhole in the Justice Department.

With all deference to the able lawyers in the Justice Department, I would submit to the House that there are some Members here who are capable of considering constitutional issues. If there is to be a debate on this subject, let it be open, let it be free, and above all, let it begin.

I have, therefore, today introduced the draft legislation on this subject. It has been neither ratified by the Bureau of the Budget nor confirmed by the Justice

Department. To be candid, I have not had an opportunity to research the constitutional history of this procedure and I cannot personally vouch for every word in this bill. I am offering it as a basis of discussion to encourage prompt action. The people of the Nation's Capital look to us for protection. We must act now to provide it.

THE CUBAN SITUATION

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, I have as of this date sent the following letter to the Secretary of State:

MARCH 21, 1963.

Hon. DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have called to the attention of the Congress, and to your agency, previously, my remarks in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of Thursday, March 14, and Monday, March 18, evidencing my concern over the existing open door of subversion through the Cuban Embassy and Cubana Airlines in Mexico City, which facilitates the visitation of not only Latin American but U.S. citizens as well to Cuba.

By the State Department's own announcement of January 16, 1961, such travel by U.S. citizens is in violation of the U.S. law, punishable by penalty of $5,000 or 5 years in jail, or both.

It is quite obvious that a number of persons visiting Cuba by this route are engaging in subversive activities and rendering services to the Castro Communist government, which appears obvious for two reasons, the first being that Cuban Embassy approval, thus Castro government approval, is necessary and, secondly, some of those known to have visited Cuba since the State Department announcement have known Communist backgrounds.

This open door to subversion in this hemisphere obviously must be closed and I am therefore asking that a strong protest be made to the Mexican Government, urging that government to withhold flight permission from any and all U.S. citizens who attempt, contrary to U.S. laws, to secure passage to Cuba and to demand that the Cuban Government stop issuing visas to those citizens and that all other Latin American governments be encouraged to make a similar demand of Mexico.

I am requesting that unified action by all the Latin American countries in this respect be taken up by the State Department through the Organization of American States, believing that a strongly worded protest from that Organization and from a number of Latin American nations and the United States could result in closing this open door to subversion.

I am further recommending that the State Department consider, in the event the Mexican Government does not heed this protest, that Alliance for Progress funds be withheld from Mexico until this necessary action is taken.

I am further requesting that the State Department, in cooperation with the Department of Justice, seek immediate prosecution of persons known to have violated the law, title 8, United States Code, section 1185, particularly in view of the fact that some of these persons who have visited Cuba since January 16, 1961, are known to have Communist backgrounds and others have openly and notoriously evidenced their recent visitations to Cuba in the Worker and the Peoples World, Communist front newspapers. Public statements emanating from the State Department to the effect that prosecution is difficult would seem to be without substance in view of the notoriety some of these Cuban travelers are providing themselves.

I would be delighted to discuss this matter with you or your representative at your convenience and to make available to you such information as I have. I also suggest that the House Un-American Activities Committee has a copy of the list of some 73 U.S. citizens who, in the short period of 4 months, illegally visited Cuba through this open door of subversion through Mexico, the list of which I turned over to the committee and I am sure the committee would make it available to your Department. I have already asked that this list be made available to the Justice Department.

With best wishes, I am,

Sincerely,

WILLIAM C. CRAMER,
Member of Congress.

Mr. Speaker, I have previously set forth in the RECORD some 73 U.S. citizens who have gone to Cuba despite the fact it is illegal.

BIPARTISAN OPPOSITION

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, the St. Louis Globe-Democrat has a well-deserved reputation as one of the fairest, most forthright newspapers in the country. In its lead editorial of March 6, the Globe focuses a clear and timely light on the subject of "Bipartisan Opposition," noting that:

The fact is, antagonism for the sterile policy Mr. Kennedy improvises at Cuba is itself bipartisan. Responsible Members of Congress are Americans first, party members second. If they fear an administration shuffling into critical national hazard, they have an obligation to oppose policy.

BIPARTISAN OPPOSITION

Administration spokesmen, even the President by his attitude, are blaming Republican politics for the bristling worry in Congress and the wide public disenchantment over Kennedy policy in Cuba.

But far more than that is at the root of national anxiety about our acute fumbling at Cuba.

Many Democrats have joined GOP Members of Congress in opposition, at least in open criticism, of New Frontier ploys in the Castro-Soviet issue.

The deep concern transcends politics. It is a rising fear that the country, under Mr. Kennedy's vacillating tactics and endless temporizing, nurtures in Cuba the military and subversive seeds of Communist takeover throughout Latin America—eventually a bloodless Moscow triumph in the Western Hemisphere.

The lament is heard in Washington that politics should end at the water's edge; bipartisan backing ought to rally behind the President's Cuba policy—no matter apparently what it is. Closed ranks will always be true in time of war. It is neither wise nor realistic under present conditions.

The fact is antagonism for the sterile policy Mr. Kennedy improvises at Cuba is itself bipartisan. Responsible Members of Congress are Americans first, party members, second. If they fear an administration shuffling into critical national hazard, they have an obligation to oppose policy.

This is precisely what has been happening on Capitol Hill. The back-and-fill conduct of the New Frontier at the time of the abortive Cuban blockade—and subsequent hand-sitting as Russia builds its Castro redoubt for a spread of subversion, sabotage and Red revolution through Central and South America—have evoked sincere and urgent warnings from both sides of the aisle in Congress.

Naturally, Republican leaders have led one contingent of opposition to the Cuba involvement. Senator KEATING of New York has been the chief Jeremiah over the Red Cuban buildup. So right and so ahead of administration information has he proved he has seemed Delphic. Senator DIRKSEN, of Illinois, has been articulate over failure to come to grips with the Cuba problem. Senator HICKENLOOPER, of Iowa, wants a full-dress review.

Senator HUGH SCOTT, of Pennsylvania, pertinently demands baring of secret communications between the White House and Khrushchev, to see if a deal was made to vacate European bases in return for removal of Moscow big missiles from Cuba.

But many Democrats have shown frank criticism and dismay over administration helplessness or accommodation at Cuba. Such comment has been voiced by Senators STENNIS, LAUSCHE, THURMOND, and HOLLAND. House Speaker MCCORMACK tersely called the attack on an American shrimp boat an act of aggression. Senator RUSSELL, of Georgia, urged a policy of hot pursuit, in which he was joined by ultraliberal Congressman CLAUDE PEPPER, of Florida.

Four investigations of the Cuba policy are underway in Congress. A probe of the Soviet buildup has been undertaken by Senator STENNIS. Senator DODD, of Connecticut, is launching a probe into pro-Castro activities in the United States. Representative SELDEN, of Alabama, has his Foreign Affairs Subcommittee looking into Cuba subversion in Latin America. Liberal Senator FRANK CHURCH, of Idaho, is inquiring into the administration's failure to halt U.N. aid to Castro.

All these committee heads, of course, are Democrats.

There is bipartisan opposition to Kennedy Cuban policies, which have so far been largely impotent and promise no improvement.

It is overt misrepresentation to impute the Cuba policy critiques to partisan politics.

When the President stiffens his policy, more accurately develops an intelligent policy for the Cuban issue, he will get all the bipartisan support he wants. Unless he starts to do something about Cuba, bipartisan opposition will continue—and mount.

OLD FRIENDS IN COSTA RICA

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, I call to the attention of the House an editorial from the Richmond News Leader dated Tuesday, March 19, 1963, entitled "Old Friends in Costa Rica," which contains some rather revealing information concerning leftwing and Communist activities in Central and South America.

As the record shows, I have on a number of occasions, based upon established facts, asked that a careful evaluation of President Romulo Betancourt's previous affiliations be made by the United States, as well as, in light of those past facts, that careful consideration be given to all present evidences that perhaps all is not as well in Venezuela under the Betancourt regime as appears on the surface.

This editorial also brings into interesting focus the activities of a number of the radical left leaders in Central and South America for closer examination.

I also include an editorial by Constantine Brown which appeared in the Washington Star on March 16, 1963, entitled "Our Image Is Anti-Communist, But Washington Buffets Conservatives Around the World, Observer Says." This editorial of coincidental actions which have had the effect of toppling or making less stable the governments of conservatives throughout the rest of the world, is an interesting corollary to the Richmond News Leader editorial which indicates the New Frontier's results are similar in Latin America, whether intentional or otherwise.

The editorial points out that President Betancourt, of Venezuela, formed, and was honorary president of, the IADF, the Inter-American Association for Democracy and Freedom, in 1950 and that the first conference of this ultra leftwing organization was attended by Jose Figureres, Haya de la Torre, Muñoz-Marín, Victor Andrade, and others, and in the late 1950's Betancourt and Figueres were joined by Fidel Castro. The three of them formed the "Pact of Caracas" and by 1958 the Betancourt junta had toppled the Government of Venezuela. "Less than a month after Betancourt's election in December of 1958, Castro was in power in Cuba."

A second conference of the IADF was held in 1960 in Caracas and was attended by a delegation of eight from Cuba, together with other leftist leaders, including Cheddi Jagan.

Further consideration should be given to the ultraliberals who have taken over in other countries, including the Presidents of Mexico, the Dominican Republic, British Guinea, and Brazil, and the efforts of Betancourt to assist in the election of his good friend and ultraliberal who opposed the present President of Chile. The pattern is becoming rather obvious and I think it is time for the people of the United States to realize what is happening throughout the world, the result of the new pattern being that the conservatives in governments throughout the world are having a difficult time and are being replaced in many instances.

I submit the following two editorials for the attention of the House:

[From the Richmond (Va.) News Leader, Mar. 19, 1963]

OLD FRIENDS IN COSTA RICA

As President Kennedy begins talks in Costa Rica today, American warships ride uneasily off the coast and security arrangements on land are as tight as those in Caracas when the President made his Venezuelan tour in 1961. The reason is that Manuel Mora Valverde, head of the Costa Rican Communist Party and brother-in-law to Romulo Betancourt, has announced in advance that the Communists will not take the responsibility for any disaster. The six Central American countries at the San Jose Conference are scared of Castro; and those who are crying the loudest for action are those who brought Castro to power and were still praising him in 1961.

Mr. Kennedy is at San Jose to boost the prestige of the year-old Socialist regime of Francisco Orlich, figurehead for the party of Jose Figueres. The relative stability of Costa Rica is due to the sound economic development attracted by the previous conservative regime of Mario Echandi. Echandi was the first Latin American to be elected in U.N.-supervised elections; a real anti-Communist, he tolerated training camps in Costa Rica for the 1961 Cuban invasion at a time when Figueres and his friends were still praising Castro.

Venezuela's Betancourt is of course not at the conference, although his exposed position on the Caribbean makes him vulnerable. But Betancourt has always worked closely with his fellow-revolutionary Figueres. In the late fifties, the two of them found a third friend whose views seemed identical to theirs. This congenial man was Fidel Castro. The three of them formed the ironically named "Pact of Caracas" (where the hated Jiminez held sway); and by 1958 the Betancourt junta had toppled the government of Venezuela. Less than a month after Betancourt's election in December of 1958, Castro was in power in Cuba.

By January 1959, Figueres began to doubt Castro's reliability. The former U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, Whiting Willauer, has testified that Figueres had helped Castro with arms and ammunition. "You and your liberal group of Betancourt, Muñoz Marín, and others, of course, put this man into power, or at least supported him very strongly," Willauer told Figueres one day over lunch; "I feel that the chances are very strong that he will be dominated by communism, if he is not already a Communist." Figueres said he was "worried," and would consult with his friends at Betancourt's inauguration in February. But still Figueres went to Havana in March at Castro's invitation; he was insulted, ignored, and had the microphone ripped away from him in the middle of his congratulatory speech.

Yet, as late as 1961, members of the Figueres-Betancourt group were still praising the Cuban revolution and boasting of the support they had given. An interesting publication of the Inter-American Association for Democracy and Freedom gives the whole story. The founder and honorary president of the IADF is Betancourt himself, who organized the group in 1950 while he was an exile in Havana. The first conference was a rollcall of the leading revolutionaries of South America: Figueres, Haya de la Torre, Muñoz Marín, Victor Andrade, and other names better known to Latins.

The first purpose of the IADF was to return Betancourt to power; and when that was accomplished in 1958, the occasion was celebrated, according to the official account, with "a dinner which proved one of the most dramatic and symbolic moments of IADF history."

Thus by 1960 the IADF was able to hold its second conference in Caracas, with Betancourt as host. There were no qualms about admitting a delegation of eight from the worker's Cuba or British Guiana's Cheddi Jagan. The Secretary General presented a report on the IADF's interventions in the Western Hemisphere, a report climaxed by a proud account of support for the Cuban revolution (see below).

Special awards were announced for Figueres, Muñoz Marín, Adolf Berle, and Herbert L. Matthews, of the New York Times (the last-named for "consistent articles clarifying the democratic struggle"). The report concluded by admitting that "the IADF organized literally hundreds of meetings, seminars, roundtable discussions, mass public meetings, luncheons, and dinners. We held numerous significant off-the-record meetings which had deep influence in many cases, in changing the attitudes of key personalities, and creating a climate of understanding, through private discussions of hemisphere problems."

All of this was published a year later, in 1961, when Castro's course had been unmistakably confirmed. Early in November 1961 Venezuela severed relations with Cuba in preparation for Mr. Kennedy's visit a few days later. An ill wind from Cuba began to fan the Marxist flames Betancourt and Figueres themselves had set. "I am a Marxist-Leninist and will be one until the day I die," said Castro on December 2. Castro is not dead, and his old friends in Costa Rica are very much alive. We hope they will examine their failure to detect that Marxist-Leninism before the shooting started.

[From the Richmond (Va.) News Leader, Mar. 19, 1963]

BETANCOURT PRAISES CUBAN REVOLUTION

(In 1961, just a few months before Venezuela severed relations with Cuba, Romulo Betancourt's Inter-American Association for Democracy and Freedom published the following account of its considerable support for the Cuban revolution. At the time of publication, the names listed in the last paragraph were still part of the Cuban regime. Editorial comment above.—EDITOR.)

Cuba's liberation from the dictatorship of Batista concerned us since the coup d'etat in 1952 when we began collecting materials; we made the first protest against Batista's betrayal of the scheduled elections.

From that date throughout the 5 years of the anti-Batista struggle, we constantly made public protests, arranged interviews for the leaders in exile with the press, facilitated the possibilities of journalists in reaching and seeing the revolutionary forces in Cuba; protesting in the United States the shipment of arms to Batista.

In the United States, IADE, for the 5 years of the anti-Batista struggle, continuously identified itself with the fighters for liberation; the secretary-general, as well as other members of our U.S. committee, talked before literally hundreds of meetings, explaining the aims of the struggle, and the brutalities against which they were fighting.

We assisted the spokesman for the revolutionary forces in the United States as elsewhere; we arranged press conferences for Dr. Urrutia, Dr. Llerena, Dr. Agramonte, and Dr. Chibas. We met in Mexico and elsewhere with Dr. Aureliano Sanchez Arango and others. We gave our constant encouragement and help to the hosts of Cuban patriots in New York, who gave so generously of their limited substance toward the liberation fight.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Mar. 16, 1963]

OUR IMAGE IS ANTI-COMMUNIST—BUT WASHINGTON BUFFETS CONSERVATIVES AROUND THE WORLD, OBSERVER SAYS

(By Constantine Brown)

Shortly before this reporer left Rome for a brief visit to Washington, he asked a Roman newspaperman what he believed was President Kennedy's image in Italy.

The reply was, "The Communists and leftists will always hate President Kennedy. But in the last year or so he has disappointed the right-of-center people. However, there are still those who look upon him as the man who will save the world—and naturally Italy—from communism."

This recalled a recent dinner conversation in Rome. The signora on my right asked, "Why does President Kennedy give such

warm support to Premier Fanfani? Fanfani has brought a left government to Italy."

I replied that the Kennedy New Frontier was itself a "progressive" Government in the belief that this policy would further its goal for coexistence and world peace, and naturally it tends to support leftist governments. The signora's surprise on learning this caused her to say, "But then we are lost. Italy—the whole world is—if America is not determined to destroy communism."

The above conversations came to mind when recently Senator HUMPHREY delayed the approval of the Foreign Relations Committee of Outerbridge Horsey as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

The reason, he said, was that Mr. Horsey had offended "some of the more liberal element" of the State Department when he was minister counselor in Rome and paid little special attention to the "leftist elements" in Italian politics.

It has been known for some time that members of our foreign service as well as those serving in the State Department in Washington must be exceptionally careful with whom they associate if they expect promotions. This has been so for the last 5 or 6 years and has been accentuated in the last 2 years.

In Rome Mr. Horsey was known for his independence in associating with those on both sides of the fence in the belief that this was the best way of obtaining a complete picture of Italian politics. But Senator HUMPHREY'S questioning of this sort of independence is serving as a warning to every member of the State Department at home and abroad.

The questioning of the Horsey appointment also brings clearly into view the basic foreign policy of the administration: that is, warm approval for leftist governments and frowns and sometimes hostility for those right of center. If one reviews the policies of the New Frontier over the last 2 years it becomes obvious that this was its intention from the beginning. To name a few instances in Laos we did not support the conservative element, but rather encouraged forcefully a neutral government with a "broad base." That is a government composed of conservative center and Communist elements.

We actually used a blackjack against the conservative Katangan leader Tshombe, preventing Katanga by force from being autonomous. Only recently we offended the Portuguese Salazar government when Assistant Secretary of State Mennen Williams stated that the United States favored self-determination of the Portuguese territory of Angola.

In Europe, Washington has frequently needled the conservative German Government. We scolded Ambassador Grewe and caused his recall. President Kennedy gave a dressing down to Ambassador Grewe's successor and we have established a lobby in Bonn against the Paris-Bonn treaty. The dislike for President de Gaulle in Washington is well known because of his policy of a Europe of the Fatherlands.

We have offended Canada's conservative Diefenbaker government, causing its overthrow. And although our relations with Britain are still cordial, President Kennedy greatly weakened the Macmillan Conservative government when he pulled the Skybolt rug from under it at Nassau.

All this, of course, is well known among political observers, but the rank and file of citizens around the world still look upon the U.S. Government as determinedly anti-Communist. Perhaps this is so because of the vast sums we spend on economic and military aid, and the great publicity given to our plans to strengthen the NATO. Abroad, our goal for peaceful coexistence seems to get lost in the shuffle.

SPECIAL ORDER

Mr. LINDSAY. Mr. Speaker, I ask that the special order I have for today be vacated, and that it be moved to Thursday next, March 28.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

THE CRIME SITUATION IN WASHINGTON

Mr. BASS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Tennessee?

There was no objection.

Mr. BASS. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. MATHIAS] has just stated he has introduced or is going to introduce a bill dealing with the crime situation in the District of Columbia. I do not know what his bill provides, but if it strikes at this problem of increased crime in Washington, even if it does so only a little bit, I want to commend him for it.

The crime situation in Washington has not only become deplorable and disgusting, but it is absolutely frightening. Almost every morning when I pick up my paper I read about a horrifying crime committed on the streets or in someone's home in Washington.

Just recently I saw where an 11-time loser, a man who had been convicted of a felony 11 times in his life, was again arrested for armed robbery. The leniency with which the criminals are treated in the District of Columbia has become an open invitation for every ex-convict in the United States to converge on the Capital of this Nation. The District of Columbia has become a teeming anthill of ex-cons and hoodlums, and I certainly hope that something can be done for stricter law enforcement, more rigid prosecution, longer, sterner sentences by our judiciary; and, if necessary, I would like to see a real habitual criminal act in the District of Columbia to stop this sort of crime wave.

COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries may be permitted to sit today during general debate.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

ADJOURNMENT OVER

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet on Monday next.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I would like to hear what the legislative program is for the rest of the week and next week.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, we have no further legislative business for this week except one resolution which will be called up. We are not ready yet to announce the legislative program for next week.

Mr. GROSS. Will there be any legislation next week?

Mr. ALBERT. We are hoping that there will be some legislation next week. If the gentleman will assist us in getting the members of the Committee on Rules on his side to report rules, there will be legislation next week.

Mr. GROSS. Of course, I will say to the gentleman that the gentleman's party has a 2-to-1 majority on the Committee on Rules, and I doubt that he needs my help under those circumstances.

Mr. ALBERT. May I advise the gentleman that one of the members on the Committee on Rules on this side of the House is in the hospital.

Mr. GROSS. Of course, the gentleman from Iowa cannot do very much about that.

Mr. ALBERT. Neither can the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. At long last it has come to pass. Again we see the poor old Committee on Rules being blamed for the alleged failure to do their work as they should. Now, if I recall correctly, along about the 9th of January this year some of our more brilliant leaders packed the Committee on Rules so that the leadership and the administration could do just as they pleased in connection with all activities in this august body. Now we come to the floor here today without a legislative program, and the poor old Committee on Rules is responsible for the fact that we do not have any legislation. Really, I feel that somebody ought to be just a bit sorry for the Committee on Rules and have a little sympathy in their hearts for the members of the committee who are serving time without assistance from either the administration or the leadership.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. Of course I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, no one is blaming the Committee on Rules. I was merely asking what the gentleman from Iowa might do with some of the gentleman's friends who serve on that committee, because we had hoped that we would get a rule on a certain bill. However, I would like further to state to the gentleman from Iowa that I appreciate the gentleman's concern. The gentleman is always a very, very conscientious Member of the House and he continually makes sure that the proprieties of the House are observed. The gentleman is quick to make sure that

every member conscientiously pursues his duties. But does not the gentleman from Iowa realize also that during the first session of every Congress the matter of organizing and considering legislation by committees is one that takes considerable time? The gentleman would not be one who would want the committees of the House hastily to consider legislation before it was reported to the floor. The gentleman would not want that, because the gentleman is very conscientious in the attention that he gives to the details of legislation.

Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will check the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD he will find, as I know he has already done, that all of the committees in the House are busy considering important legislation at this time.

Mr. Speaker, I can assure the gentleman that we will program legislation just as fast as it can be expeditiously reported and ready for action on the floor of the House.

Mr. GROSS. I want to say to the gentleman from Oklahoma that I cannot recall in my years around here—some 14 years—a session getting the late start of this one. Spring has already arrived. This is almost the last of March and still the dawdling goes on.

Mr. ALBERT. If the gentleman will yield further, I think if the gentleman will check back to the 83d Congress the gentleman will find that there was not very much legislation before Easter.

Mr. GROSS. I am going to have to do a little specific research with respect to past sessions.

Mr. ALBERT. I recommend that to the gentleman.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. I wonder what makes the gentleman from Iowa, or the gentleman from Oklahoma, for that matter, feel that the gentleman from Iowa would have any more influence with the Committee on Rules which is controlled not by the minority party, but by the majority party by a 2 to 1 voting margin, than you would have with the full membership of the House which is also controlled by the majority party.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. GROSS. I always yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. ALBERT. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BROWN] obviously does not have as much confidence in the gentleman from Iowa as the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. I am just inquiring what influence you might have. I am sure the gentleman from Iowa has not had too much influence this morning thus far in this matter.

Mr. AVERY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. AVERY. Mr. Speaker, I might supplement what the distinguished gentleman from Ohio has said. The Committee on Rules, in its wisdom, did reserve judgment on a certain bill by a 7-to-7 vote, but I might also say to the gentleman from Oklahoma that there was a proposal pending before the Committee on Rules having to do with backdoor spending. If the gentleman could get us one more vote, we could have had that scheduled for next week and I think it would have made a very comfortable legislative program for at least 1 day.

Mr. ALBERT. If the gentleman from Iowa will yield further, I thank the gentleman from Kansas for his suggestion.

I would like to state further—I have made one request and I am about to make another—that committees be permitted to sit this afternoon. I have been making those requests for the committees day in and day out. I would advise the gentleman that the committees have been busy. They have been sitting morning and afternoon, and I am sure that when the fruits of their efforts are forthcoming, we will have the cooperation of the gentleman from Iowa in putting these bills through the House.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I only hope that we can arrive at some week soon when the House can do some business.

Mr. Speaker, with that I withdraw my reservation.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

DISPENSING WITH CALENDAR WEDNESDAY BUSINESS

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Calendar Wednesday rule program may be dispensed with on Wednesday next.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that a subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor may sit today during general debate.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

RECENT SURVEY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend my remarks, and to include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, the press reported last week an alleged leak of a recent survey of Western European public opinion. Because the results of this survey have produced considerable comment, I have made an investigation into the circumstances. I am satisfied that there was no intentional leak of this confidential document which was supposed to have remained classified for 2 years; and I am also satisfied that the public release and discussion of the survey at this time would be useful because the results have great significance for our foreign policy.

There has been considerable concern, not only among Members of Congress but also in the press that the prestige of the United States may have been adversely affected by recent events in Western Europe.

In France, for example, General de Gaulle's attitude toward the Nassau pact, his policies which suggest some degree of political and economic isolation for Europe, and his insistence upon an independent nuclear force, all have made it appear that the people of France may have suddenly become disenchanted with their close association with the United States and U.S. policy.

One might conclude that President Kennedy's unwavering support of those great principles which have been the foundation of our relations with Europe for many years may have set back the United States in the eyes of French opinion. The survey indicates that this is by no means the case.

In February 1960 only 28 percent of Frenchmen interviewed approved of our foreign policy and 23 percent disapproved. In February of this year the percentage of Frenchmen approving had increased to 46 percent against 24 percent who continued to disapprove.

It is also important to note that 2 years ago most Frenchmen believed that we were not doing all we should to prevent World War III and that our actions did not match our words. Today the majority of Frenchmen believe that the reverse is true.

The survey results in Great Britain are just as startling. Contrary to what some have been saying and thinking, the recent Skybolt controversy has not caused a wave of anti-American feeling. In the past 2 years the confidence of the British people in our ability to lead the free world has risen from 35 to 54 percent; and today 59 percent of them regard our recent actions in international affairs favorably, as against only 48 percent 2 years ago.

The attitude of the British people toward neutralism has also shifted significantly in the 2-year period. In May of 1960, 46 percent of the people interviewed in Great Britain believed that their Government should not take sides in the cold war, while 42 percent believed that Great Britain should side with the United States. Today 52 percent want to align themselves with us, and only 38 percent prefer the neutral role.

And finally, nearly two Britons out of three now believe that our country is doing what it should do to prevent a third world war. In 1960 the majority interviewed felt we were not.

In West Germany public opinion has reached a new high in favor of the

United States and its foreign policy objectives. Seventy-seven percent of Germans have confidence in our leadership as against 57 percent in 1960. Seventy percent believe that we have the will to translate our words into deeds, as compared to 45 percent in 1960. More than two-thirds of the Germans interviewed approve of our foreign policy and peacemaking efforts today, while less than half approved them in 1960.

I think we can draw a lesson from the reports of opinion in these three Western European countries. The prestige of the United States, it seems to me, does not vary with the daily ups and downs of diplomatic exchanges. Rather it depends on the qualities of firmness and consistency in our leadership of the free world toward goals which are universally approved and which are responsive to the desires of freemen.

I think the President can take considerable pride in the results of this survey, for they demonstrate clearly that if the major lines of our foreign policy are forcefully and constantly expressed, and if we follow up with consistent actions taken with calmness and without hysteria, the message of the United States will be understood and approved in the free world.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ALBERT. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. GROSS. I am not clear as to the source of this survey. Can the gentleman tell me the source of this survey? Who made the survey?

Mr. ALBERT. It is the survey with respect to which there was an alleged leak of confidential information.

Mr. GROSS. Who conducted the survey?

Mr. ALBERT. The gentleman knows as much as I about who conducted it.

Mr. GROSS. No, I do not know; I will tell the gentleman honestly I do not know.

Mr. ALBERT. I do not know any more about the names of the individuals who conducted it than does the gentleman.

Mr. GROSS. Well, what agency or department of Government conducted it? Was it the USIA?

Mr. ALBERT. I assume that it was conducted under the direction of the USIA but I have not discussed this matter with the USIA and I do not know.

Mr. GROSS. I wonder if this is the same survey which the USIA refused to give a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs only a couple of weeks ago?

Mr. ALBERT. I am unable to advise the gentleman as to that. The information to which I have referred, having been compromised by having been published in the press in part at least, could not now be considered confidential in my opinion.

A TWO-WAY SAVINGS PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Mr. SAYLOR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

Mr. SAYLOR. Mr. Speaker, an article in this morning's Washington Post discloses very concisely how this Congress can effect a multimillion dollar saving in the Federal budget and at the same time inject a note of equitable treatment for the Nation's coal industry. I am going to ask that the item, "Lilienthal Asks Halt in Atomic Power Plans," be inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD this very day, and I hope that a copy of the complete speech referred to will soon be available for this purpose.

David Lilienthal, the first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, once believed that, through a reasonable amount of research, electric power could be generated by the atom at great savings over conventional fuels. He now feels that enough Federal funds have been fed into the research program, energy from the atom is not needed at this time, and that industry can and will put fissionable materials to use in electric power generation when and if needed.

Mr. Lilienthal is to be congratulated for this forthright stand. We, who represent coal areas are especially grateful, inasmuch as the Atomic Energy Commission has been planning to dole out millions of dollars to private utilities to stimulate the civilian atomic power program and thus deprive coal from getting a fair share of the increasing business of its best customer.

Mr. Speaker, on January 19, 1956, the Honorable Cleveland M. Bailey of West Virginia inserted in the RECORD an article which I had prepared for Public Utilities Fortnightly in regard to the subsidization of atomic generating stations. To give emphasis to Mr. Lilienthal's current appraisal and to demonstrate what few changes have taken place in this field over the past 7 years, I ask at this time for unanimous consent to reprint in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks the full magazine article, with the introductory remarks by Mr. Bailey. The Washington Post article will then follow, and I urge my colleagues to note all of this material carefully.

Mr. Speaker, I shall not ask for further space at this time, but I should like to refer to other newspaper articles that have appeared in Washington newspapers during the past week with respect to the search for a building site for the U.S. Patent Office. There has been talk of its locating in areas removed from downtown Washington, including the Annapolis-Baltimore area. In view of the grave need for reducing Government spending, the executive department can quickly solve the Patent Office space problem by making room for it at the Atomic Energy Commission headquarters in Germantown, Md.

I propose, Mr. Speaker, that the AEC be put on notice that this Congress is going to slash its appropriations to the extent that personnel engaged in the civilian atomic power program will be relieved of their duties immediately. Once this order is complied with, there will be more than enough space for the Patent Office at Germantown. In effect, Congress will be bringing about a dual savings: by reducing AEC expenditures and making a new Government building unnecessary.

Lest this premise sound harsh, Mr. Speaker, be assured that the cutback in personnel at the AEC can be accomplished without undue hardship to anyone. In an organization the size of this Government, there are jobs opening every day in other departments. Many of them should never be filled because they are unnecessary; still there will be hiring, and the other departments of the bureaucracy will be able to absorb some of the AEC people. Private industry will want some of the scientists and engineers. In any event, it is the business of Congress to force the executive department to operate as efficiently as possible, and here is the place where we definitely must begin to tighten the purse strings.

Perhaps the job of clearing out unnecessary personnel at AEC could be superintended by Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, Director of the Office of Science and Technology, who also questions the advisability of going forward with the AEC's civilian research program.

The articles follow:

ATOMIC WASTE: FINANCIAL AND OTHERWISE—SPEECH OF HON. CLEVELAND M. BAILEY, OF WEST VIRGINIA, IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THURSDAY, JANUARY 19, 1956

Mr. BAILEY. Mr. Speaker, under special permission to extend my remarks, I am inserting in the RECORD an article entitled "The Basic Danger in the A-Power Program," which was written for Public Utilities Fortnightly magazine by the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. SAYLOR]. In that it points up some questionable spending of the taxpayers' money by a Government agency, I feel that the article merits the attention of every Member of the House and Senate.

Congressman SAYLOR has stated, in effect, that the Atomic Energy Commission's rapacious penchant for developing atom-powered electric plants has led to extravagant expenditures for which justification is sought through the use of distorted figures on coal reserves.

Mr. Speaker, at the outset of these remarks let me make it clear that the prospects of using the atom to make electricity and for other peacetime chores is a welcome thought. We are cheered at the U.S. Navy's success in using the atom as a fuel for powering submarines. We look with relish to the improvement of agricultural crop yields through the application of radiation from radioisotopes. We hope that someday a jigger of uranium will be all that is needed to move our automobiles for hundreds of thousands of miles. And we will be grateful if research and science ultimately enable us to light and heat our homes through fissionable materials at as small a cost as we have been led to believe will be possible. But I protest the idea that an endless stream of funds from the Federal Treasury should be channeled through the Atomic Energy Commission to conduct a myriad of experiments in an effort to make these dreams come true.

As representative of the Nation's largest coal-producing State, I particularly resent the AEC's implication that atomic powerplants must be constructed at all costs because there will not be an adequate supply of conventional fuels to meet demand. We recognize that electric-generating capacity is steadily being increased; it is estimated that in another 20 years 350 million tons of coal

per year will be required by the electric utilities alone. A current advertisement published by the First National City Bank of New York predicts that the figure may reach 500 million tons by 1975. Well, West Virginia can guarantee to provide its share of that load, plus its other commitments for both industrial and domestic use, for at least another two centuries.

Yes, annual coal production can be doubled over present output and there will still be enough mineable reserves to last for at least 200 years. If that sounds like such a short time as to be cause for alarm, let me remind you that two centuries would take you back 20 years before this great Republic was born. In 1756 Benjamin Franklin, whose memory we honor this week, still had more than three decades of his life to go. Young Charles Cornwallis, who later surrendered at Yorktown to end the fighting in the Revolutionary War, was commissioned an ensign in the British Army. Maria Antoinette and Louis XVI were still babes-in-arms and Napoleon Boneparte was not yet born. There was no talk of atomic piles at that time; in fact Alessandro Volta was still too young to have developed Volta's pile, which was to become the first real battery capable of delivering a steady current of electricity.

So you see a lot can happen in 200 years; in fact, there is a good chance that the atom as a source of power for electric power will become obsolete even before those supplies of coal in West Virginia are exhausted. For the record, let me also point out that there will be a lot more coal in America's reserve stockpile even after West Virginia's share is gone. In addition to the 50 billion tons in my home State, there are at least 1,162 billion tons of coal elsewhere in the United States. Members of Congress should keep these figures in mind when they are told that the Atomic Energy Commission must be given more millions of dollars to hurry up the job of developing reactors that will compete with coal and other conventional fuels.

Another factor which cannot be overlooked in the program for peacetime application of nuclear power is the risk element. Thus far the insurance companies have found it impractical to underwrite the hazards, and the Federal Government apparently will soon be asked to accept this responsibility as a necessary expense.

I contend that if the operation of a nuclear powerplant, as well as the disposal of radioactive wastes resulting therefrom, constitutes such a tremendous hazard to the welfare of the people, then Members of Congress had better stop and decide whether the Government should be willing to stimulate the growth of the hazard by accepting such a responsibility. Congress is first obliged to demand concrete information that will enable us to determine whether the need for setting up atomic powerplants at this time is worth taking such chances, and whether the tremendous outlays for nuclear power and the perils to which our people may be exposed will be compensated for by savings in the cost of power.

Before such questions can be answered, we need additional information which has not yet been made public. The dangers that would come with the disposition of radioactive wastes, and attendant hazards that go with the operation of a nuclear powerplant, appear to be of such tremendous magnitude that the Members of Congress cannot blindly stimulate further the creation of such jeopardy without breaching the trust imposed by the American people.

Not long ago a scientist warned that the disposal of atomic waste might inflict serious damage on the minds and the bodies of future generations. Another scientist, a sanitary engineer for the Atomic Energy Commission, recently made a speech in which he admitted that, as the atomic power industry grows, the problems of sufficiently diluting atomic wastes to make the air and water safe for human beings could be fabulous. He said that if one-third of the electric power which this country expects to produce in 1980 were to be supplied through atomic energy, the amount of water required to dilute the poisonous byproducts to safe levels would be equivalent to the flow of 12,600 Mississippi Rivers.

I cannot vouch for the authenticity of these statements, but I do know that the man who tried to tell the world about the serious effects of atomic radiation was quickly hushed up by the people who want to rush the reactor program through without first taking heed of the consequences.

Mr. Speaker, these are some of the conditions which must be studied carefully when the request for the Atomic Energy Commission budget is taken into consideration. In view of the fact that U.S. coal reserves will last us hundreds of years longer than AEC spokesmen have been saying, I question the soundness of placing almost $2 billion at the disposal of the crowd which is so quick to dispose of coal's potentialities. For the further elucidation of Congress, I believe that the AEC could be most helpful if it would make available complete data on how much of its total expenditures are actually being spent on the electric power phase of the program. These statistics would include information on how many persons were sent to the atoms-for-peace session at Geneva at taxpayers' expense and how many others are traveling all over this country and the rest of the globe working on a project that no one is sure will be practical.

You can be sure, Mr. Speaker, that I do not for one minute object to the appropriation of funds for the continuance of the defense aspects of the nuclear program. We will give our scientists and engineers what they need to develop the necessary weapons to protect our shores and our homes, but I think that the time has arrived when we should check closely to find out just how much of the rest of the work is necessary and feasible, and how much of it is the dream of that coterie of spenders who insist upon discounting the coal industry and its potential. West Virginians who have been put out of work by maneuverings of free trade theorists and other stargazers want to know how much of the money which we pay in taxes is being used to develop another means of encroaching upon our markets.

I commend Congressman SAYLOR'S article to your reading.

(The article referred to is as follows:)

"[From Public Utilities Fortnightly of Jan. 19, 1956]

"THE BASIC DANGER IN THE 'A' POWER PROGRAM

"(By the Honorable JOHN P. SAYLOR, U.S. Representative from Pennsylvania)

"(This author warns against expecting too much and too soon in the way of atomic power. It could be just as disastrous as too little and too late—if the American taxpayer has to pay the bill for a pig in a poke.)

"For an industry traditionally disdainful of Government supports and subsidies, the electric utilities today appear to be treading on dangerous right of way. The perilous path originates at the disbursing office of the Atomic Energy Commission and moves along the course carefully designed by advocates of public power.

"Of a certainty, the Atomic Energy Commission—in its headlong drive to set up the atom as a producer of electricity—has made it difficult for private companies to refuse its generous subventions; perhaps, however, the time has come for beneficiaries in the utility field to make it distinctly clear that further grants—whether in the form of finished reactors, guaranties, or writeoffs—are unwanted, unwelcome, and unacceptable.

"The desirability of encouraging research and development leading to the production of electricity at reasonable costs through the medium of fissionable materials is not in question. There is definitely a place for the atom as an added fuel, particularly in areas where conventional fuels are not readily available. Development of economically feasible nuclear power is necessary to provide electrical energy for underdeveloped areas of the world, to assist nations which have power shortages, and to protect the future of the United States in the power field. The atom should be put to work in whatever peacetime roles it is capable of assuming in our competitive economy, but not at the risk of enabling the Federal Government to encroach further into the realm of private business.

"House-to-house salesmen often use gifts as a guise for getting a foot in the door. The Government also employs this technique most effectively. It entered the electric power business on a broad scale through a back-door entrance by using agricultural development in the Tennessee Valley as a part of the opening wedge. By the same token, bureaucracy's continued investments in the power-by-atom program might give the Government a foothold on private property that would ultimately bring a demand for full title. Meanwhile the A program may be placing all supporters of the free enterprise system in an embarrassing position, for the so-called participating projects are creating a made-to-order and more-than-valid issue for public power protagonists.

"The recent history of AEC's participation in the development of atomic energy for commercial purposes would imply that (1) the Federal Treasury has such an abundance of funds as to preclude the necessity for careful and economic expenditures, and (2) the welfare of the Nation depends upon the ability of the Government and/or the utilities to generate power through the use of fissionable material.

"The fallacy of the first premise is evident to everyone save possibly those Government officials behind the go-for-broke program. Assumption No. 2 has been given such widespread publication that the principal arguments of the program's promoters need to be exposed if the AEC spending spree is to be effectively restrained.

"The obvious strategy of the program has been to attempt to convince the general public that diminishing resources of conventional fuels make it necessary for the rapid development of electric-generating plants powered by the atom. Voluminous statistical reports have been prepared in whatever way is deemed necessary to strengthen this impression. Few have any basis in fact, and all such allegations can automatically be refuted by a reference to authentic tables on coal reserves.

"Oil and natural-gas reserves, are undeniably being depleted at an increasing rate and eventually will be exhausted. Natural gas is admittedly a short-term fuel. The necessity for conserving it has prompted the Federal Power Commission, on occasion, to refuse applications for the use of natural gas under industrial boilers in areas where coal is available.

"The end of our oil reserves, on the other hand, is not in sight at the present time, although it is highly possible that the country will begin to feel a pinch before the end of the century. When this scarcity develops, America's fuel industries will be prepared for it. Atomic energy cannot replace the higher uses of petroleum, but synthetic fuel plants can provide both gas and oil when they are no longer available in Nature's storehouse. The raw material to be used in the production of synthetic fuels will be oil shale or coal—both of which occur in generous quantities within America's soil.

"All indications point to coal's carrying a progressively increasing portion of the energy load in the years ahead. The continued upturn in the use of electrical and mechanical energy will spiral demand for coal from the present 400 million to 500 million tons per annum to the billion-ton mark before the year 2000. Even at this rate of production, however, there is enough coal within the borders of the United States to last for more than a thousand years.

"Specifically, recoverable coal reserves are in excess of 1.2 trillion tons. Pennsylvania, which has produced about one-third of all the coal used in this country since 1850, still contains some 30 billion tons of mineable deposits. These estimates are based on studies of the U.S. Geological Survey, an agency which apparently has not been consulted by the AEC officials who have set out to portray coal as a short-life fuel.

"The other misconception being publicized in the all-out campaign to continue using taxpayers' money in attempts to expedite creation of an atom-powered electric utility industry is being developed around the cost factor. In the past year there have been numerous news stories based on promises by AEC spokesmen that the atom will eventually generate cheap electric power. Presumably, this objective will be reached if a kilowatt-hour of electricity can be produced in a range somewhere between 4 and 7 mills.

"To the average reader, that statement may sound most attractive. The fact is, however, that conventional fuels have long been producing electricity at a cost of less than 4 mills per kilowatt-hour. Modern steam plants within close proximity of coal mines are producing 3-mill electricity at the present time. Even in remote areas, where freight rates boost the delivered cost of coal to twice the cost at the mine, electricity is generated for less than 7 mills per kilowatt-hour.

"The Government's failure to disseminate actual cost information in regard to the peacetime nuclear program makes it almost impossible to determine how many billions of dollars will have to be turned over to the AEC before the atom will produce electric power at a reasonable cost. When construction began on the atomic powerplant at Shippingport, Pa., in September 1954, the AEC—which is building the reactor—was extremely vague about the cost factor. Finally, 15 months and a great many millions of dollars later, a Commission spokesman was cornered at a press conference and admitted that electricity from the Shippingport plant is expected to cost 52 mills per kilowatt-hour—at least 10 times the cost of electric power generated with conventional fuels.

"The AEC's propensity for keeping expenses in the darkroom while the artist's conception of nuclear powerplants is projected to the public in glowing terms could eventually strike a damaging blow at the private utility industry. Sooner or later the public power sodality will reveal figures disclosing the total amount invested by the AEC in developing atomic electricity, then ask this question:

" 'Since the Federal Government has contributed such an enormous sum toward making nuclear power stations possible, is there any reason why the taxpayer should permit public utilities to profit from this undertaking?'

"To obviate such a possibility, the general public should demand dissemination of actual cost information except where publication would be inimical to the national security.

"The assumption that nuclear power from presently contemplated reactors may eventually become competitive with electricity from conventional plants disregards the progress in coal utilization. In other words, the nuclear power planners are assuming that atomic-generated electricity will challenge coal pricewise if capital and operating costs of nuclear reactors are reduced as hoped for and—meanwhile—coal technology stands still.

"In 1920 it required an average of 3 pounds of coal to produce 1 kilowatt-hour of electricity. By 1930 the figure was down to 1.60; in 1940 it was 1.34 and in 1950 it was 1.19. Early in 1955 the average dropped below 1 pound of coal per kilowatt-hour. Some of the modern plants are far below that average. These figures, unlike those pertaining to power costs in atomic electric plants, are not hypothetical. They are based on established records and are in the files of the Federal Power Commission.

"In spite of continuing progress, the present utilization efficiency of coal in the steam plant is only about 38 percent. Obviously, there is still a great deal of room for progress. It is not inconceivable, if research underway bears fruit, that when and if nuclear power reaches the point where it can be producing 7-mill electricity, the efficiency of coal utilization will have doubled over its present rate. Philip Sporn, president of the American Gas & Electric Co., explains it this way:

" 'It needs to be kept in mind, too, in judging whether and to what extent nuclear plants will be built in the future in place of new conventional plants, that the nuclear development will always be competing with a constantly improved—that is to say, more efficient—conventional alternative.'

"Another factor which the backers of this new application of atomic power find convenient to withhold from publication is the relative cost of fuels in the overall operating budget of a public utility system. It is therefore not generally realized that only 16 percent of the total cost involved in generating power and bringing it to the consumers is chargeable to fuels. Thus, even if it were possible to find a way to generate electricity through a self-perpetuating fuel that could be obtained absolutely free, it would still be impossible to reduce a $6 electric bill by more than $1.

"Under the circumstances, it would appear that U.S. consumers are already receiving inexpensive electricity and that, since the promised cheap power from the atom is still confined to the province of theory, there is no justification for the vast expenditures being made under the auspices of the AEC research on the commercial application of nuclear materials.

"There is no denying that if the Government is going to subsidize construction of reactors and other necessary facilities; if the Government is going to undertake to insure property and personnel against damage that could be inflicted in the event of an accident in an atomic plant; if the Government is going to underwrite commercial operations against losses incurred in developmental programs; if the Government is going to supply atomic fuel at less than the full cost thereof; if the Government is going to subsidize atomic fuel processing and disposal of atomic waste—then there is a basis for the assertion that the atom may soon become a principal source of electric power. In all likelihood, electricity at TVA rates can be made available to consumers in various areas of the country if the Federal Government is willing to pour sufficient funds into the atomic energy program.

"Public power groups want to make Federal funds available to whatever extent is necessary to produce their brand of cheap electricity. They are urging more AEC help to private firms for the construction of atom power reactors. They want research and development aid on more liberal terms, and they want the AEC to bear the cost of fuel elements for small reactors. And while the Nation's private insurance industry is attempting to determine the most feasible methods of providing indemnity to cover damages that would result from an accident in an atomic electric plant, the public power enthusiasts would have the Government assume the insurance burden regardless of costs involved. What we who oppose unnecessary expansion of the public power program must realize is that each such subsidy provides bureaucratic forces with a further opportunity to claim a vested interest in the electric power industry; to believe otherwise is to underestimate the intent of public power supporters.

"Those who would socialize the whole power industry find the atom's potential in the generation of electricity a very convenient steppingstone, particularly since the Government fostered basic research and has exercised strict control over succeeding developments. The new atomic energy law, enacted in 1954, tended to lessen the Government's monopolistic grasp on the atom, but it retained Federal control over private development in the nuclear fission field. The revised law has been described thusly by Dr. Robert E. Wilson, chairman of the board of Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), himself a renowned engineer:

" 'If anyone claims that the new Atomic Energy Act turns over to private industry a bonanza in the form of already solved technical and economic problems and an assured profit, either he does not know the facts or he is an arrant demagog. Any private investment in commercial atomic power generation in the near future will have to be inspired more by public service motives than by any reasonable expectation of substantial profit.'

"Atomic energy is novel, and its advertised possibilities in industrial application have wide public appeal. It arouses the curiosity, heightens the imagination. It is another source of heat with a new and special technology, yet on close examination we discover that it has no immediate advantages which should impel us to expedite its advent into the power field by investing billions of hard-to-get tax dollars.

"Practical businessmen and industrialists will welcome the opportunity to put this new source of power to work. Yet they foresee no immediate need for it. The electric-utility industry is proceeding with an unprecedented expansion program in steam-electric stations. Some of the companies, while not discounting the theory that in a decade or so hence it may be profitable to invest in full-scale atomic-energy plants in certain areas of the country, are erecting steam-generating stations in coal-producing regions at greater distances from consuming communities than has heretofore been considered economically feasible. At the present time 340,000 volts are transmitted by generating stations; utility experts believe that eventually it will be possible to operate 500,000-volt wires, thereby decreasing line losses and permitting transmission over greater distances. Under such circumstances, more and more generating stations would be located at the mine mouth, thus reducing costs and further discouraging the entry of competitive sources of power, except in remote sections of the country.

"Left to their own resources and ingenuity, the electric utilities will develop atom plants soon enough. Meanwhile the industry will supply all the power that is required without any help from the Federal Government. This point was stipulated very succinctly in one sentence of Adm. Ben Moreell's analysis of the Hoover Commission Task Force Report on Water Resources and Power: 'Technically and financially there is no present prospective need for Federal power activities.'

"Federal encroachment in the power-making business has already gone entirely too far. Neither the general public nor the electric-utility companies can afford to permit

the Government to proceed with some of its elaborate plans for participation in the atomic-energy projects that belong in the private-industry classification. By allowing the Government to come into the tent so long as it has the price of admission, electric utilities might learn too late that they have made it possible for the bureaucrats to take over the center ring."

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 21, 1963]

LILIENTHAL ASKS HALT IN ATOMIC POWER PLANS

(By Howard Simons)

A call by David Lilienthal for the Government to abandon its support of atomic power development and to reduce substantially its support of basic atomic research has prompted a congressional committee to ask the Atomic Energy Commission to answer its critic.

Lilienthal, the first Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, challenged the AEC last month in a series of lectures at Princeton University. The theme of his lectures was that "the facts of the world of 1963 are in conflict with the way in which we think and deal with the atom, we should jettison and junk those outmoded ideas."

Lilienthal urged the Government to put "the atom into the mainstream of men's affairs" and not keep it artificially separate and apart, as Lilienthal views the present role of the atom in U.S. activities. To do this, Lilienthal suggested that the AEC, itself, might need drastic modification.

What aroused the interest of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy even more than these comments were Lilienthal's suggestions about continued Government support for civilian nuclear power and basic science as it relates to the atom.

The Joint Committee has championed Government support of both these programs.

As regards atomic power development, Lilienthal suggested the following as premises for 1963:

Energy from the atom is not now needed for civilian purposes.

At the time and place where it is needed it will be forthcoming without governmental prodding. If there is a real need it will be met by the utility and manufacturing industries, as it has been with the automobile, the diesel engine, the telephone, and so on, in response to proved economic need.

There is now no urgent fuel or power crisis and no prospect of one in the foreseeable future; when such a shortage develops, it will be taken care of by the atom if that is then the best alternative.

Moreover, said Lilienthal, who resigned as Chairman of the AEC on February 15, 1950, the Government "should stop trying to force feed atomic energy."

Throw away the present discredited timetable. Don't abandon the hope for competitive power, he advised, but deal with it realistically.

The same approach, Lilienthal argued, should apply to the atom in basic science, in medicine and agriculture and industry. Funds and scientific manpower should be freed for other starved areas of research and development, such as biochemistry.

In effect, Lilienthal was saying just the opposite of what the AEC had reported to President Kennedy in November 1962, and what AEC officials told the Joint Committee in late February.

This was essentially that nuclear energy can and should make a vital contribution toward meeting the Nation's long-term energy requirements and that the proper role for the Government is to develop and to demonstrate the technology that will lead to a self-sustaining and growing nuclear power industry.

In short, where Lilienthal wants the AEC to get out of the nuclear power business, the AEC not only wants to remain in the atomic power business, but to increase its support of the Nation's nuclear power efforts.

Citing such variances between the AEC and Lilienthal, the Joint Committee, in an unpublished letter, has asked the AEC for its comments. The Joint Committee further asked the AEC to make its views of Lilienthal's views known before the resumption of its annual hearings on the state of the Nation's atomic energy industry.

These hearings, continuing those held in February, will begin on April 2 and will be devoted largely to non-Government witnesses.

ON COMMEMORATIONS AND SPECIAL OBSERVANCES AND ON THE ISSUANCE OF A SPECIAL COIN TO COMMEMORATE THE GETTYSBURG ADDRESS

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. SCHWENGEL] is recognized for 40 minutes.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SCHWENGEL. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak on a recent revelation that disturbs me greatly. I refer to Secret Service proposals for this fiscal year that would increase Vice President JOHNSON'S personal protection staff to approximately 36 men, or 34 more than any other Vice President in history. Since the days of the Honorable Vice President Barkley, it has been traditional to have two agents protect the Vice President. Before making a number of specific points, and filling in my colleagues on the background, I would like to say that the proposals are both preposterous and presumptuous.

Even more alarming, Mr. Speaker, is that 19 agents would be taken directly from the field at a time when counterfeiting, for example, is at an alltime peak. Justification of this fantastic personal staff for Mr. JOHNSON is, I suggest, absolutely impossible. There is not a single individual in this House who could say to me that this is a sensible proposal. It suggests everything unwise, unreasonable, and unnatural.

And I might direct my next comment to the Vice President himself, a man in whom I have the greatest respect and one who was a great majority leader of the other body. He comes from the State, Mr. Speaker, that has its would-be tradition wrapped in praise of its tough frontier spirit—the land of the six-shooter and so many other things. This sedate House, Mr. Speaker has heard Texan after Texan extoll the great virtues of independence almost beyond the point of toleration. Yet we have listened, Mr. Speaker, and we have accepted this in the best tradition of our national life.

But now we are confronted with a very serious matter. The Chief of the Secret Service, Mr. James T. Rowley, is authorized to provide this protection of the Vice President. To go back a bit, after the Blair House shooting of 1950, the election of coverage has been up to the Vice President himself, by request.

The law, Public Law 87–829, passed on October 15, 1962, states that the Secret Service is authorized to protect the Vice President 24 hours a day for 365 days a year. This is something that we here would agree to. What I cannot understand is that previous protection by request never amounted to more than two individuals except while the Vice President was on an exceptionally important mission.

I can well understand and appreciate the dangers incumbent upon the Vice President when he goes abroad. No one would doubt this. However, I cannot quite rationalize how the Congress in its right senses could justify this tremendous expansion at a time when the lives of a number of public officials in town are in greater potential danger than is the life of the Vice President. I do not mean to play "cloak and dagger" in this situation, but certain Justices of the Supreme Court and U.S. Senators are much more controversial. I do not have to name names here. I simply do not feel the Vice President is in any great danger. I am strongly in favor of the maximum protection for the President, but some armies do not have 35 guards trained with the efficiency and expertise of the Secret Service.

Unlike the feast at Cana, where the best wine was served last, I have saved the worst news for my conclusion.

The cost for the 35 Johnson agents would amount to over $261,000 and the 1 clerk over $4,000. There would be an additional expense of over $20,000 for personal benefits and over $37,000 for overtime pay. This does not include travel expenses which total $390,000 for both the President and Vice President, an increase of $165,000. Without travel the cost to the taxpayers per year will be $322,000.

In summation, Mr. Speaker, the whole issue here is exceedingly unwise. We are being asked to take men from strategic positions within the Secret Service for protection that has never before been necessary. Is it now analogous that the Secretary of State would also demand the same amount of protection? We could be establishing a precedent here that would cost thousands of dollars. I want to reiterate my claim that I have nothing personal against the Vice President in this matter, but simply with the precedent involved. I believe firmly in the rightness of my cause and I intend to pursue it. Mr. Speaker and Members of the House, do you not think we should start protecting the poor overburdened taxpayers?

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONTE. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. CRAMER. I thank the gentleman for bringing out these facts. But, I think an even more dangerous precedent was set 2 years ago, which I brought out on the floor of the House at that time, and that is the fact that about $1 million is being spent annually for a private FBI investigative force for the Attorney General to be used at his sole discretion and direction for the first time in the history of this country, outside of J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI itself. Recently there was published for the first

time that I had seen it in print—in Newsweek—this fact that some 54 private investigators, under the direct supervision and control solely of the Attorney General, exist. I understand that number is closer to 100, and last year a substantial increase over the previous year was asked for and granted. And, I think that this expenditure of funds for this private, separate, exclusive investigative force, solely under the control of the Attorney General, outside of the FBI, is a matter that this Congress should give serious consideration to, in that I know of nowhere that this force and its functions are authorized or their duties prescribed by law or proper authorizing legislation. Therefore, the serious question is raised as to what authority did Congress in the first place have to appropriate funds and to establish this force without proper authorizing legislation proscribing, prescribing, and ascribing the duties of these people that should have come out of the Committee on the Judiciary on which I serve. I favor adequate personnel to investigate organized crime, but I think Congress should have authorized such a unit and set out its duties or should have added to the FBI force already authorized.

Mr. CONTE. I thank the gentleman from Florida. Of course, we will have an opportunity to vote on this particular item when the Post Office and Treasury appropriation bill comes to the floor before the Easter vacation, and I hope my colleagues will support me to strike out all of the agents except two, which is all the other Vice Presidents have had; one or two, but two was the maximum that any Vice President ever had.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONTE. I yield to the gentleman from Vermont.

Mr. STAFFORD. I want to compliment the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts on the speech he just delivered on this important matter and endorse what he said and associate myself with his remarks.

Mr. CONTE. I thank the gentleman from Vermont.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONTE. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. First of all, I am interested to learn that we are going to have one appropriation bill before Easter. I was not aware that we were going to do any business at all before the Easter recess. But, let me have those figures again. My hearing is not very good this morning. Did I understand that there are going to be 37 new agents?

Mr. CONTE. Thirty-five Johnson agents and one clerk. Of course, besides those you will have supervisors and assistant supervisors on down the line.

Mr. GROSS. How many have past Vice Presidents had?

Mr. CONTE. The most any Vice President had since Barkley was two.

Mr. GROSS. Why has this sudden danger to the life of this brave Texan developed?

Mr. CONTE. I am glad you brought up that question. For, when this law went through the House, it was estimated that at best it would not cost over $100,000 for these additional agents. That law merely authorized protection for the Vice President. So, I asked the Chief of the Secret Service, a very able man, "Prior to this law it was by request of the Vice President; is that correct?" He said, "Yes." I said, "Did JOHNSON ask for protection last year?" He said, "Yes." I said, "How many men did you give him?" He said, "Two." So I said, "Why give him 35 now? Because there is a law on the books?"

Mr. GROSS. Does the gentleman think that 37 or 35, whichever it is, will be enough, or should we turn out a platoon of marines to trail him around day by day, hour by hour, and evening by evening?

Mr. BASS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONTE. I yield to the gentleman from Tennessee.

Mr. BASS. Let me ask my friend from Massachusetts this question. Did the Vice President request these agents himself?

Mr. CONTE. He did request last year and received two.

Mr. BASS. I mean, did he request this increase?

Mr. CONTE. Now, I think I made it clear here that I am not directing my remarks to the Vice President.

The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Dillon, when he presented his budget to the Congress or to the President, and the administration in turn presented it to the Congress, requested 35 men on behalf of the Chief of the Secret Service.

Mr. BASS. Could it be that the Chief of the Secret Service knows much more about this situation than I and perhaps even than the gentleman from Massachusetts, and feels that in his great wisdom and experience that it would take 35 men to carry out the wishes of the Congress when we stated we would provide the Vice President protection?

Mr. CONTE. First let us get the record straight. I certainly do not want to assume here that I am an authority on this. I think Mr. Rowley is doing a fine job. He is an authority. However, it does not take much commonsense to rationalize that in the past when the Vice President requested protection, he was given two. Why, all of a sudden, has that figure jumped up to 35? I cannot understand this.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman cannot tell me that Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, who possesses great secrets, is not in as much grave danger as the Vice President. The gentleman cannot tell me that Chief Justice Warren, who is a controversial figure in certain parts of the country, does not require the same amount of protection as does the Vice President. The gentleman cannot tell me that Senators like the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. MCCLELLAN, and Senator GOLDWATER, and other controversial Senators in the U.S. Senate do not require the same type of protection.

I am all for protecting the Vice President. I think he is a fine man. I am willing to give him two men, but I cannot see why he needs 35. What are they going to do with these 35 men?

Mr. BASS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SCHWENGEL. I cannot yield further at this point. I yielded to the gentleman from Massachusetts for a 3-minute statement originally out of the 40 minutes of time that I had taken to talk about something a lot more important than this.

However, since so much of my time has been taken already, I will have to continue making this brilliant statement that I have prepared, which is much more pertinent and valuable to the Congress and to the world than this matter now being discussed.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for an observation?

Mr. SCHWENGEL. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. CONTE. I have a 15-minute special order during which I will be glad to yield to the gentleman from Iowa, if we can pursue this item a little bit further. This is a very important issue.

Mr. BASS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SCHWENGEL. I yield to the gentleman from Tennessee.

Mr. BASS. Mr. Speaker, I only want to say this: I do not know how many agents it takes to protect the Vice President of the United States. However, I want the RECORD to show that the Vice President did not personally request this.

Mr. CONTE. As far as I know, the request came from the Secretary of the Treasury; who requested these men to him, I do not know.

Mr. BASS. He did not personally request a given number of agents to protect him. But let me say this: I refer to the statement I made just a few moments ago on the floor of the House to the effect that if something is not done to relieve the crime-wave situatior in Washington, D.C., I can visualize the time when I personally would want 35 people around me to protect my life and the life of my wife, and to protect the life and the life of the wife of the gentleman from Iowa, as well as the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SCHWENGEL. I yield briefly to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. CONTE. The gentleman is absolutely right. I would like to take those 35 men and put them here in the District of Columbia to protect the citizens of this area. I think it would be of greater value.

Mr. LINDSAY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SCHWENGEL. I yield to the gentleman from New York for 1 minute.

Mr. LINDSAY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend, the gentleman from Iowa, for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I have asked the distinguished gentleman from Iowa to yield for one purpose only. I was on the floor of the House and listened with a great deal of interest to the remarks made by the distinguished majority leader, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. ALBERT] about the leak of a group of popularity polls taken abroad. I would like to sug-

gest that one of the things which is wrong with our foreign policy at the present time is that it is foreign policy by popularity polls. If the administration would try to do more of what is right and courageous instead of worrying about what a group of pollsters say, we would be in much better shape in the world today. I think it is unfortunate that this pollster business had to be elevated to such a high level here on the floor today by a distinguished Member, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. ALBERT] the majority leader, who is a spokesman for the administration.

Mr. Speaker, the very fact we spent so much time on it indicates that there is too much concern about what is popular and not enough concern over what is right. If the administration would care more about substance than it does about public relations, we would have a more solid foreign policy today.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I should like to continue this debate, but I have something very important to discuss and I cannot yield at this time.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. RHODES of Pennsylvania). The gentleman from Michigan makes the point of order that a quorum is not present. The Chair will count.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I have been yielding all over the place. I am sure the gentleman from Michigan can get time as much as he wants. I think I have been very generous. I think the gentleman is unfair in suggesting with this motion and kind of inference with the point that he is making. However, I shall yield to the gentleman.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan has made a point of order.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw the point of order.

Mr. SCHWENGEL. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I simply make the observation that this is a continuation of the same blockheaded foreign policy that was displayed by previous administrations.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SCHWENGEL. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from New York [Mr. LINDSAY] made the point that foreign policy was being conducted by popularity poll. It seems to me that I recall that we have had a number of criticisms of the administration on the floor of this body and in the other body for the past 3 or 4 or 5 weeks, because it was charged that the administration proceeded with our foreign policy operations even though they did not satisfy Mr. Diefenbaker, even though they did not satisfy Mr. de Gaulle, and even though they did not satisfy Mr. Tshombe. It does seem to me that the distinguished gentleman from New York might want to consult with other members of his party and decide whether they are criticizing the administration because it is supposed to be conducting foreign policy by popularity poll or because it is supposed to be conducting foreign policy in spite of the wishes of our allies. It does seem clear that the only subject on which the Members on the other side of the aisle can agree is that no matter what the Kennedy administration does, it is wrong.

Mr. CEDERBERG. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SCHWENGEL. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. CEDERBERG. Mr. Speaker, maybe we can set this policy question to rest. I recall during the last election this was quite a subject. So we discussed the matter with the head of the USIA when he came before our subcommittee for appropriations and we tried to get him to tell us what the policy picture was going to be under this administration. At that time they decided they were not going to conduct any polls because they were not of any value anyway, because they did not really get to the depth of the question and really did not settle anything. So I think this whole policy question ought to be well buried, because I do not think it has any relevant importance. I agree with my colleague, the gentleman from New York [Mr. LINDSAY], on the subject.

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SCHWENGEL. I yield to my colleague from Florida.

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, with regard to foreign policy and polls and the administration's foreign policy, I think it is a travesty that we dropped the ball when we had a chance to make a touchdown at the Costa Rica Conference. Most of those countries were willing and anxious to have drafted a strong, firm, long-range, planned program to get rid of Castro and communism in Cuba and the subversive results and aftereffects in this hemisphere. I think it is a shame that at the time when we had a real opportunity to work with countries, many of which have actually been invaded by Castro marauders during 1961, and with many of the Presidents of those countries asking for a firm policy, that are largely for a planned program that they could follow, that the Organization of American States could consider on the recommendation of the Central American States—I think it is a shame that we dropped the ball when we could have made a telling touchdown in Costa Rica by providing a long-range, firm program to eventually get rid of Castro and communism in Cuba and in this hemisphere.

I do not know what the polls would show in Latin America after this visit, but I would say our prestige is much lower than it would have been if the United States had provided the firm leadership that we should have at Costa Rica instead of announcing in advance our intentions not to try to carve out a stiff, meaningful program. I call attention to my remarks of Monday, March 18, pages 4425–4430 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Speaker, before I launch on my prepared remarks, I want to say in response to the observations made by the majority leader when he stated that committees were hard at work in the Congress and that soon we will get some legislation. If the committees are not any harder at work than the great committee of which I am a member, the Committee on Public Works, then we are not working very hard. There is a lot of important business before that committee. One of the subcommittees, the subcommittee on investigating the interstate highway building program, has not even called together the members of that committee. The members on the minority side do not know what the plans are, what they intend to do, what or where they are investigating, and what the problems are in many areas. We do not know much about it because we do not have an adequate staff to do anything about it.

Last year, I think it was in July, I wrote the chairman of the subcommittee a letter after I had counseled with him about an idea about stepping up the activity and the effectiveness of this committee. He said he thought it was a good one. "Write me a letter and we will take it up." I wrote him a letter and he has not even answered. So I reiterate, I believe the committees are not busy if they are not any busier than the Committee on Public Works of which I am a member.

So much for that.

Very briefly, then, on foreign policy. As the House knows, I have been one of those who believe in presenting a united front on the foreign policy question to the Congress, and that we ought to have a bipartisan foreign policy. But I have been here long enough to know that we have made a lot of mistakes with our foreign programs; in fact, I think the trouble with this whole matter in the foreign area is that we have no discernible, understandable foreign policy. It is for this reason that I have suggested from time to time to the State Department and members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs the issuing of a statement on foreign policy that reflects the true intentions of our country.

I am reminded that just as England needed a Magna Carta in her period of crisis in early history and as we needed a Declaration of Independence in 1776, so somebody needs to issue a policy statement that makes some sense on the foreign front and that will be understood both by the American people and freedom-loving people everywhere. Then we will not have to worry about prestige polls and the other things we have discussed here today.

Mr. Speaker, I ask permission to revise and extend my remarks; also, I ask that the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GOODLING] be allowed to revise and extend his remarks at the close of my remarks.

Mr. Speaker, it is a tradition in America that we commemorate significant events, important developments and occasions that have emphasized and carried forward the great ideals authored,

enacted into law, fought for, and sacrificed for in our history. It is fitting and proper that we do this. These commemorations serve to remind us of the great ideals and ideas that moved us forward in the right direction on the moving vehicle we call freedom. It has been said that in understanding the past we can open the future. With these commemorations we have strengthened our system in many ways.

Because our forebears understood this and I believe felt more keenly than we do the importance for a rich heritage they wisely formed a pattern of proper observances and built memorials to our Nation's great all over this land we call America. We have a fine collection of these here in the District of Columbia where the millions who come to visit can, while they are here, catch something of the spirit that burned in the hearts of the torchbearers of freedom.

We build libraries everywhere with the aid of foundation money and with tax money where the books that reveal our literature, our art, and our dramatic history can be stored, used, and read by the population in order to better understand our system of popular government and to help give the advantages that came from a free society.

The world's largest and most valuable of these libraries is, very logically, here in Washington.

Archives buildings are found in all of the States and principal cities to house the valuable original documents that signaled our birth such as the Declaration of Independence and the document which carried out its objective—the Constitution—both housed here in our own Archives Building at great cost to the taxpayer who willingly and gladly assumes this responsibility.

Monuments built to the memory of the great in our heritage can be found in every State of the Union. They are also built at the scene of sacrificial action for the preservation and advancement of liberty, there to be a reminder to us and to posterity of those who toiled, who fought and who sacrificed in the struggles that have brought us to this point in our history.

The Congress of the United States, I believe, has shown great wisdom in providing for programs and projects to accent our history by leaving reminders in all of our national parks where it is appropriate and convenient to do so.

There are so many, many areas one could point to where a most significant and appropriate memorial has been constructed and reconstructed. Among the most meaningful and appropriate is the Independence Hall area in Philadelphia—a project that is carried out in cooperation with the city of Philadelphia and the State of Pennsylvania. This project reminds us of the great things that can happen through the cooperative effort of elected representatives of the people.

The National Park Service, responding to congressional action, has also featured contributions by individuals in our heritage. Most important of the people who have received this kind of attention is a man whom I have dubbed the most American American—Abraham Lincoln. In cooperation with Kentucky and the citizens around Hodgenville they have restored the Lincoln birthplace area. Everywhere where Lincoln has lived is marked and is made available for the people to see.

One of the most outstanding in his early life is the Pidgeon Creek area in Indiana where last year a Nancy Hanks Park was dedicated in tribute to the mother of this great American and in appreciation of the contribution the great State of Indiana has made toward the shaping of Lincoln's destiny.

The State of Illinois has restored New Salem so that it looks just like it did when Lincoln lived there. The Lincoln tomb where Lincoln lies buried with his wife and three children is another great tribute made possible by the Government. The city of Springfield and the State of Illinois are now planning to restore a large section of the downtown area so that it will be reminiscent of the kind of community in which Lincoln lived and served as a legislator and a lawyer.

The city of New York wisely has kept the Cooper Union Building where Lincoln made that famous speech ending, "Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith, let us, to the end, dare to do our duty as we understand it."

In the city of Washington we have built a memorial to Lincoln which is neither tomb nor temple but something of both; a most magnificent structure and appropriate tribute to Lincoln. It draws more people to it than any comparable memorial anywhere else in the world.

Volumes could be written about the other tributes to this great man in bust, in statue, in picture, in books, and on our postage stamps. Why, you ask?

Again I suggest that the reasons are reflected in the some 6,000 books that have been written, all of them in part or in whole dealing with what Lincoln said, what he did, and what he was. What he said throughout his lifetime revealed the heart and soul of this man. It proves his burning desire to know what was right and then to say what was right in such a way that people could understand it. Then, with an unbounded faith in those ideals that gave us freedom he directed the forces spiritually and politically in the tragic and challenging period and we find now that what emerged then was an America more nearly like that envisioned by our forefathers than even the most avid abolitionist believed possible.

In this 100th anniversay and commemoration period of that time, the Civil War, we emphasize not the conflict but the tragedy, that at frightful cost enriched and made clear the American tradition. The phrase, "Conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal," acquired a magnificent meaning during and since the war for all of us and for all time. With the result that our Nation under God was unified and made strong beyond any power again to separate and divide. What has emerged now is the last great hope of an imperiled mankind. The fragment of history that we show so humbly today may furnish an insight into the tumult, the bitterness, that in the end cleared the air for the triumph forever of the American genius for justice and freedom.

Mr. Speaker, the State of Pennsylvania with its Civil War Centennial Commission assisting and the people of Gettysburg with the Lincoln fellowship there have, through the years, commemorated the anniversary of the Gettysburg Address. To that community, on the 19th of November, they have drawn national leaders, Governors, Senators, Congressmen, Cabinet members, historians, and poets like Sandburg and each time, with these programs, these people have enriched the American heritage there by recalling, reviewing, reappraising, and placing in proper perspective for us what was said there and the things we need to be reminded of that this situation recalls. For this I believe every American should be thankful.

Mr. Speaker, no greater expression of our appreciation could be shown for the sacrifice that was made for freedom, and which, through a combination of circumstances, was so eloquently called to our attention by Lincoln on that important day 100 years ago next November, than the passage of H.R. 1611 introduced by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, GEORGE GOODLING, the Representative of that district, calling for the issuance of a 50 cent piece to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Gettysburg Address.

Mr. Speaker, I therefore would like to give my support to H.R. 1611 and review if I may a little history in connection with this address that might be worthwhile for us to think about as we consider this very appropriate tribute to a man, to an occasion and through both to our philosophy of government of, by and for the people.

I will begin by reminding you that 100 years ago two armies met near the little town of Gettysburg, in southern Pennsylvania. The details of the titanic battle that followed have been well covered in numerous books, so that it is not necessary, even if it were possible, to recount them here. The battle raged for 3 days, July 1–3, 1963. Thousands laid down their lives in sacrifice and other thousands were wounded, captured, or missing. We who are so far removed from that awful conflict can hardly imagine the heroism and hope, the tragedy and despair of the men who fought there.

In the end, Lee withdrew across the Potomac. The high-water mark of the Confederacy had been reached. The contest was not ended, but Lee was never again at the head of an army of equal strength, and never again did he set his columns in motion and enter into a conflict with such high hopes. The battles of Cold Harbor, the Wilderness, and Spottsylvania were still to be fought, and Sherman was yet to make his historic march to the sea. But after the failure of Pickett's charge on July 3, Appomattox was inevitable.

Gettysburg was decisive not only in the American Civil War; it was decisive

also in man's long struggle for popular government.

Following the battle the heroic dead were hastily buried in shallow graves, many of them unmarked. This condition was highly unsatisfactory, and Mr. David Wills, a resident of Gettysburg, who was a true-hearted patriot and a man of great executive ability, took the lead in correcting it. On July 24, 1863, he wrote to Governor Curtin, submitting a plan for a cemetery in which the remains of the dead heroes could be reinterred and properly marked. With the approval of Governor Curtin and the cooperation of the Governors of other States, land was purchased and the cemetery grounds plotted and laid out. Plans were made for consecrating the cemetery with appropriate ceremonies and the Honorable Edward Everett of Massachusetts was selected as the orator for the occasion. In deference to his wishes the ceremonies were postponed until November 19.

The invitation to President Lincoln to speak at Gettysburg was an afterthought. On November 2 Mr. Wills wrote to the President informing him:

> These grounds will be consecrated and set apart to this sacred purpose, by appropriate ceremonies, on Thursday, the 19th instant. Hon. Edward Everett will deliver the oration. I am authorized by the Governors of the different States to invite you to be present and participate in these ceremonies, which will doubtless be very imposing and solemnly impressive. It is the desire that after the oration, you, as Chief Executive of the Nation, formally set apart these grounds to their sacred use by a few appropriate remarks. We hope you will be able to be present to perform this last solemn act to the soldier-dead on this battlefield.

President Lincoln needed no urging. His heart was full of gratitude for what had been so gloriously accomplished at Gettysburg. He determined to find time in the midst of a busy schedule to participate in the dedicatory ceremonies.

The original plans proposed that the train carrying the Presidential party should leave Washington at 6 a.m., arriving at Gettysburg at noon. On the return trip, the train was to leave Gettysburg at 6 p.m. and arrive in Washington at midnight. Lincoln was not satisfied. He wrote on the note from Stanton the following endorsement:

> I do not like the arrangement. I do not wish to so go that by the slightest accident we fail entirely; and, at the best, the whole to be a mere breathless running of the gauntlet.

In deference to the President's objection, an alternate arrangement was made providing that the train should leave Washington at noon on November 18 instead of at 6 a.m. on November 19.

Almost innumerable books and magazine articles have professed to tell the true story of Lincoln's notable address. It has been asserted that he wrote it on the train between Washington and Gettysburg; that he wrote it at the Wills' residence the night before its delivery; and that he wrote it in full before leaving Washington. There are five copies, still extant, in Lincoln's own handwriting. The first page of the first draft is on a sheet of "Executive Mansion" letter paper. Except for the first sheet, the first draft is written in pencil on the wide-lined paper that he habitually used for public documents, similar to that which he used for the writing of his second inaugural address. William E. Barton, in his excellent work, "Lincoln at Gettysburg," says:

> Whether Lincoln had wholly completed his first draft before he left Washington, we are not sure; if he had, he was not satisfied with the way it ended. He certainly did not write the address or any large part of it on the train. At Judge Wills' house that evening he read over the first draft of his speech, and was not pleased with the way it ended. His second sheet, whatever he had on it, he presumably destroyed. About 9 o'clock the following morning, Lincoln rose from the breakfast table in the Wills house and went to his room. There, not very long afterward, John G. Nicolay found him rewriting his address. For this rewriting he used the same kind of paper which he had used for the pencilled first draft of his second page. From the new draft, written wholly in ink, and without erasure, on two pages of the wide-lined paper, Lincoln delivered his address that day. This second draft is virtually a fair copy of the first draft.

The dedicatory program opened with a dirge by the Birgfield band of Philadelphia, followed by a prayer by the Reverend Thomas H. Stockton, Chaplain of the U.S. Senate. The effort was eloquent although somewhat lengthy, but it was the embodiment of the spirit of patriotism and victory rather than of the spirit of humility and devotion.

A selection by the Marine band followed, after which letters of regret from Gen. George G. Meade, Gen. Winfield Scott, and others, were read.

It was noon when Mr. Everett arose and spoke the opening words of his oration:

> Standing beneath this serene sky, overlooking these broad fields now reposing from the labors of the waning year, the mighty Alleghenies towering before us, the graves of our brethren beneath our feet, it is with hesitation that I raise my poor voice to break the eloquent silence of God and nature.

His oration, which had been prepared with care, was delivered with effectiveness. It was nearly 2 o'clock when he closed with the prophecy that "down to the latest period of recorded time, in the glorious annals of our common country there will be no brighter page than that which relates the Battles of Gettysburg."

Everett's oration was followed by a hymn composed for the occasion by B. B. French, of Washington, and sung by the Baltimore Glee Club. The second stanza reflected the spirit of the occasion and set the tone of thousands of Memorial Day ceremonies in the decades to come:

> "Here let them rest;
> And summer's heat and winter's cold
> Shall grow and freeze above this mold,
> A thousand years shall pass away,
> A nation still shall mourn this day,
> Which now is blest."

The crowd was silent when Lincoln rose to speak, following the hymn, but the address was so short that the people had hardly adjusted themselves to its spirit when he ceased. It is reported that as he took his seat there was silence for a moment, then some scattered applause.

The Gettysburg address was not received with universal acclaim. The simple remarks were given scant attention by the big dailies. The opposition press, as might be expected, treated the address with indifference or even with scorn. The Springfield (Mass.) Republican was almost alone in its immediate recognition of the immortal words. The following day, the Republican labeled it "a perfect gem, deep in feeling, compact in thought and expression."

It is true that greatness in a speech, like greatness in other events, is often recognized only when seen through the haze of time. As the curious but sympathetic multitude saw a sad-faced man sink down in his chair, how little they realized that the sentences they had been privileged to hear would take their place among the great works of literature. Prof. H. C. Holloway, who was present that day, says in his reminiscences:

> Indeed, so great was the speech that no one at the time comprehended it fully. No eulogistic utterances in regard to it can do it justice. As the ages go by it will lose none of its luster. We had heard very much more that day than we dreamed of.

Yet, even then, the brief address elicited commendation from one who was certainly a qualified judge. Edward Everett spoke with the voice of prophecy when he said:

> Mr. President, your speech will be remembered long after mine is forgotten.

The following day he wrote to Lincoln a letter in which he expressed his great admiration for the address, and said:

> I should be glad if I could flatter myself that I came as near to the central idea of the occasion in my 2 hours as you did in 2 minutes.

Notwithstanding the importance of the battle itself, and in spite of Lincoln's assertion that "the world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here," it is the address that has kept alive the memory of the battle. The Gettysburg address has become a part of our American heritage and of the heritage of freedom-loving people throughout the world. It stands in the very first rank of American state papers, surpassed only by the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and the Bill of Rights. It is the object of H.R. 1611 to commemorate the anniversary of the delivery of this historic address, a purpose in which I heartily and sincerely concur.

In one version of the address the closing clause reads, "and that this Government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth;" in its final form, however, this clause was changed to read, "and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth." This change gave it universal application and demonstrated that Lincoln's thoughts and hopes swept far beyond the borders of America and embraced the whole of humanity.

In the Gettysburg Address, delivered in the midst of a long and bloody war, we find no trace of an appeal to the baser

passions. It was an occasion on which exultation or vindictiveness might naturally have found a place in wounded hearts. Such sentiments were not entirely absent from the program and from the applause which the expression of those sentiments evoked. Even the chaplain's prayer was not wholly free from a spirit of boasting and bitterness. But no suggestion of rejoicing or revenge is found in Lincoln's words. Emerson says:

> Lincoln's heart was as large as the world, but in it there was no room for the memory of a wrong.

His thought rose above the passing passions of the hour and dwelt on great and abiding truths.

Today, the forces of communism press everywhere against the frontiers of the free world. In international affairs we pass from one crisis to another. In his article entitled "The Last Best Hope of Earth," Carl Haverlin says:

> In this battle for sheer survival, the ideas of Abraham Lincoln and the power that has been generated by what he was, what he accomplished, and what he stood for are, in my opinion, among the most potent weapons that the free world can wield. Since so many of the globe's inhabitants are have-nots, the figure of Abraham Lincoln gains added strength because of his own insignificant beginnings, and his lifelong dedication to the dignity of man. Wherever one looks, whether at home or abroad, there are many examples of this imprint today.

Elsewhere in the same article, Mr. Haverlin writes:

> But I am sure that in the balances of men's minds—whether they be men of Ghana and black, or men of India and brown, or men of China and yellow, or whether pigmented like ourselves and thus in a world sense in the minority—the existence of Abraham Lincoln and the body of people who supported him weighs in those balances more heavily in our national interest than we can realize.

This bill provides that the United States shall not be subject to the expense of making the necessary dies and other preparation for such coinage. I mention this point only in passing. I do not desire to emphasize it because I feel that the project would be a worthwhile one even if the expense were substantial.

Mr. Speaker, the United States can have no finer image in the eyes of the world than the one supplied by the Gettysburg Address. The issuing of this commemorative coin is, in a sense, an affirmation of our faith in the ideals of Lincoln and in the sentiments that he expressed in the Gettysburg Address. It is a rededication to the great task remaining before us. It is an indication, before the whole world, that we are willing to stand up and be counted. It is a renewal of his high resolve, and ours, "that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth."

Mr. Speaker, some will argue against this proposition because of precedent. Let me say that while a new precedent may be established with the issuance of this special 50-cent piece to commemorate the Gettysburg Address, it is not new to have a special issue of the 50-cent piece.

This Congress, in its wisdom, did just that to help Iowa commemorate the 100th anniversary of its coming into the Union. This was good public policy and it served the public interest because it did call attention to a great and important event in our history—and I say parenthetically that Congress never did a finer thing when they gave the people of Iowa the opportunity and privilege of having more self-government. This has added both to the welfare of the people there and to the Nation and it has enriched our culture. This issuance encouraged the people of Iowa to reflect on the contribution that they have made to their heritage and to renew their pledges to the great ideals summed up pretty well in the Iowa motto that says "Our liberties we prize and our rights we will maintain."

But Mr. Speaker, if this is establishing a new precedent it is a good one just like the setting of other precedents have been throughout history.

I do not know the details of the impression that they would have on this coin but I imagine there would be a quote from the Gettysburg Address itself if not the complete address. This they tell me is possible. Possibly they would use just the last part which reads:

> That we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this Nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.

If just those ringing, meaningful words could be called to the attention of our people daily and to the attention of all who would have occasion to use our currency, they would be reminded each time of our system which gives freedom for the people. It is clear from this statement, too, that what is referred to here for the people is meant for all the people everywhere.

Mr. Speaker, because of the fact that this can be done almost without cost to the Government and the further fact that it can and will do so much good for freedom, let us join hands in the passage of this legislation and in every way we can to aid and abet those in Pennsylvania and Gettysburg to adequately commemorate this great occasion, this magnificent speech, and this great ideal that was exemplified so eloquently and impressively 100 years ago next November 19.

This does involve history, a great interest of mine. For those, and there may be some, who believe that history is dead, dull, and finished, let me suggest what a great historian has said and that is:

> The events of the past are but the earlier acts in a drama that is still going on—that what happens tomorrow is only the shadow of an action taken today, the echo of a thought conceived yesterday. Understanding the ideas created and nourished by great minds through all our centuries can give contemporary man a new capacity for judgment and vision—a capacity which will clarify and illuminate his life, as a citizen and as a man.

I suggest in addition, that the deeper we look into our own history, the further we can look forward with confidence in the great ideals that were reflected in the life and action of Abraham Lincoln who, in my opinion, stood so tall among us that day when he gave us the 267 words we find in the Gettysburg Address. They need to be remembered forever, they need to be commemorated in such a way that the impact of what was there said will be made more manifest, more meaningful, to more people everywhere.

A COIN SHOULD BE MINTED TO COMMEMORATE THE CENTENARY OF LINCOLN'S GETTYSBURG ADDRESS

Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GOODLING] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa?

There was no objection.

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, 100 years ago, 5 score if you will, come November 19, thousands of Americans gathered at Gettysburg to witness ceremonies held to dedicate a portion of a great battlefield of the American Civil War as a national cemetery. What transpired on that day has made the name of Gettysburg known and cherished wherever in this world men love freedom.

On that occasion, the President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln, was asked to make a "few appropriate remarks." Confining his remarks to less than 300 words is an indication he complied with the first request. The President did not live to learn how appropriate his words actually were. Their real significance is attested by their lasting fame. They have been revered throughout the world as the sublime Gettysburg Address. A grateful posterity has taken what he said as the creed for all who love liberty. Freedom and sacrifice then as now, are inseparable.

It would appear fitting and proper that a coin should be stricken to commemorate the centenary of what is probably the most meaningful and lasting address, one which acquires deeper significance with each passing year. It has become an American heritage and stands as a beacon light for the entire world. Like the man who uttered it, its fame does not end at waters edge. Wherever there is written and spoken language, Lincoln and his immortal passages are known.

There is no more fitting and finer tribute to the Gettysburg Address than that of Lord Curzon, in an address delivered at Cambridge University, November 6, 1931. The following is a part of that speech:

> It is an amazingly comprehensive and forceful presentation of the principles for which the war then was waging. It joined the local to the national, the occasional to the permanent, it went straight at a declaration of the purpose which animated the soul of Abraham Lincoln, and for which the men buried at Gettysburg had given their lives. Above all, it was a declaration of America's fundamental principles.

When Mr. Lincoln went to Gettysburg he must have had some supernatural power to look beyond his immediate audience. Democracy was on trial and this had to be shown to the world. There is evidence that the phrase a "few appropriate remarks" gave him considerable concern and weighed heavily upon him and caused him to give serious consideration to what he should say.

The President reached Gettysburg in the afternoon of November 18, carrying with him at least part of his address. It was completed in the home of Judge Wills where he was a guest.

The ceremonies on the 19th were solemn and impressive. There was appropriate music, the recital of a dirge written for the occasion by Benjamin B. French, the U.S. Commissioner of Public Buildings and what was to be the main address of the day. This was delivered by the foremost orator of the time, Hon. Edward Everett, of Massachusetts. For 2 hours he expounded in his graceful polished phrases which had gained him his standing as the Nation's greatest orator.

This then was the situation as the tall man arose. So brief were his dedicatory remarks the audience had barely settled before he had finished. It was probably a disappointed audience, it having expected more. It was not until it appeared in print that its true beauty became apparent. As stated, the President was looking beyond the Gettysburg audience. Here he summed up the one fundamental principle of American Government—political equality. He portrayed briefly all fields where men have contended and died for human liberty and for government which would assure to all the rights and opportunities of life. Lincoln showed the country the Civil War was waged to test democracy and that his and future generations must dedicate themselves to the unfinished tasks. One hundred years later much remains unfinished.

Few men have the ability to say so much in so few words. The real significance of the Gettysburg Address can be summed up in one word—simplicity.

Gettysburg was the turning point in the war. It was decisive in the Civil War, but was also decisive in the world struggle for popular government, one that would recognize all who would become Americans, one which believed in the brotherhood of man.

A coin should be minted for Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. The words are as relevant today as they were one century ago. An unknown minister said:

> Lincoln's Gettysburg speech was a coin dropped from the mine of the Anglo-Saxon language.

The precedent has been established. A coin was minted to commemorate the 75th anniversary in 1938. Within the last few days this House did what had never been done in the history of the country. It established a precedent by making a distinguished gentleman an honorary citizen of the United States.

It does appear fitting and proper that a coin should be minted to commemorate the centennial of what is truly a landmark in history and will live as long as the spoken language. This event should be properly remembered, for contrary to what Mr. Lincoln suggested, the world did note and remember what he said there.

THE TFX CONTROVERSY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PRICE] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks and include two newspaper articles.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Speaker, I am sure that we are all concerned about the continuing controversy reported daily in the press on the subject of the congressional inquiry into the TFX award recently made by the Department of Defense. I participated in the discussions on this subject on the floor on March 4. At that time my interest centered around the appeal of one of the two major participants to the Congress after having lost the competition primarily because of failure to adhere to the ground rules prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. The losing company really designed two airplanes rather than one as prescribed in the ground rules. A number of the other participants, major aircraft companies, which had previously been eliminated could easily have duplicated the proposal of the losing company had they, too, failed to adhere to the ground rules.

That the ground rules were feasible can be readily demonstrated. The tactical plane currently in major production for the Air Force is produced in an aircraft plant adjacent to my district. It was designed and built by the Navy for the Navy mission. Afterward this plane was found to be the best plane for the Air Force tactical mission as well. I am greatly disturbed that the example of this plane has apparently escaped the notice of the inquiry and the press.

Subsequent to my remarks on the floor on March 4 the press has taken a much more balanced view of the whole matter. One of the articles that has done much to clear up the uncertainties is an article by John G. Norris published in the Washington Post on March 18. After very capably reviewing all facets of the matter, Mr. Norris points out that no one seriously suggests that politics entered into Mr. McNamara's decision. He very knowledgeably sums the situation up as follows:

> In the last analysis, it comes down to a question of judgment. And as McNamara pointed out, he is the man charged by law with making such highly important judgments. Right or wrong, most people feel that it will turn out to have been an honest judgment.

During my membership for some years on the House Armed Services Committee we have been urged repeatedly to pass legislation giving the Secretary of Defense adequate authority over the military. These recommendations cautioned us on the danger of the military-industrial threat to our way of life and have come from people at high levels who have borne high responsibility and from both political parties. In the instance of Mr. McNamara we have the capable man that we have all sought who is attempting to do the job that we in the Congress have outlined by our legislation. The columnist, Mr. William S. White, has adequately addressed himself to this aspect of the matter in the Evening Star of March 18 in which he says:

> Congress clamored for years for a Secretary who would knock heads together at the Pentagon.

If Mr. McNamara is seriously embarrassed by the congressional inquiry, perhaps subsequent weaker Secretaries of Defense will be tempted to view problems in terms of what powerful Member of Congress from what powerful congressional committee is interested in the problem rather than the merits of the matter at hand. Let me quote Mr. White:

> Somebody will be hurt; and this is a pity. But if the principal victim is Mr. McNamara, it will be a very bad thing, indeed.

I commend to you for your earnest consideration both articles as follows:

[From the Washington Post of March 18, 1963]

MISJUDGING MCNAMARA SEEN AS BOEING'S ERROR

(By John G. Norris)

Boeing lost the $6.5 billion TFX warplane order, it now seems clear, not as the result of political influence, but because it did not realize who was boss at the Pentagon.

In repeated proposals, the Seattle aircraft company offered the Air Force and Navy higher combat performance than its rival, General Dynamics—made possible only by building what are essentially two separate planes—instead of meeting Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara's demand for one all-purpose craft that may save $1 billion.

HOW BOEING LOST OUT

After 22 months, General Dynamics finally came up with what is essentially a single fighter plane design acceptable to both services' military chiefs even though its performance will be less than Boeing offered.

Boeing apparently based its hopes of winning on: (1) a bid that was about $100 million less than its rival's, and (2) a conviction that McNamara finally would yield to the military view that air combat performance was all important.

Instead, he rejected Boeing's bid as unrealistically low, declaring some of its proposed design innovations to attain higher performance were technically risky.

General Dynamics and its affiliate, Grumman Aircraft, received the award to build essentially similar versions of one fighter, on the ground that the one-plane approach and more conventional design promised to deliver a satisfactory plane sooner and cheaper.

M'NAMARA FACES QUIZ

In essence, McNamara's position is that the expected $1 billion savings outweighed the extra performance Boeing offered.

Whether McNamara is right remains to be seen. When he goes before the Senate Permanent Investigating Subcommittee this week for questioning on the detailed brief he submitted to it Wednesday, McNamara must:

Convince the public that Boeing greatly underestimated the cost of developing the

complex TFX fighter and that the Government would have had to bail out the company had it been given the order even though its proposal was a fixed-price bid. Pentagon officials say he not only will present detailed data on where Boeing was low but will give official estimates of what the cost actually would have been.

Uphold his contention that Boeing's inexperience in building fighters—whereas General Dynamics and Grumman are veterans in the field—is a valid argument against it. Opponents insist that Boeing's record in making bombers is excellent and that fighter production techniques are not too different.

Explain away the errors discovered in some Pentagon evaluations of the rival bids and some charges of "unusual procedures" employed in the evaluation that have been brought out before the Senate subcommittee. McNamara did not touch on these in his "brief" last week, but aids insist they are of minor importance.

Convince Congress that his estimate of a billion-dollar saving in having one plane instead of two is realizable. The Secretary is relying not only on economics in development costs, but those in production, operation, maintenance, and spare parts inventories once in service.

The importance of this central point of McNamara's case has been challenged. Some contend that the differences between the Air Force and Navy versions of the Boeing proposal—compared to these in the successful bid—were less marked and vital than claimed.

Show that the added performance offered by Boeing was marginal compared to the marked advantages that introduction of the General Dynamics-Grumman plane will bring when the TFX is introduced to Air Force squadrons and Navy aircraft carriers in the late 1960's.

NEW TYPE OF WING

The new plane, to be known as the F-111, employs a radically new variable sweep wing than can be pulled back for high speed—1,700 miles an hour—or pushed forward for "loitering" over combat areas and landing on short, rough fields. This innovation also will give the craft much improved performance at both low and high altitudes and in cross-ocean ferrying range. It is designed for use in both conventional and nuclear warfare.

Congressional testimony so far has brought out that the original specifications set by McNamara in 1961 for the all-purpose plane had to be watered down because bidders could not satisfy the differing Air Force and Navy needs without building what amounted to two airplanes.

McNamara's opponents say that because of this and the final decision favoring General Dynamics instead of Boeing, the Air Force and Navy will get poorer planes than if the aircraft industry had been allowed to push for two top performance aircraft.

DELAYS IN PAST PRACTICE

In the past, the practice generally has been to try to build the best combat plane possible within the state of the art of aeronautical science. This has often led to delays in eliminating bugs and getting them into service on schedule—a point made by McNamara against the Boeing design.

Many believe, however, that if time shows McNamara to have been wrong, it will be because he overruled the military and insisted on his moneysaving all-purpose airplane.

No one now seems to be seriously suggesting that politics entered into his decision. When General Dynamics won the coveted order last fall, some people's eyebrows were raised. The company will develop and build the TFX at its Fort Worth plant in Democratic Texas, while Boeing would have done the work at its Wichita plant in Republican Kansas.

GROUNDLESS INNUENDOS

Washington wiseacres promptly dubbed the TFX—which stands for tactical fighter experimental—the L.B.J.—short for LYNDON B. JOHNSON. But after extensive airing of the controversy these innuendos seem completely groundless.

It is too early to say definitely who is right and who is wrong in the complex controversy. McNamara made a strong case in his statement filed with the Senate subcommittee last week. The evidence before Senator JOHN L. MCCLELLAN's investigating group so far indicates there may be a strong case against it.

In the last analysis, it comes down to a question of judgment. And as McNamara pointed out, he is the man charged by law with making such highly important judgments. Right or wrong, most people feel that it will turn out to have been an honest judgment.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Mar. 18, 1963]

MCNAMARA'S BIGGEST TEST—STRONGEST MEMBER OF KENNEDY'S CABINET FACES STRONGEST MEN OF CONGRESS

(By William S. White)

Irresistible force and immovable object are meeting in a great and melancholy contest now drawn taut between the strongest member of the Cabinet, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and the strongest men of Congress.

Somebody will be hurt; and this is a pity. But if the principal victim is Mr. McNamara, it will be a very bad thing, indeed.

For the real issues lying between the devoted Robert McNamara and the equally devoted men of Congress are infinitely bigger than even the chief present symbol of their dispute, the multibillion-dollar contract now being investigated in the Senate.

Aptly enough, this inquiry is being conducted by one of the best groups in Congress, the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee headed by Senator JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, of Arkansas. His panel is doggedly examining why Secretary McNamara let a contract for the all-purpose TFX warplane to General Dynamics Corp. rather than to the rival Boeing Co., which had offered what seemed on its face to be a lower bid.

With equal doggedness, Mr. McNamara is defending that decision on the ground that, taking everything into consideration, it was his judgment that General Dynamics could do the job in the least time, at the least risk, with the best result in weaponry and, in the end, also at the least cost.

The rights and wrongs, in sheer terms of immediate dollars and cents, are quite beyond any independent evaluation by this columnist and may forever be. For by their very nature such vast outlays by the Pentagon include such immense and varied factors as to make any outside judgment as difficult to grasp as a wavering moonbeam flitting across the ceiling of a shuttered room at midnight.

Other and more important things, however, can be said with complete confidence. Involved here is a challenge to Secretary McNamara's ultimate civilian control over the Pentagon by uniformed officers with pipelines to Congress who beyond question are far less interested in economy than he is. Their professional interest, and rightly so, is in having all the arms they want of the kind they prefer, period.

His interest must be in procuring the best arms available; but with due regard to economy, to unified general military policy and to many other considerations which do not overly concern the uniformed military fellows.

And involved—though not in the McClellan committee itself as a whole—is a determined movement in Congress to reduce the authority of this civilian head of the Pentagon and to increase that of the generals and admirals.

There is no "conspiracy" between the men in uniform and the men in Congress. But there is undoubtedly some working purpose to cut Secretary McNamara down to size.

At last, the whole question comes to this: Is civilian authority to be supreme, or is it to be abridged in the clearly well-intentioned but profoundly dangerous notion that, in these days of cold war, the generals and admirals really know best?

It is a hard question superificially, but to those who have read the Constitution it has only one answer. The Secretary of Defense must remain the Secretary of Defense. If he falls into fatal error, it will be necessary to get another man. But neither Congress nor the generals-admirals can run the Pentagon—or should.

All the same, there is tragedy here. The men in Congress who are striking at Secretary McNamara are acting from the highest motives. And the man they are striking at has been regarded up to now by these very men of Congress as the best Secretary of Defense in history, tough and nonpolitical.

Congress clamored for years for a Secretary who would knock heads together at the Pentagon. Congress has got him now—and is not so happy with the choice as it was before.

SHOULD THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES TOLERATE NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. ASHBROOK] is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, should the Congress of the United States tolerate noncompliance with the law? The answer is certainly "no" but it should be a more emphatic "no" when it comes to this body or its Members. Certainly if we are to require obedience to the laws which we enact to regulate the diverse affairs of our fellow men, we should zealously endeavor to live within both the spirit and the letter of the law when it directly relates to us and to this august body.

On March 12, 1963, on pages 4017–4019, I outlined a situation which exists regarding the reporting of counterpart funds under title 22, section 1754 of the United States Code. This law clearly requires the reporting and full disclosure of the counterpart funds expended by Congress. Section (b) of this statutory requirement says, in part:

(b) *Provided,* That each member or employee of any such committee shall make, to the chairman of such committee in accordance with regulations prescribed by such committee, an itemized report showing the amounts and dollar equivalent values of each such foreign currency expended and the amounts of dollar expenditures made from appropriated funds in connection with travel outside the United States, together with the purposes of the expenditure, including lodging, meals, transportation, and other purposes. Within the first 60 days that Congress is in session in each calendar year, the chairman of each such committee shall prepare a consolidated report showing the total itemized expenditures during the preceding calendar year of the committee and each subcommittee thereof, and of each member

and employee of such committee or subcommittee, and shall forward such consolidated report to the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives.

The report which was filed for the Committee on Education and Labor in the March 11, 1963, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on pages 3967–3968, clearly was not in accordance with the requirements of this law. I pointed out these areas of noncompliance in my March 12 address to this body.

It is interesting to see the impasse regarding this noncompliance with our own statutory mandate. As a Member of Congress, I have used every means available to find out the full story on these funds expended by our committee, but everywhere it is a dead end. I am well aware of the fact that the Attorney General does not give opinions to Members of Congress but I nonetheless wrote to him and asked if he had any responsibility to enforce title 22, section 1754. This is the reply I received:

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, March 18, 1963.

Hon. JOHN M. ASHBROOK,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN ASHBROOK: This is with reference to your letter to the Attorney General of March 13, 1963, regarding the responsibility placed upon Members of Congress by the reporting requirements of 22 U.S.C. 1754(b).

We very much regret that the Attorney General is unable to furnish you with an opinion on the matter. The law limits him to giving legal advice to the President and the heads of the executive departments. See 5 U.S.C. 303, 304. Beginning with Attorney General Wirt, it has been the traditional position of Attorneys General that legal opinions should not be rendered either to Congress, its committees or its Members. (See e.g., 1 Op. A.G. 335; 2 id. 499; 36 id. 532.)

We are, however, desirous of assisting you as far as possible, and therefore offer the following as an unofficial comment. The statute in question authorizes local currencies owned by the United States to be made available to certain committees of Congress for their local currency expenses, and provides that each member or employee of any such committee shall make an itemized expenditure report to the chairman of the committee. It is further provided that the chairman of a House committee shall forward a consolidated expenditure report to the House Committee on House Administration and the chairman of a Senate committee shall forward such a report to the Senate Appropriations Committee. The section does not contain any penal sanction for failure to comply with its provisions, and we are not aware of any. We assume that noncompliance is a matter for the chairman of the committee involved or for each House of Congress itself in an appropriate case. I invite your attention to the Conference Report on the Mutual Security Act of 1958 (H. Rept. No. 2038, 85th Cong., 2d sess.), the relevant portions of which appear at 1958 U.S. Code Congressional and Administration News 2805–06.

Sincerely,

NORBERT A. SCHLEI,
Assistant Attorney General.

I also wrote to the State Department after a telephone conversation with Mr. John Leahy of that Department. Mr. Leahy was most courteous but felt it was not within his authority to release to me the figures on counterpart moneys expended by the Committee on Education and Labor. The letter I directed to Secretary Rusk elicited the following reply:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 18, 1963.

Hon. JOHN M. ASHBROOK,
House of Representatives.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN ASHBROOK: I am replying to your letter of March 11 requesting statistics on counterpart funds expended by the Committee on Education and Labor.

Present procedures for the disbursement and accounting of local currencies owned by the United States were established in 1953 after consultation with Congress and provide for annual reports to be made in detail to the chairman of the congressional committee authorizing the use of those funds. This is done on the basis of the relevant act of Congress (sec. 502(b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1959) which states that local currencies "shall be made available to appropriate committees of the Congress engaged in carrying out their duties * * *."

A detailed report is annually provided by the Department to each committee covering all funds drawn by its members and staff pursuant to letter of authorization from the committee chairman. Since the sole authority for the use of the local currency resides with the legislative branch and the funds are for the use of its members and staff in carrying out their duties, it has been concluded by both the executive and legislative branches for a number of years that information concerning congressional use of the money should be obtained from Congress rather than the State Department. I respectfully urge that the proper place to which your inquiry concerning the Education and Labor Committee should be directed is appropriate officials in Congress and submit that this is strictly pursuant to the long evident intent of Congress on these matters.

For an agency of the executive branch to undertake unilaterally to change established procedures primarily concerning the Congress would obviously not be proper. Also, as a matter of basic policy, the separation of the executive and legislative branches of Government militates that Members of Congress be accountable through their respective Houses concerning these funds. For it to be otherwise would, in effect, have the Department police Members of Congress.

The Department submitted on February 28 to the Committee on Education and Labor a full report on the disbursement of local currencies for its members and staff pursuant to letters of authorization from the committee chairman. This was done on the same basis as in past years. The report included the amount of local currency obtained by its members, the date the money was furnished, the country where it was provided, the equivalent U.S. dollar value, and whether for transportation, as an advance, or other purpose specified by the Members of Congress.

I regret that I cannot provide the specific information which you request.

Sincerely,

FREDERICK G. DUTTON,
Assistant Secretary.

You will note that the Department "submitted on February 28 to the Committee on Education and Labor a full report on the disbursement of local currencies for its members and staff pursuant to letters of authorization from the committee chairman." I have therefore directed the following letter to the chairman of our committee:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., March 20, 1963.

Hon. ADAM C. POWELL,
Chairman, Committee on Education and Labor, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN POWELL: As a member of the Committee on Education and Labor I am interested, as I am certain you are, in making sure that our committee complies with the law. It is apparent to me on the face of the report which you filed with the Committee on House Administration concerning the expenditure of so-called counterpart funds that this report is not in compliance with title 22, section 1754, United States Code.

Possibly this is a clerical error on the part of one of our committee staff members. At any rate, the error should be rectified. The State Department informs me that on February 28, 1963, they furnished you with a full report on the counterpart funds expended by our committee. Unless you consider this report as a matter which is private to you and not available to the members of the committee, I would like to receive a copy of it.

At any rate, I hope every effort will be made to correct this report so we will comply with the law.

Sincerely,

JOHN M. ASHBROOK,
Representative to Congress.

This is a most interesting situation, as I have stated before. The Committee on House Administration says that it is not their responsibility to check into the expenditure of these funds. I am sure that they are right. On the other hand, the only department which knows the full story, the State Department, will not tell and the Attorney General's Office is not interested. Now, if our chairman will not tell me, how will we ever know the true picture of these moneys expended? Possibly some Members feel that the expenditure of these funds should be treated like a private little game preserve for chairmen of the various committees, but I am sure that the taxpaying public does not agree with this contention.

In checking the history of this provision, we once again see what happens in a Senate-House conference where the House recedes from its position. The mutual security bill of the House of Representatives, H.R. 12181, 85th Congress, had provided for a substantial modification and reorganization of the accounting procedures of the House of Representatives which would have brought about a more thorough disclosure of the counterpart funds used by Members of Congress. In the language of Senate Report No. 1627, which accompanied the conference report, the conferees stated that:

The House conferees * * * accepted the simpler language of the Senate amendment, since it appeared to attain their desired objectives.

It is now evident that this provision has not accomplished the desired objective.

"THE TEST BAN: AN AMERICAN STRATEGY OF GRADUAL SELF-MUTILATION"—CHAPTERS I AND II, BY STEFAN T. POSSONY

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from California [Mr. HOSMER] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman Missouri?

There was no objection.

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to insert at this point in the RECORD chapters I and II of an article entitled "The Test Ban: An American Strategy of Gradual Self-Mutilation" by Stefan T. Possony of the Hoover Institution.

CHAPTER I

At all times and ages, some people felt the urge to turn back the wheel of time. Mostly, this urge degenerates into innocent "reactionary" talk; but sometimes the talk affects policy and delays reform. Since 1945, when the first atomic bombs were exploded, the urge to go back to the "good old days" of World War I and World War II (which cost upward of 100 million casualties, worldwide) has become overpowering in many, and has resulted in a foreign policy out of Pandora's Box. But these nuclear age reactionaries are posing a threat far worse than mere slowdown of technical progress; they are playing into the hands of the Communist revolutionaries, and thus endanger both peace and survival.

In the late 1940's some nuclear physicists, hoping that the invention of atomic weapons could be undone or neutralized, proposed a ban on testing. It was assumed that, given adequate detection equipment, any nuclear explosion anywhere on the globe could be detected without difficulty. Consequently, cheating would be impossible and a test ban would be self-enforcing. As a result, the development of nuclear weapons would be delayed or stopped, and the specter of nuclear holocaust eliminated.

Geneva, 1958: Science turns political

In 1958, American, British, and Soviet scientists met in Geneva to determine the nature, performance characteristics, and size of an international detection system which would be needed to control compliance with a test ban. The theory was that the inspection system should be constructed according to the findings of objective scientists, i.e. a reliable detection system was to be the prerequisite for a political test ban agreement, the system was to possess as much reliability as the scientists were able to build into it, and the political compact was to insure the construction and operation of the detection system, substantially as the scientists recommended it.

The findings of the first Geneva scientific conference reflected many concessions by American scientists to Russian scientists. Russian negotiators were setting forth arguments inspired by political decisions, and some of them were not very familiar with the problems under discussion. American negotiators were interpreting scientific facts as loosely as possible in order to ensure that the negotiations not be broken off prematurely. It turned out later that much of the information on which the initial Geneva recommendations had been based, was invalid. The conferees had taken the "easy way out" by disregarding such outstanding questions as the technology of cheating, or even the feasibility of underground and space testing. Subsequent scientific conferences had to be called to cover some of the gaps, but to this day such crucial questions as techniques of evasion still remain to be discussed, and great uncertainty about the requisite number and performance capabilities of control stations persists. For example, the number of control stations recommended at Geneva implicitly assumed that the test violator would cheat on or under terra firma but not at sea.

Careful study of the various Geneva documents shows that even in theory it is quite impossible to build a dependable detection system. In the political reality, only more or less phony detection systems are practical. Nevertheless, the test ban negotiations were continued and the unduly optimistic Geneva recommendations were watered down step by step. During the past few years test ban negotiations have centered around inspection and control systems which would provide only uncertain protection. Great trust is placed in unmanned so-called "black boxes" which a dictatorial state should not find too difficult to tamper with. But even the number of these black boxes has been reduced to below the bare minimum—obviously it is easiest to tamper with the smallest black box system.

Thus, the terms "detection," "identification," "inspection," and "control" have become mere symbols, and no longer refer to substantive hardware systems. The strategy of the test ban proponents has been to bring about a treaty in which lip service is paid to the need for inspection, for example, but in which provisions are made only for a pro forma inspection system. Shadowboxing of this sort is necessary to obtain the required public support.

Naive and biased test ban advisers

Many American policymakers have been sympathetic to test ban proposals for reasons not directly connected with American military security. Some have held that by pushing the test ban negotiation, the "image" of the United States would gain, notably in the underdeveloped areas. These proponents are forgetting entirely that a country which fritters away its basic strength and which is susceptible to being fooled by its opponent, is bound to lose prestige. Others hoped that the emplacement of a worldwide inspection system would open up presently closed societies—entirely forgetting that no dictatorial regime would acquiesce in a test ban if it involves the demise of the dictatorship, and overlooking the fact that a few inspectors digging a few holes in isolated mountain wastelands hardly can have political impact.

Unfortunately, many American decisions on test ban negotiations resulted in part from misinformation which was fed to decisionmakers and from a personnel policy through which test ban advocates were placed at focal positions throughout the Government, while their critics were silenced or removed.

Many of the U.S. scientists who presently are advocating for a test ban agreement, in 1949 were arguing against ICBM's and hydrogen bombs. Some of these people were then arguing that the United States did not need fusion devices and that if it did develop hydrogen weapons, the Soviets would be put in a position to copy the technology—yet at the time these arguments were set forth, the Soviets already were busy working on fusion weapons of their own design. If the advice of these experts had been followed, the Soviets would have gained a monopoly in ICBM systems with highly effective warheads and might have been in a position, sometime during the 1950's, to defeat the United States with little risk to their own survival.

Most of the American nuclear scientists who presently favor the test ban as a device to stop the arms race, to avoid nuclear holocaust, and to obtain mutual accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union have not taken the trouble to study communism, its objectives and action patterns. They have not familiarized themselves with Soviet strategy. They have no understanding of how the test ban, or rather the Communist protest ban propaganda, fits into the strategy of the Kremlin. Some assume naively that the Soviets are interested in the test ban as a step to securing world peace as we understand this term in the United States. These people would be highly surprised to learn that in Communist "Aesopian" semantics, the expression "lasting peace" is synonymous with "fully established worldwide Communist dictatorship after the elimination of all actual and potential forces of opposition and resistance."

It should be pointed out that some of the scientists favoring a test ban very often have been wrong in their scientific estimates. In particular, many have a record of denying feasibility of certain technical developments which later proved entirely feasible. The history of the H-bomb, among others, gives ample illustrations of this point. In other words, scientific interpretations have been bent to conform to political desires.

Soviet test ban strategy: Weapons superiority

The test ban was advertised as a "first step" to a broader agreement with the Soviets. It was argued that since both the Soviets and ourselves are interested in avoiding nuclear destruction, the test ban would satisfy an identical mutual interest, consequently, it would be feasible despite the cold war. Unfortunately, the assumption of a common mutual interest in strategy is fallacious. True, the Soviets don't want to be blown up, just as we don't want to succumb in a nuclear exchange. But the Soviets do not have the slightest interest in the survival of the United States or even the American people. They are interested in their own survival and victory, and in our destruction. Similarly, they are not interested in slowing down the technological race. Their interest is to slow down the technological progress of American weapon systems.

A relative slowdown of American nuclear progress was precisely what the Soviets achieved through the first unpoliced weapons moratorium. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on March 3, 1962, stated that the Soviet test series of 1961—by which the Soviets broke the de facto moratorium which had existed since October 31, 1958—made it "mandatory for the United States to examine our present and projected capabilities very closely" emphasizing that weapons systems development "is a dynamic technology similar to many industrial technologies," Mr. McNamara reassured Americans that as of March 1962, "The weapons in the arsenal of the free world are adequate to meet the strategic objectives of the present." However, he added the warning that "every effort must be made to insure" that these weapons "do not in fact become obsolete in their relationship to capabilities of a potential enemy."

In discussing the Soviet test series of 1961, Mr. McNamara characterized it as an "extensive weapons development effort." The implications of continuing the moratorium on atmospheric testing by the United States would be very grave indeed: "It would only be a matter of time before the present powerful U.S. nuclear strategic advantages would begin to diminish in relation to Soviet force capabilities and might ultimately shift in favor of the U.S.S.R." The United States, therefore, was forced "to recognize the extreme importance of the so-called 'technological momentum' as applied to this aspect of national defense." In other words, nuclear technology is progressing very fast, and American security policies must be based on a sober recognition of this central fact.

President Kennedy, in his address of March 2, 1962, indicated that the Soviet tests of 1961 "reflected a highly sophisticated technology, the trial of novel designs and techniques, and some substantial gains in weaponry." The President emphasized that the Soviet test series had as a "primary purpose * * * the development of warheads which weigh very little compared to the destructive efficiency of their thermonuclear yield," thus implying that the Soviets succeeded in increasing nuclear efficiency in terms of the yield-to-weight ratio. The increase of nuclear efficiency is one of the most significant factors governing weapons design. Not surprisingly, therefore, the President disclosed "in all candor that further Soviet series, in the absence of further Western progress, could well provide the Soviet Union

with a nuclear attack and defense capability so powerful as to encourage aggressive designs. Were we to stand still while the Soviets surpassed us, or even appear to surpass us, the free world's ability to deter, to survive and to respond to an all-out attack would be seriously weakened."

The President added that the United States "cannot make similar strides without testing in the atmosphere as well as underground" and that "in many areas of nuclear weapons research we have reached the point where our progress is stifled without experiments in every environment."

The President added another discouraging observation: as of March 1962, the Soviets had tested 30 high yield devices, while the United States had tested only 20 devices in the megaton range. It should be added that the United States never tested devices of a yield as high as those tested by the Soviets. Furthermore, as a result of the 1962 Soviet test series, during which they exploded at least 11 megaton shots, including two of about 30 megatons, the relative Soviet advantages over the United States in the high yield area should have increased further—unless we assume that we are smarter than our opponents and obtain better results through half the number of tests.

The 1961 tests provided the Soviets, as President Kennedy pointed out, "with a mass of data and experience on which, over the next 2 or 3 years, they can base significant analyses, experiments, and extrapolations, preparing for the next test series which would confirm and advance their findings." Chairman CHET HOLIFIELD, of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, on March 2, 1962, reiterated this same point: "Should the Soviets build upon their last series of tests with another series, the free world could be in great danger."

It so happens that the Soviets, during 1962, indeed conducted an additional, very extensive series of tests. According to U.S. announcements there were at least 34 shots. As soon as they concluded this second test series, they promptly made a "concession" to restart the test ban negotiations in earnest.

Political pressures devalue U.S. tests

It is true that the United States also tested during 1962, but as appears from Secretary McNamara's statement of March 3, 1962, as well as from many other statements and indications, the American tests were put under stringent operational limitations. There is a great difference in a test series designed to gain a maximum of scientific data and another in which many of the research requirements are subordinated to political apprehensions leading to inflexibility in scheduling events to sharp curtailments of yield.

One of the objectives of American testing was stated succinctly by Secretary McNamara: "Since the actual high altitude physical environment cannot be duplicated below ground, it was recognized that on the basis of technical developments in nuclear weaponry, the United States under the present conditions has no alternative but to proceed with an atmospheric test program." In this connection President Kennedy referred to Soviet high altitude nuclear explosions—"in one case over 100 miles high"—explaining that our opponents were seeking information on the effects of nuclear blasts on radar and communications and that this sort of testing constituted an important step in the development of an antimissile defense system. On the basis of these disclosures, it should have been expected that the U.S. high altitude tests would be pressed with vigor. But as soon as our high altitude tests ran into a number of technical difficulties and propaganda headwinds, the effort apparently was greatly scaled down.

With one known exception, the Soviet test shots were all atmospheric, whereas the majority of ours were underground In my judgment, much of the criticism of underground testing is ill-considered but it is true that certain tests must be conducted in other media. Hence an underground testing program, if it is to produce satisfactory results, must be larger in scope than an equivalent atmospheric program.

The plan was, as Mr. Kennedy announced last March, that "we will be conducting far fewer tests than the Soviets." Actually we attempted during 1962 about 103 shots—41 atmospheric, 2 underwater, 55 underground, 2 joint United States-United Kingdom underground, and 3 at high altitude, of which 2 were failures—but apparently less than a handful were genuinely high-yield tests. If the two Soviet test series of 1961 and 1962 are compared with our tests since the rupture of the moratorium, it appears that the Soviets detonated about 90 devices, including 25 of high yield, while the United States shot about 115 devices, with an absolute minimum of explosions in the megaton range.

Naturally, the number of Soviet tests as announced by USAEC must be considered to be a minimum figure: AEC may have missed a few shots, and it may not have announced all it knew; in particular, their figures do not include more than one Soviet underground shot. In the absence of a detailed analysis, one might infer (perhaps quite wrongly) that in general, progress in both countries probably was about even. However, with a high degree of confidence one could conclude that the Soviets now enjoy a lead in the capability of designing high-yield weapons.

To control the amount of radioactivity released during test series by testing underground, is neither unwise nor undesirable. The simple fact, however, is that the significance of tests with no holds barred is considerably higher than of those tests where one of the main intentions is just to go through the motions, and to advance physics rather than weaponry. I do not know whether the Soviets or we progressed farther during 1962, but to judge from the manner in which the two test series were conducted, the Soviets should have achieved substantially greater improvements in their relative strategic position.

Who now has nuclear superiority?

The possibility that there might now be in process a reversal in the strategic balance of power was spelled out with great clarity by Adm. Chester C. Ward on February 8, 1963, in his statement to the GOP conference committee on nuclear testing. He asserted that the Soviet weight-to-yield ratio which before 1961 had been about twice ours, by 1963 had leap-frogged over our capability. Irrespective of what the exact figures are, our previous lead, it is generally agreed, has diminished and may be disappearing. The Soviet weight-to-yield improvement apparently was particularly impressive in the large and superyield categories. Admiral Ward deduces from this fact that the Soviet stockpile of 1961 which was estimated at 20,000 megatons, in theory, could be reworked without addition of any new nuclear materials, into a stockpile of far larger dimensions. It is well to observe that a stockpile, to be militarily effective, must be deliverable. But it is also important to realize that the Soviets, through their test ban strategy, are attempting a reversal in the global nuclear power contest. They are aiming at superior nuclear efficiency, and through a technological quantum jump, at a vast enlargement of their weapons stockpile, as expressed in terms of megatons.

It is most discouraging, to say the least, that prior to ordering the temporary cessation of underground tests on January 26, 1963, neither the President, nor the Secretary of Defense, nor the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, felt a need to report to the Nation about the nuclear events of the past year. They did not disclose any information, let alone exact data, as to whether, as a result of the recent American tests, our lead which had become narrower by the end of 1961, again had been increased in American favor. If our advances had been spectacular, perhaps a temporary and very short suspension of our tests would have little meaning, even though the President stated in March 1962: "The basic lesson of some 3 years and 353 negotiating sessions at Geneva is this—that the Soviets will not agree to an effective ban * * * as long as * * * a new uninspected moratorium or a new agreement without controls, would enable them once again to prevent the West from testing while they prepare in secret."

The United States, on January 20, 1963, had again discontinued testing at a moment when the Soviets had done all the testing they planned to do and needed the time to digest the information. That this decision was based upon another misreading of Soviet intentions appeared speedily and on February 1, 1963, resumption of testing was ordered. But complicated programs cannot be turned off and on like water without falling to pieces. Nuclear security is not an area for playing a diplomatic cat-and-mouse game.

CHAPTER II

The test ban: a Soviet strategy for unilaterally disarming the West

There is a widespread assumption throughout the United States, and particularly among scientists, that the Soviet Union presently pursues a policy of "peaceful coexistence" and that this term means to the Soviets an attitude of live-and-let-live with the United States. Even if this is the correct interpretation, it does not follow that a test ban is desirable. The present policies of the Kremlin cannot be considered to be permanent. Technology continues to advance and requires constant endeavor.

"Peaceful coexistence"

But this wishful interpretation of peaceful coexistence is quite inaccurate. In his speech of January 6, 1961, for example, Khrushchev stated that peaceful coexistence, among other things "helps * * * the forces struggling for socialism, and in capitalist countries it facilitates the activities of Communist parties * * * it helps the national liberation movement to gain successes." Peaceful coexistence, according to the very architect of that strategy, "implies intensification of the struggle of the working class, of all the Communist parties, for the triumph of Socialist ideas." It is "a form of intense economic, political, and ideological struggle of the proletariat against the aggressive forces of imperialism in the international arena." "Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class struggle * * * the coexistence of states with different social systems is a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism."

Khrushchev summed up the essence of his current strategy as follows: "The policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of mobilizing the masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace."

The Communist magazine National Affairs Monthly (February 1955) made the point very explicit by saying: "peaceful coexistence does not take away from the right of the peoples to change their governments * * * but presupposes this right. The idea that peaceful coexistence must include the maintenance of the status quo is imperialist propaganda."

"Sincere" disarmament

Another widespread illusion is that the Soviets want disarmament "sincerely." The Communists are indeed very sincere about desiring U.S. disarmament but they don't have the slightest intention of disarming themselves. It is patently unfair to accuse

the Communists of insincerity in these matters because they did state what they want very clearly. Insincerity, by contrast, must be ascribed to those Americans who deliberately ignore the Communist message.

The Communist doctrine on war and disarmament has been entirely consistent since the times of Marx and Engels. For the Soviet Union the doctrine was laid down explicitly by Lenin. For example, in 1916, Lenin stated: "Only after the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie will it be able, without betraying its world historical mission, to throw all armaments on the scrap heap." In 1917, he said: "We are no pacifists * * * we have always declared that it would be stupid if the revolutionary proletariat promised not to wage revolutionary wars which might become indispensable in the interest of socialism."

In 1928, the resolutions of the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International disclosed: "The aim of the Soviet proposals (for general and complete disarmament submitted in November 1927) is * * * to propagate the fundamental Marxian postulates that disarmament and the abolition of war are possible only with the fall of capitalism."

In the same vein, Khrushchev, during the 20th party congress in 1956, made this interesting "dialectic" statement: "Putting into effect a policy of peace our party considers it to be its most important duty to strengthen untiringly the gallant and glory-covered armed forces of the Soviet state—our army, navy, and air force; equip them with the latest technology * * *."

On October 20, 1960, Khrushchev spoke about the need to "force" the capitalist countries to come to an agreement on disarmament. Similarly, at a meeting of representatives of 81 Communist parties, in December 1960, the directive was laid down that "an active determined struggle" had to be waged to "force the imperialists into an agreement on general disarmament."

In his speech of January 6, 1961, Khrushchev quoted Lenin to the effect that it was necessary to establish "contacts with those circles of the bourgeoisie who gravitate toward pacifism." A Russo-German military dictionary published in 1962 by the Military Academy of Communist East Germany defined liberal pacifism as "impotent peace sentimentality" which serves to bemuse the masses. It adds: "The Communists have never been pacifists" but "fight against unjust wars and support, with all means, just wars." The current world peace movement, the dictionary avers, is different from "pacifism" in that it conducts an "active offensive struggle against the danger of war. The best elements among the pacifists support the world peace movement. Imperialist agents are attempting to carry pacifism into the Socialist countries * * * to weaken their defensive power. Therefore pacifism is fought energetically in the Socialist countries."

On January 6, 1961, Khrushchev made points which should be remembered by every American: "The struggle for disarmament * * * is an effective struggle against imperialism." This struggle is also "an active struggle against imperialism" but above all, it is an active struggle "for restricting its military potentialities."

In the very next sentence, after he explained that the purpose of the Communist disarmament policy is to weaken the military power of the United States (this is a translation into English of Khrushchev's "Aesopian" version that disarmament is an active struggle to restrict the military potentialities of imperialism), he insisted that "peoples must do everything to achieve the prohibition and destruction of atomic weapons." The achievement of both a nuclear test ban and the cessation of production of nuclear materials have been assigned as a high priority objective to the Communist world movement since 1956. Can a Communist objective really be in U.S. interest? Did they err in assuming the test ban agitation serves their purposes? Or are we wrong in thinking it helps our cause?

Perhaps the clearest statement was made by Khrushchev to the World Congress on General Disarmament and Peace on July 10, 1962: "The struggle for general disarmament facilitates the struggle for national independence. For their part the successes of the national liberation movements strengthen the cause of peace, contribute to strengthening the struggle for disarmament. Disarmament means disarmament of the forces of war, the liquidation of militarism." The meaning of the last sentence is again that the U.S. should be disarmed but not the U.S.S.R.

"Just" war

In his recent book on military strategy, marshal of the Soviet Union, V. D. Sokolovsky specifically argued that the invention of nuclear weapons in no way changed the character of war. He opposed the contention that nuclear war was unthinkable and that war no longer could be considered as the continuation of politics by forceful means. According to the Sokolovsky book, war remains an instrument of politics, a concept which, incidentally, coincides closely with Mao Tse-tung's dictum: "Whether shields and spears are used as in ancient times, or modern weapons, the objective of warfare remains the same."

In brief, as V. Cherpakov, a representative of the Soviet Ministry of National Defense expressed it in 1954, "Communists link the cause of peace with the cause of victory of the proletarian revolution." Lenin originally defined the purpose of Soviet disarmament policy as being to disarm the bourgeoisie and arm the proletariat. Khrushchev, in January 1961, phrased it slightly differently: "The slogan of the struggle for peace does not contradict the slogan of the struggle for communism."

These statements must be read with the understanding that the Soviets firmly adhere to the doctrine of "just war," i.e., of wars fought to overthrow "oppressing classes," are legitimate and may have to be fought. The above quoted dictionary states that a "distinction of the character of war according to its conduct (offensive or defensive war) is false." It also avers that "just wars" occur particularly frequently in our modern era and clarifies the key point: if it were to come to a war between "imperialism" and the "socialist camp," this war would end "inevitably with the victory of socialism and the complete liquidation of imperialism. It would be the last war in history, on the part of socialism the most just, and on the part of imperialism the most unjust of all wars."

In October 1962, the World Marxist Review, the theoretical organ of world communism, wrote that "general disarmament does not mean disarming the peoples fighting for national liberation. On the contrary, it would deprive the imperialists of the means to halt progress and crush the struggle for independence * * * disarmed, the imperialists would be powerless to prevent the people from attaining freedom. Disarmament primarily means dismantling the gigantic war machines of the highly developed countries," i.e., the United States.

It should be emphasized that these quotes are just a sample and could be multiplied virtually ad infinitum. The wishful notion that the Soviets have abandoned all intentions to go to war against the United States just cannot be supported by any dependable evidence.

"THE TEST BAN: AN AMERICAN STRATEGY OF GRADUAL SELF-MUTILATION"—CHAPTERS III AND IV, BY STEFAN T. POSSONY

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. ARENDS] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman Missouri?

There was no objection.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to insert at this point in the RECORD, chapters III and IV of an article entitled "The Test Ban: An American Strategy of Gradual Self-Mutilation" by Stefan T. Possony, of the Hoover Institution:

CHAPTER III

The test ban: A Soviet strategy for military superiority

At this stage of the game, the Soviet Union is not yet in a position to carry through its plans for world conquest or, to put it differently, to complete the world revolution. The ultimate victory of communism necessitates the elimination of the United States as a military power, preferably through surrender but through nuclear war if otherwise unattainable.

Surrender cannot possibly be achieved unless and until the Soviet Union acquires a vast qualitative and quantitative preponderance in nuclear firepower, means of delivery and defensive weapons. Nuclear war cannot possibly be waged, let alone won, by the Soviet Union against the United States unless the Soviet forces are militarily vastly superior and in particular capable of inflicting heavy initial destruction on, or even crippling U.S. retaliatory forces by means of a nuclear surprise attack, as well as fending off and absorbing any strikes by residual American capabilities.

To achieve a posture where, by one means or the other, the Soviets can impose their will on the United States and the rest of the world, they must yet accomplish considerable advances in nuclear weapons systems. Marshal Sokolovsky's book is permeated by the twin ideas that modern conflict is nuclear in character and that it is necessary for the Soviets to win the technological race. He emphasized that the "appearance of qualitatively new types of weapons and war materiel and their rapid introduction into the armed forces" is a distinguishing feature of modern war and concluded that "the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries must be prepared, above all, to wage war under the conditions of massive use of atomic weapons by both belligerent parties."

In connection with U.S. reluctance to share nuclear weapons with our allies and our inclination rather to risk the destruction of NATO than the "proliferation" of nuclear weapons, note Sokolovsky's reference to the "other Socialist countries." This passage seems to indicate that the Soviets may be willing to "share" their nuclear weapons with at least some of their satellites. The Russo-German military dictionary also dealt with this problem and stated, somewhat ambiguously, that the U.S.S.R. is compelled "to produce the most modern nuclear arms and to equip with those weapons the Socialist armed forces for the defense of the Socialist camp."

According to Sokolovsky, nuclear weapons which achieve "incomparably better results than ordinary means of destruction * * *

can be used for the solution of problems on every scale: strategic, operational, and tactical." His conclusion is: "The correct and profoundly scientific solution of all the theoretical and practical questions related to the preparation and waging of just such a war (nuclear war) must be regarded as the main task of the theory of military strategy and strategic leadership."

There are, of course, numerous statements indicating that Soviet scientists are fully alive to the potentialities of rapidly advancing nuclear technology, including statements showing their awareness of revolutionary new approaches like neutron bombs and even particle annihilation. Soviet awareness of the feasibility and utility of neutron bombs dates back to 1952. V. S. Yemilyanov, member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, a strong influence within the Soviet nuclear program, and director of Glavatom, the Soviet AEC, between 1960 and 1962, suggested in Izvestiya on August 31, 1961, that if it were feasible to bring about particle annihilation, for example by "uniting the proton and the antiproton" and thus transforming the particle mass completely into radiation, the highest release of energy would be accomplished, "approximately a thousand times greater than through thermonuclear fusion." There is no point in viewing this particular theoretical statement with alarm. The quote is given merely to illustrate the direction of Soviet thinking, not to suggest that the Soviets are presently embarked upon a program of particle annihilation. By contrast, there is every reason to assume that they are busy developing the neutron bomb.

The Soviets are indeed sincere in pushing the test ban—as a stratagem to slow down American technological progress, nuclear and nonnuclear, in order to facilitate the winning of the technological race by the Soviets. It is inevitable that a decline in the rate of nuclear progress will affect the design of all delivery and defense systems.

It is true that as compared with the first round of the test moratorium, a simple verbal commitment no longer seems acceptable to the United States. This point was stressed by the President last spring. Consequently, to slow down American nuclear programs again, Khrushchev may be prepared to make a slight concession in the hope of achieving a second moratorium round. The Soviets intimated that they would allow three—or perhaps only two?—inspections and the installation of detection equipment at three points selected by the Soviets themselves. In 1958, Soviet and Western scientists envisaged a quota of 27 inspections and 21 monitoring stations. It is a foregone conclusion that an inspection system acceptable to the Soviets will be in no position to inspect anything of importance, let alone verify that no clandestine testing is taking place.

A careful reading of Khrushchev's communications to President Kennedy leaves some doubt as to what the Soviet Union is ready to "give." In his letter of January 7, 1963, he stated: "We believe and we continue to believe now that, in general, inspection is not necessary and if we give our consent to an annual quota or two or three inspections this is done solely for the purpose of removing the remaining differences for the sake of reaching agreement." However, in his letter of December 19, 1962, Khrushchev referred to "Ambassador Dean's statement, the United States would also be prepared to work out measures which would rule out any possibility of carrying on espionage under the cover of these inspection trips including such measures as the use of Soviet planes piloted by Soviet crews for transportation of inspectors to the sites, screening of windows in the planes, prohibition to carry photocameras, etc."

And again in his second letter, Khrushchev wrote: "Of course, in carrying out on-site inspection there can be circumstances when in the area designated for inspection there will be some object of defense importance. Naturally, in such a case it will be necessary to take appropriate measures which would exclude a possibility to cause damage to the interests of security of the state on the territory of which inspection is carried out."

Assuming that the verification of a cheat explosion would damage the "interests of security" of the U.S.S.R., it would appear that the inspectors will not be allowed entry to the places were evasions have occurred and can be confirmed.

Whether or not the Soviets will, for a long period of time, cheat, for example underground, or at a time of their choosing resume atmospheric tests openly, is conjectural. The point which in terms of international law is of overriding significance is this: The Soviet Constitution specifically authorizes the Government of the Soviet Union to abrogate any international agreement or treaty at any time unilaterally (art. 49–0).

CHAPTER IV

The test ban: an American strategy for military inferiority

In times past, some American scientists have argued that, in the advance of nuclear weapons, a sort of a plateau was reached. In terms of nuclear efficiency, not too many additional improvements could be expected; moreover all, or practically all, bright design ideas which would be useful for weapons uses, already had been proposed. The possibility of further discovery and progress was not denied but the significance of such progress for U.S. security was questioned. Sometimes it was intimated that U.S. security would be served better if further progress were inhibited. Such ideas were propagated many years ago and set forth with considerable conviction during 1958. Undoubtedly, these same notions are repeated today, despite the fact that events disproved these expectations.

Even a cursory reading of technological history will show that basic inventions (like electricity or electronics) do not run their course within a 20-year timespan; the development curve of nuclear physics hardly will have a unique shape of its own, nor be the shortest of all major inventions.

If a scientist does not foresee possibilities of future developments, his contentions are in the nature of statements on his own limitations but cannot be considered as predictions of things to come.

Other scientists argued that the yield of nuclear weapons in the American arsenal has reached an upper limit of practical usefulness. This type of argument depends on many assumptions, few of which ever are made explicit. Surely, as the putative opponent hardens his installations to secure them against nuclear attack, yields must be increased to keep pace with such hardening. Yield requirements also depend, among other factors, on accuracy and on the strategy adopted. For example, a strategy designed to knock out cities can do with relatively low yields but a counterforce strategy, as announced by Mr. McNamara, needs rather hefty yields.

It is, of course, true that yields and numbers may be "traded off" against each other; and it may even be preferable to launch against a target 10 missiles with 10-megaton warheads each, instead of 1 missile with a 100-megaton warhead. But according to this arithmetic 10-megaton warheads and 10 missiles would be required. Naturally, we have no program to augment the number of our missiles to the enormous quantities needed to maintain an effective firepower balance, and even if this were the plan, we could not afford the cost. In addition, we are mostly buying missiles with warheads in the low megaton range. Perhaps one 100-megaton missile does not equal fifty 2-megaton missiles, but what is the ratio according to the administration? On a straight firepower basis, 2,000 Minutemen and Polaris with yields augmented through testing would be the equivalent of eighty 50-megaton Soviet missiles. In such a confrontation, we would be far more seriously deterred by fallout dangers than our opponent.

It is true that the overall cost of the superyield missile would be much higher, perhaps twice or three times as high as the cost of smaller missiles. Hardening, in particular, would call for very heavy expenditures. The Soviets, however, could dispense with hardening their large missiles, because presumably they would use them for a first strike, while we are obligated to keeping our missiles for retaliatory operations. The superyield missile also possesses the advantage of a very high single shot kill probability.

Against these reasons favoring increases in yield, the argument is customarily being made that increased accuracy would achieve the same result as the augmentation of yield. In other words, a bull's-eye with a 1-megaton missile may be more effective than a miss by 1 mile with a 100-megaton missile. Actually, for a 1-megaton missile to achieve the same kill effectiveness as a 100-megaton missile, its accuracy must be almost five times greater. For all practical purposes, this would mean that an intercontinental missile requires a CEP of around 1,000 feet. Accuracies of this order of magnitude are extremely hard to attain and they may require gear which would reduce the payload of the missile, in addition to greatly increasing its cost. It is generally admitted that improvements in accuracy above a CEP of 3,000–4,000 feet follow an asymptotic curve.

Thus, it is technologically far easier and economically far cheaper to improve the effectiveness of missiles by increasing yields, rather than by trying "shoot for the moon" in accuracy. If, in addition, accuracy should improve according to a normal growth curve, the effectiveness of a superyield weapon would be enhanced as a bonus.

It should be added that a superyield weapon, in a sense, anticipates the first generation of anti-missile missiles: the superyield weapon can be exploded at a very high altitude and still cause a great deal of damage. The small yield missile must be detonated at a far lower height over the target. If anti-missiles force the height of burst upwards—the incoming missile would be set to explode before it is intercepted—the effect of the explosion would be negligible.

In any event, the Soviet Union clearly has embarked on a course of maximizing the yields of its warheads and bombs. Whether or not this is desirable, it is incumbent upon the United States to acquire the technological know-how and the equipments which would allow our forces to use yields at least as effective as the opponent. The "escalation" to our detriment from a lower to a higher level of nuclear violence, can be prevented only if U.S. yield and overall firepower capabilities exceed those of the U.S.S.R. The implied message of Khrushchev's speech of January 16, 1963 is this: a thermonuclear showdown with the United States is infeasible so long as ways have not been found to reduce substantially the amount of deliverable firepower held by the United States. Is it our intent to help Khrushchev solve the most crucial task confronting his strategy of world revolution?

Many scientists have argued the desirability of slowing down technological progress. There is indeed no doubt that if technology could be decelerated, weapon systems would obsolesce much more slowly and military expenditures could be reduced.

Unfortunately, technology is in the nature of an impersonal force. Hence it can be influenced only in a very limited fashion. Certainly, it is feasible deliberately to slow down one's own technology, for example by starving R. & D. budgets and stopping experimental physics in the form of a unilateral test ban. But such a unilateral decision does not necessarily influence the rate of technological progress in the Soviet Union. In fact, the European states, formerly the leaders in weapons technology, have slowed down almost to a standstill, but their security was not helped by this forbearance. They would have bet their independence if the United States had stepped out of the technological contest, too.

If we decelerate American technology now, the main result will be that the Soviet Union will achieve technological superiority which it can and will use to destroy the United States. Let us not forget that the Soviets operate in line with a command issued by Khrushchev as recently as January 16, 1963 at Berlin: "The duty of Communists at the helm of state power is to do everything possible to insure that our strength will grow."

It would be definitely to American advantage if, for example, Soviet advances in nuclear efficiency could be stopped. But if we were to enter into a test ban now—and assuming the test ban would work as expected by its proponents—we would be stabilizing a military situation which is most unfavorable for our strategy of not striking the first blow. The present technological situation favors aggression and renders defensive warfare almost unmanageable. Actually, if a test ban were consummated, we would only be making this situation worse by allowing the Soviets, through clandestine testing, to acquire strategic missiles and bombs with a higher effectiveness than our own. Whether Soviet knowledge of the effect of high altitude explosions facilitates their planning for a surprise attack or not, our lack of warheads most suitable for anti-ICBM weapons and the relative inefficiency, and cost, of our current tactical nuclear weapons would facilitate Soviet attack against the United States and Europe.

To put it differently: nuclear technology presently has produced the most potent offensive weapon systems of history. This brutal fact certainly does not stabilize the international situation. If, against the trends of the past two decades, we want to stabilize international life, we must be able to reduce the relative advantages of aggression. Hence it would not be to our benefit to decelerate or stop nuclear technological progress before some balance between the offense and the defense has been reestablished. By interfering with U.S. technological progress now, we facilitate a Soviet strategy of agression and expose ourselves to the danger of military defeat. Let us not forget that in his Berlin speech of January 16, 1963, Khrushchev reiterated one of the oldest points in Communist conflict doctrine, viz that "especially in countries which have suffered defeat, a favorable situation arises for the victory of the working class."

As we analyze official U.S. statements on recent Soviet test series, it appears that these were designed to improve existing nuclear technology. Their progress in the yield-to-weight ratio has given the Soviets two additional options and thereby that increased flexibility to which we pay lipservice: they can increase the yield of their individual weapons, both missile warheads and bombs, and they are able to utilize their improved nuclear efficiency, if they so desire, to reduce the size of their missiles, while preserving very significant yields. Since in addition, the Soviets have been using their recent tests to improve their antimissile capabilities, it is apparent that they are making considerable strides in augmenting the threat they are holding out against the United States. The United States, in turn, is in dire need of increasing the explosive strength of practically all its missiles, and it too has requirements for antimissile defense.

All this, however, has been, and still is in the nature of evolutionary improvements in existing technologies. To forgo technical progress which still can be achieved would be a far greater strategic sacrifice for the United States than for the Soviet Union, simply because we are operating, by and large, under a second strike nonaggressive strategy. But the crucial issue of the test ban revolves around a problem which is far more basic than a matter of mere evolutionary improvement. In the present period the issue is not whether we want to assure continued technological progress in abstracto, nor whether we can afford to stop experimental tests undertaken for the purpose of chance discovery. The specific question which is the guts of the test ban decision, is whether or not the United States should develop so-called neutron bombs and pure fusion weapons.

"THE TEST BAN: AN AMERICAN STRATEGY OF GRADUAL SELF-MUTILATION" CHAPTERS V AND VI, BY STEFAN T. POSSONY

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from New York [Mr. MILLER] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman Missouri?

There was no objection.

Mr. MILLER of New York. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to insert at this point in the RECORD chapters V and VI of an article entitled "The Test Ban: An American Strategy of Gradual Self-Mutilation," by Stefan T. Possony of the Hoover Institution:

CHAPTER V

The test ban and the neutron bomb

For years, a great deal of misinformation has been propagated about the neutron technology. It is remarkable, to say the least, that opponents of the neutron development—and they are more or less the same people who opposed the H-bomb and otherwise have excelled by "cautious advice"—have been very vociferous, whereas the scientists with firsthand knowledge on the subject have been unable to speak out or even to correct false and falsified information.

It has been suggested, for example, that the neutron bomb could not be perfected for nearly half a century; that even if the scientific problem could be licked, no useful weapons that would be light and compact enough for practical use could be developed; that, even if a weapon were available, it would have barely any military use; and that it would be very easy to achieve protection against neutron weapons.

It is patently impossible to state with finality when a weapon development will be completed, and to predict exact design and performance characteristics, before the weapon has been tested, developed, and perfected. The optimist is not always right, and the pessimist not always wrong. It is nevertheless incredible that supposedly responsible people are setting forth arguments for which there is no basis in fact. This observer, for one, has gained the conviction that many of these evaluations of future weapons do not reflect professional knowledge and judgment but rather emanate from political considerations, notably from wishful thinking on how the conflict with the Soviets could be settled.

It is remarkable that, despite the fact that a debate on the neutron bomb has been going on for some time, the Government has not seen fit to publish basic information on the subject.[1] Thus, as of 1963 we have presented to the American people less information regarding it than Soviet scientists presented as of 1958 to the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at Geneva. The fundamental design idea of the neutron bomb was explained by the Russian physicist L. A. Artsimovich, who also disclosed that the Soviets apparently were interested in this technology as early as 1952. Here is his explanation:

"A pulsed thermonuclear reaction may also be possible under conditions when a high temperature is reached during the compression and implosion produced by a charge of conventional explosives (such as TNT or something more powerful) surrounding a capsule of deuterium or a mixture of deuterium and tritium."

In simple terms: an atomic bomb is a device by which an explosion is achieved through the fission of uranium, plutonium or perhaps thorium; the hydrogen bomb is a device by which an explosion is obtained through the fusion of hydrogen, brought about initially through a fission explosion; a neutron bomb is a device by which an explosion is accomplished through the fusion of the heavy isotopes of hydrogen, namely deuterium and tritium. If the fusion of the heavy hydrogen isotopes is achieved without initial fission, but by nonnuclear means we would have an all-fusion weapon.

The term "neutron bomb" refers to the fact that unlike fission and fission-fusion bombs, which produce mostly heat and blast, the energy released from the fusion of the heavy hydrogen isotopes will be largely in the form of neutrons. A Soviet colonel by name of M. Pavlov has given more exact data:

"In the reaction of the nuclear fission of uranium or plutonium, the neutron flow comprises about 1 percent of the total weight of the nuclear charge. The kinetic energy of the neutrons accounts for only 3 percent of the total energy of the explosion. * * * In a thermonuclear bomb * * * as much as 20 to 33 percent of the total weight of the nuclear charge is used in the creation of a neutron flow and a considerable part of the energy of the nuclear explosion is accounted for by the kinetic energy of the neutrons."

The neutron weapon is therefore different in kind from other nuclear weapons, not only because it has an entirely different ratio between heat, blast, and radiation, but also becaus it differs in the nature of the radiation and in the penetrating power of the released neutrons.

The neutron weapon kills people and except in the area of immediate impact, does not destroy equipment, installations or housing. Another characteristic of this weapon is that on a yield-by-yield basis, its effectiveness against personnel extends over a greater radius than that of other nuclear weapons. Hence the yields needed to incapacitate targets can be reduced, in practically all cases by one order of magnitude or better.

In addition, the weapon does not result in uncontrolled fallout which, it is generally agreed, would be the main cause of the ulti-

---

[1] An American blackout of the discussion on space flight preceded the surprise ascent of sputnik in 1957.

mate cost of nuclear war. More specifically, it would cause very little genetic damage and it would result in a low disability rate, i.e. most of those casualties who escape death would have a full recovery.

The neutron weapon would allow conducting operations with great accuracy, making it possible to reduce the losses among the civilian population. The most basic cause of military destructiveness and the long duration of military conflicts always has been that in order to kill enemy troops, the surrounding territory had to be flattened, and weapons and logistics had to be destroyed. With the neutron weapon, much of this traditional requirement for destruction can be ignored. To destroy a company in a ditch, it will no longer be necessary to destroy an entire village; and to stop production in a factory, it will no longer be unavoidable to flatten an entire town.

It is true that protection against the neutron weapon can be developed; protection is always forthcoming ultimately. For the time being, however, the neutron bomb will have the upper hand over protective materials and measures that would be available on a battlefield. It is interesting to note that some of those who argue that defense against A and H-weapons is impossible, view the chances of protection against N-weapons very optimistically. Protection against neutrons is harder to come by, even in a normal fallout shelter.

The fact that through the accurate employment of neutron bombs casualties can be more or less restricted to the military force and that industries and cities may escape being smashed up, naturally would allow faster and more effective reconstruction after the war.

Mr. William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, stated that "pure fusion weapons would not be of great advantage to us because they would constitute primarily a cheaper substitute for the explosive component in our already large stockpile of nuclear weapons." The above listing of some of the characteristics of the neutron bomb would indicate that a neutron device would be considerably more than just a "cheaper substitute" for existing weapons, but would be a new weapon with entirely new use patterns and effects. It should not be forgotten that this weapon would have features which, to the extent that any weapon can be "attractive," would be considerably more attractive from the humane point of view than existing fission and fusion weapons.

It is no minor matter by any means whether weapons are cheaper or more expensive. Perhaps it is true that cost reduction (if this were the only advantage to be gained from the neutron device) would be of marginal utility for our strategic systems. But this would certainly not be the case of our tactical weapons requirements, let alone of the requirements for air and missile defense which, if the statistics of past wars are any guide, will be very large. To turn this around: if we could combine in our missile defenses accuracy with large numbers we would possess so strong a defensive position that a Soviet first-strike strategy may become impractical. What is so wrong about this?

Moreover, the question of cheapness has a great bearing on the effectiveness of the NATO alliance. The United States should not be surprised to discover that our allies are getting somewhat restless when we base our technological policies on this sort of reasoning. What may be a minor economic advantage for us may mean the political survival of many of our friends as independent nations. It should be obvious that all-fusion weapons are economically far closer within the reach of Western Europe than fission and fission-fusion weapons, that they are well suited for European conditions, and that they would really improve the defense of Europe. If this is true, then it also is obvious that decisions on neutron weapons should not be made unilaterally by the United States.

The military significance of the neutron bomb has been deprecated by comments to the effect that it would have only tactical applicability and that we already are well provided for with tactical weapons. Disregarding the fact that the neutron device probably will be particularly effective in anti-missile defense, it is surely incorrect to state that the tactical nuclear weapons we now have are adequate in numbers and performance. With the present technology which is ruled by the requirement of the "critical mass," low-yield weapons are extremely costly and can be achieved only through the deliberate prevention of a higher yield for a given amount of fissile material, i.e., a low yield is achieved by willfully reducing efficiency. Cost price of present nuclear weapons is largely independent of yield; a lower yield and a higher yield weapon come at about the same price.

But let us assume our present tactical arsenal were adequate and let us even assume that there were enough tactical weapons to equip, in case of war, our allies and fight on for a while. The full utilization of our present weapons, even if we restrict ourselves to relatively low yields, would create considerable havoc in densely populated areas. I do not think that a weapon which inflicts unnecessary casualties on friendly or even hostile populations is very desirable, nor does it help to further good relations among allies. I can only marvel at the strange logic of those who, in the name of humanism, oppose the development of a weapon like the neutron bomb.

But let us for a moment suppose that the Soviets have neutron weapons and we do not, and let us suppose that the Soviets are attacking Western Europe. An enemy in possession of neutron technology would have no trouble appearing on the battlefield with 10 or a 100 times more tactical weapons than we would have available. These weapons would come in a greater variety of yield but most of them within the lower spectrum of yields, and the cost of each weapon would be proportionate to the yield. The owner of the neutron weapon thus would possess vast numerical superiority and greater tactical versatility, and his armed forces would be far less vulnerable than those of his opponent. In addition, the use of neutron devices by the Soviets would make a great deal of sense because it would allow them to conquer Europe pretty much intact.

Our first encounter with a Soviet force unilaterally equipped with neutron weapons probably would lead to a rather catastrophic defeat because our troops would suffer from tactical and technological surprise. If we want to recoup and resist, we would have no other choice but escalate the conflict. If we started with conventional weapons only, we probably would be compelled to use weapons in the 10 to 100 kiloton range, and if we started with tactical atomic weapons, we might have to decide to move into the full strategic exchange. In the words of Professor Dyson, "any country which renounces for itself the development of nuclear weapons, without certain knowledge that its adherents have done the same is likely to find itself in the position of the Polish Army in 1939, fighting tanks with horses." The hapless Poles had little choice in the matter, but we are picking a strategy of inferiority deliberately.

It is a grave mistake to think that the neutron bomb has no applicability to strategic warfare. Neutron weapons are perfectly adaptable to strategic and massive operations. They would allow both a very effective "selective bombing" campaign in the style of World War II (but with a fire-power suitable to a conflict in the present technological era), and they could also be used for "city busting" and a genocidal strategy. The point is that the present hydrogen technology precludes the selective bombing approach and forces everybody else into a strategy of across-the-board destruction. The neutron technology, by contrast, would increase our flexibility and greatly reduce the probability of a holocaust conflict. There would be more and better options.

It would make sense for the Soviets, in an aggressive war against the United States, to use superyield devices as counterforce weapons to knock out our retaliatory capabilities, and to follow up the disarming strike with selective attacks with neutron weapons against segments of our population. The main advantage for the Soviets of this strategy would be that while the United States is knocked out, the American industrial plants would remain intact and be available to the victor. At the same time, a neutron strategy on the continent would allow the seizure of the European industrial plant. Thus, the Communists would avoid a Pyrrhic victory. Even if Soviet industry were smashed by our residual retaliation, the Communists, despite nuclear war, would be in possession of the wherewithal needed to rule the world. Hence, it is to be expected that the Soviets will make every effort to equip themselves with the neutron weapon. We cannot, for that matter, be sure they are not yet in possession of a neutron capability.

This argument can be spun out endlessly but it seems self-evident that the new technology opens vast new horizons and for the nation which does not possess these weapons, poses enormous dangers of technological surprise. However, one of the most interesting aspects of this development is that the new nuclear technology does not continue the trend toward greater destructiveness and greater human loss. In fact, it reverses this trend and does so not by a futile program trying to go back to the weapons of McKinley and the troglodytes, but by moving forward with the clock of history.

It is, of course, easy to argue that the neutron technology should be resisted because it would make war again more manageable and hence more "thinkable." But responsible statesmen cannot operate with sophistry of this type. They must assume that, under certain circumstances, their best efforts to preserve peace will fail and that if a war has to be fought, it is preferable to fight it with highly effective weapons which allow to keep down the cost of human suffering and material damage, instead of with weapons which are far more destructive than necessary but not necessarily more effective than weapons which could be used instead. Flexibility is one of our announced strategic goals—here is a way to achieve this objective.

If the United States were to sign a test ban treaty, it would ipso facto renounce the development of the neutron bomb. As matters stand today, our neutron development proceeds at a pace slower than necessary or prudent. In view of the fact that the Soviets have known about the neutron bomb design principles for at least 11 years, this development should be accelerated to the maximum extent possible. But if we were to sign the test ban, we also would institute a so-called control system which, according to the most liberal interpretations of the treaty's present stipulations, would be entirely ineffective in preventing the Soviets from developing the neutron weapon through clandestine testing.

CHAPTER VI

The test ban: A cheater's paradise

In addition to many overriding strategical considerations militating against the test ban, the proposed control scheme will

founder on numerous technical and practical difficulties. To begin with, there is no definition of the term "testing" and "test."

An international agreement on a subject which remains undefined can only lead to trouble.

During the past moratorium, the United States operated most of the time under the most restrictive possible definition of testing. We could have been entitled, within the spirit of gentlemanly behavior, to adopt a sensible definition. But as soon as we engage in a venture we consider "progressive" we lose, temporarily, all sense of proportion. This is a bit of national psychology which has great bearing on the problem.

There is no doubt that the Soviets did adopt an entirely different definition—one which allows them maximal freedom of action—and they would again operate under the most permissive definition. Unless this particular confusion were straightened out, a test ban agreement would work to the detriment of the United States, even if the Soviets did not cheat and just continued their nuclear "experiments" up to the yield which, in their judgment, constitutes the borderline between a "test" and an "experiment."

There is not much argument that nuclear explosions in the open atmosphere can be detected with standard equipment. It usually is overlooked, however, that the probability of detection varies with several factors, including yield and altitude of the shot, the amount of radioactivity thrown out, topographical conditions of the area, distance from the test equipment, etc.

While it would be imprudent for a violator to carry out high yield tests in the open atmosphere, a good possibility exists that relatively low yield tests of clean weapons may go undetected and that effective concealment techniques may be developed for some types of shots. Furthermore, tests undertaken in remote areas, such as oceans in the southern hemisphere, though they may be "detected" in a fashion, probably would provide only ambiguous instrument readings.

With respect to space shots, the launching of a space vehicle may or may not be detected. This depends, among other things, on intelligence capabilities: no provisos for this type of detection would be included in a test ban agreement. Depending on altitude, the explosion may or may not be discovered by optical and electromagnetic gear. A detection system in space might conceivably scoop up or record the presence of radioactive debris. Yet this detection of radioactivity could be made known to observers on the earth only by telemetry which is ambiguous evidence; or else the space vehicle must be recoverable.

To put it mildly, the capability to detect space shots at present is strictly circumscribed. Though we are planning to make five shots to install a space detection system, such a system does not exist now and may never exist. Space is very large and the probability of detection obviously depends on the distance of the control vehicle from the explosion, the yield of that explosion, and environmental conditions. The would-be violator would know the exact characteristics of the control orbits and hence would be able to plan his shots with a view toward minimum detectability. In any event, the effectiveness of a satellite system would have to be tested out experimentally before we can place any figure of reliability upon it—but this presupposes several nuclear space shots which would be outlawed by the test ban.

It is generally admitted that the detection of underground shots is most difficult and in many ways a matter of chance. Recently, the Government has issued much publicity advertising alleged progress in the technology for detecting underground explosions. There is no reason to doubt that such progress has been made although it is strange that the Government has exercised strong censorship to prevent dissenting voices from being heard. Moreover, the releases were couched in vague language.

But just as the art of detection is making progress, so the art of cheating could make progress, too, and undoubtedly is making such progress in the U.S.S.R. The technologies of detection and concealment are in a see-saw race, with the latter still enjoying a very considerable lead. Whoever concentrates more brains, efforts and resources on this problem, whether the detector or the violator will gain an advantage. Without going into any details, let it be stated that if the would-be violator has a good knowledge of the performance characteristics of the detection system, he always will possess a superior capability to conceal clandestine tests.

Depending on definitions of testing, there may be arguments on whether very low yield explosions are really tests or just experiments. It may be possible to accommodate significant explosions in metal containers and certainly it is feasible to combine the techniques of container testing with those of underground testing. Whether the violator will go to any lengths to insure secrecy for such experiments is debatable, but it is apparent that laboratory experimentation up to the high fractional kiloton level can be conducted undetected quite easily.

It is true, on the other hand, that the very existence of a detection system would force the violator to forego certain types of tests and to place restrictions on others. This may or may not be a handicap to him, but it is to be presumed that if a test ban were to last for 10 or more years, the main result would be that the technology of the violator would be deflected into directions different from those which would be followed in the absence of a detection system. To make this point more specific: a test ban would virtually assure that the Soviets will develop neutron weapons.

Verification is more difficult and in some ways more important than detection. Yet it is rarely discussed. Verification is that portion of a test ban arrangement through which an accusation of violation is proved or disproved. For example, the American detection system would be alerted, by instrument readings, to a possible underground shot in the Soviet Union. Thereupon inspectors would be sent to the probable place of the explosion, where they would "inspect," dig for radioactive samples and other evidence, and ultimately find the radioactive debris. Through this radioactive corpus delicti it would be "verified" that the Soviet Union, indeed, had violated the agreement. If by contrast, no radioactive sample is found, the accusation must be dismissed.

However, lack of incontestable evidence by no means constitutes proof that no violation has taken place. Should the detection system receive indicators of suspect events and should the inspectorate fail to uncover verificatory evidence, there would be a great deal of confusion and apprehension which could lead easily to an international crisis.

The verification of shots in the atmosphere over land usually is deemed to be simple. But is it? Disregarding the fact that vast tracts of land may not be accessible to the inspectors (e.g. China), the verification of an explosion probably can be prevented without too much trouble. The nuclear test device may have been dropped from an airplane, and not be exploded from installations on the ground. It may have been shot in by missile from a distant launch point and exploded over a "proving ground," which is nothing but a set of measurement instruments. The measurement equipment can be withdrawn, within a few hours, by trucks and helicopters. Moreover, the shot need not leave any residual radioactivity.

If after such a carefully planned event the inspectors arrive on the scene, perhaps after 2 or 3 days which would be early, they might find a single depression on the ground. This depression hardly would constitute evidence, even if it could be proved that it did not exist 1 week earlier. But there may be no depression at all.

If the device was missile-fired, inspection of the launch site—provided it is identified—might indeed indicate that it has a store of nuclear weapons. But so what? Any missile site must be provided with warheads. For that matter, the inspectors would not be allowed even close to the missile base and they certainly would not be allowed to inspect its books and installations. The violator also may claim that the missile was fired from a foreign base and that the shot actually constituted an act of aggression. There is no limit to this sort of skulduggery.

Take, for example, atmospheric shots fired by submarines at sea. Suppose a Soviet submarine fires a test device in the South Atlantic and suppose that within 3 or 4 days enough evidence, including radioactive air samples, is available suggesting that an explosion did occur. Suppose that the exact location of the explosion can be determined. If the inspectors were to go to the place of the explosion, it would be impossible for them to find any evidence: they would find the ocean in the same shape as an ocean is always found. But the radioactivity, if any, would have been long dispersed. To catch the violator it would be necessary to discover the submarine and force it to surface, which is an impractical proposition. It seems unnecessary to spin out this case further: verification of overwater shots indeed is far from certain.

Currently there is no feasible method of verifying explosions in space. If the Soviets were to launch a space vehicle and explode a nuclear device, at not too great a distance, the United States might gain a good notion of what was going on. But we would not possess the type of evidence which "would stand up in court," assuming that we could make public use of the evidence we have. Hence, we would be reluctant to move, just as during the Cuban crisis, Washington did not move before there was clear photographic evidence of the presence of Soviet missiles.

With respect to the verification of underground shots, the situation is that in order to get at the radioactive debris caused by an underground nuclear explosion, the location of the presumed event must be pinpointed with extraordinary accuracy. Once the inspectors are in place, it would be necessary to start digging through an area of tens or even hundreds of square miles. All kinds of fascinating calculations can be made to determine the probable number of man-days required for digging and drilling until the debris is actually discovered. However, unless telltale clues of test preparation are discovered, it is clear that the discovery of the debris is clearly a matter of chance and a very small one at that. Naturally, an inspectoral team may discover all sorts of circumstantial evidence confirming the indicators received from the detection system. But such sort of ambiguous evidence simply does not constitute valid verification.

Actually, it would be relatively simple to "discover" all kinds of "evidence" which are not there. As soon as there were some evidence on Soviet cheating, we can rest assured that they would find "evidence" of U.S. cheating. The violator has at his disposal numerous political tactics to vitiate any attempt at verification, and it can be predicted safely, on the basis of past United States and Soviet performances, that after one or two tries, inspection will fade out of business.

Undoubtedly, if indicators multiply, suggesting continuous cheating, the most cooperative signatories to the test ban will be forced to react. Theoretically, they can

decide upon "sanctions" but in practice they have few alternatives but to resume testing themselves. Since their reaction will be sluggish and since furthermore the violator will have made allowance in his plans that he might be found out, he will have arranged things in such a manner that he maximizes his time advantages.

If the cheating starts at a moment when the cheater and the noncheater enjoy technological parity, the violator, without too much trouble, may gain a lead of 2 to 3 years. If this advance were achieved during a period when, for one reason or the other, war is ruled out, the violator would have gained only a temporary advantage. However, the violator may be preparing for aggression and may have readied his weapon systems in such a way that he can rapidly incorporate the most up-to-date nuclear devices. If then he restricts his tests to the proofing of radical designs, he can arm his delivery means with the types of warheads which the tests showed to be most successful. Ingenuity and careful planning should go a long way toward rendering the violation of the test ban militarily productive.

The effectiveness of the test ban stratagem can be seen more clearly if we assume that concealment techniques have advanced to such a point that clandestine underground testing will, in fact, not be detected, let alone verified. If after a long series of clandestine shots, the violator openly abrogates the test ban treaty by full-yield atmospheric proof tests, and at the same time checks the reliability of his existing weapon systems, he may be able to secure nuclear preponderance and insure maximum effectiveness of his first strike.

Intelligently employed, the test ban stratagem of conceal and surprise could prove to be decisive for the outcome of the war, or even for success of the ultimatum: "Surrender or die."

"THE TEST BAN: AN AMERICAN STRATEGY OF GRADUAL SELF-MUTILATION"—CHAPTERS VII AND VIII, BY STEFAN T. POSSONY

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. LAIRD] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to insert at this point in the RECORD chapters VII and VIII of an article entitled "The Test Ban: An American Strategy of Gradual Self-Mutilation," by Stefan T. Possony of the Hoover Institution:

CHAPTER VII

The test ban treaty: Manifold problems of verification

A signatory to a test ban, if he decides to cheat, will try to commit a perfect crime. It will be recalled that a large percentage of murders go unpunished because the murderer is not identified or apprehended. Even if tried, murderers are not always convicted and they often benefit from loopholes in the law and thus escape a penalty which would fit the crime. In addition, many deaths which go into the books as accidents, heart attacks or suicide actually are homicides.

Perhaps it is pertinent, in this connection, to recall that the true nature of the death of Pavl Bang-Jensen, the U.N. official from Denmark who was in charge of the files concerned with the Hungarian uprising of 1956, never has been fully clarified. Was it suicide or was it murder dressed up as suicide?

In any event, many murders remain unpunished because the average police detective does not reach the standards set by fiction writers like Conan Doyle and Erle Stanley Gardner; because there often is lack of personnel and laboratory resources to investigate evidence thoroughly and completely; and because indicators of foul play often escape physicians and coroners engaged in rapid routine examinations. There is no perfect crime but many crimes remain unpunished because enforcement agencies are inadequate and overworked. The key to detection is a strong incentive to detect, perseverance, and even creativity in interpreting indicators. If these ingredients are lacking in a test ban inspectorate, cheating would be easy.

The detection of clandestine nuclear explosions is primarily entrusted to scientific instruments, including unattended "black boxes." Presumably these instruments provide "objective" data which can be easily read and interpreted; thus, human frailties seem to be excluded.

If the violator is clumsy, then the instrument readings, in all likelihood, would disclose the transgression. But if he is skillful, these readings could be very ambiguous. Contrary to what laymen may think, even seemingly unambiguous instrument readings can give rise to protracted debates and often interpretations are affected by a priori theories.

In the end, debates about the meaning of detection data would be decided by the conviction of those within the detection bureaucracy who possess the greatest power and whose function it is to coordinate different views. This situation, incidentally, may work in two directions: it may facilitate cheating or it may lead to a major international crisis in all those cases where the coordinators are convinced, rightly or wrongly, that despite lack of verificatory evidence cheating is taking place.

Inspectors who are sent into the field to investigate a presumed violation will find indicators and evidence according to their observational talents and their eagerness either to find or to overlook. Naturally, their effectiveness also may be reduced by "red herring" indicators conveniently planted by the evader, as well as by any number of diversionary techniques. Conversely, the inspectors of some countries would find it relatively easy to act as provocateurs.

As year-in-year-out inspections do not produce any results, the inspectors will lose enthusiasm for the job and the numbers of inspectors may be cut. After all, if everybody is honest, a small police force is adequate. Presumably, only few technically qualified personnel will apply for positions within the inspectorate.[1] If genuine professionals are assigned to the job, the situation may be different but there are not too many of those available in the first place. It would be very imprudent to assume that the Communists cannot influence any of the inspectors or plant their own agents (with American or British nationality) within the inspectorate.

Even an otherwise effective intelligence service is not immune against deterioration or wishful thinking. During the last moratorium there was an argument about whether the Soviets were cheating by means of underground testing.

Honest men were entitled to differ in their conclusions on this point. But whether or not the Soviets were cheating before resuming open testing in 1961, there was no great eagerness to find out. On the contrary, suggestions that this problem better be investigated were frowned upon; and some of those who got busy with the task and unearthed suggestive indicators were ridiculed.

Much of this negative attitude was derived from an assumption that it would make no sense for the Soviets to cheat. Some of the more naive "true believers" even asserted the Soviets would abide by the moratorium lest they risk the censure of public opinion. Bureaucracies are not likely to push causes against the predilections of the upper echelons, and intelligence bureaucracies are no exception. This sort of thing is highly irrational and ultimately backfires. Nevertheless, chances are that within a democracy, the reaction time against test ban violations will be exceedingly slow.

Incidentally, it is noteworthy that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission announced on February 2, 1962, that the Soviets had fired an underground shot; some time later, the Soviets confirmed, in an offhand manner that, indeed, they had carried out a single underground explosion. It is, of course, wildly improbable that the Soviets never checked on underground test technology. They are known to possess very good information on the phenomenology of underground shots, and disclosed themselves that they fired a considerable number of subterranean HE explosions. If they did not experiment with underground nuclear explosions, someone should be fired in the Soviet Union for dereliction of duty.

Their disclosure about the one and only shot may be interpreted as an attempt to convince us that our capabilities for detecting underground shots are perfectly adequate. This little incident illustrates Soviet mastery of deception techniques, as well as, unfortunately, an American reluctance to recognize the fact that the Soviets are employing deception as a standard operating procedure.

CHAPTER VIII

The test ban: Range of nondetectable cheating

It is generally agreed that underground testing is the most promising method of evading a test ban agreement. Mr. William C. Foster in his statement to the Republican Conference Committee on Nuclear Testing belittled the feasibility of clandestine underground testing. He argued that since seismic signals which occur from explosions of the same size vary, an evader could not be sure of evading seismic detection. He also alleged that "big hole" decoupling is time consuming and expensive. In addition, the excavation of the large cavity might be detected and an underground test might unexpectedly produce a visible surface crater which may be found.

Undoubtedly, these possibilities exist but only on condition that the would-be evader of a test ban is clumsy, does not plan his cheating properly, or does not bother to spend too much money and effort on hiding the clandestine shots because he is not worried about the ambiguous indicators that might result from a poorly concealed clandestine program.

Some of our underground tests have unexpectedly led to venting and to some minor changes in the configuration of the mountains over the test sites. On the basis of our experience, the chances that there would be an unexpected large visible surface crater is certainly not better than 1 in 10. That such a change in the landscape would be detected, presumably by intelligence, is a little farfetched but let us assume that there is a probability of one in five. The combined

---

[1] Mr. Foster explained that a "surprise abrogation by the Soviets" of a test ban treaty "might leave us as much as 18 months behind in our readiness to test." He stated that the Government will make it "a matter of national policy to maintain readiness to test"; scientists would continue nuclear weapons research and "our weapons laboratories should function effectively." This is wishful thinking because the most creative scientists would have no incentive to stay with a dead-end program; at best, our laboratories would decline in quality.

probability that such a crater would occur and that it would be detected is then 1 in 50. This means that there is a chance of 1 such an occurrence per 2 test series of 25 shots each. However, this is merely the chance that intelligence might discover the crater, by no means to be confused with detection of a shot by instruments, let alone with verification through ground inspection.

The argument that big hole decoupling is time consuming is irrelevant. The test ban negotiation has been going on for 5 years already, hence there was adequate time to produce any number of big holes. The argument that the creation of a big hole is expensive is equally irrelevant, since cost is meaningful in terms of what a price buys. If a test ban immobilizes the technological progress of the United States and allows the Soviet Union, through cheating, to achieve nuclear supremacy, the expenditure for a few big holes would be trivial.

It is perhaps true that a large excavation project might be discovered during the construction phase, but such a possibility would be anticipated by the evader. There are any number of techniques through which discovery even of a large earth-moving job can be prevented, some of them very simple and inexpensive. The observation might be added that during the construction phase no suspect seismic signals would be received from the particular area: testing has not started yet. But in the absence of specific suspicions attached to a specific area, the excavation would be discovered only by chance. Even in this case the excavation may be explained away through a cover project.

But this criticism of big hole decoupling overlooks the fact that adequate decoupling can be achieved in natural caves as well as in mines; and that it is not always necessary to produce a very big hole: depending on the yield of the test as well as on the decoupling factor which is desired, the size of the hole can be increased or decreased. There are other decoupling techniques which either may be substituted for the big hole or used in combination with it. In the latter case, the decoupling factor may be increased for any given size of the cavity.

It is true that explosions of the same size produce variable signals. Some of these are due to variations in the geological environment and presumably can be anticipated through proper analysis. Other variations are caused, among other factors, by weather and temperature changes. There are a few unpredictable elements. However, these variations occur within limits: a 1-kiloton shot will not unexpectedly result in a 100-kiloton signal. Hence this danger can be easily guarded against through a prudent choice of yields and decoupling techniques.

Mr. Foster asserted that the "number of tremors from earthquakes in the Soviet Union which might be confused with tremors from nuclear explosions" originally was overestimated. He added that our ability to distinguish between earthquakes and explosions has been improving steadily.

But what is an improvement? Mr. Foster indicated that so far we are able to distinguish only over half of the seismic events. Actually, he chose careful language by saying that over half of the earth tremors give indications of being earthquakes on the basis of such seismic criteria as first earth motion. He did not say that the distinction could be made with finality from seismic criteria, he merely talked about indications. He added that somewhat less than another third of the seismic events were ruled out by nonseismic criteria; that is, by a number of judgments entirely divorced from instrument readings. These judgments may be right or wrong, but even if they are excellent they have no bearing on the effectiveness of scientific detection. Hence the seismic system produces reasonable indications on about half of the events.

However, even according to Mr. Foster's statistics, about 15 percent of the seismic events remain in the dubious category, that is, they could be earthquakes or explosions. Significantly, Mr. Foster left it to the reader to figure out the magnitude of this residue for himself. It may be presumed that if we concern ourselves only with large seismic events, this residual number may not be too large. But since the decoupling technique exists, we really must be concerned with very small seismic events whose number, especially during periods of high seismic activity, is very considerable. The fact that fewer earthquakes which produce tremors similar to those of an explosion have been observed than was expected, is not very meaningful.

In the absence of exact figures, we will grant, for argument's sake, that the difference between expectation and observation is significant. But seismic activity varies in intensity. When we talk about an annual number of earthquakes in a given region, we are talking about a statistical average. It is obvious that in a period of low seismic activity, the number of suspect events will be smaller than in a period of high activity. Our present statistical evidence is based on too short a timespan to allow a firm assessment of what the true average may be. Furthermore, this type of argument again disregards the decoupling technique: the number of small earth tremors is quite large, and the signals from low-energy events are most ambiguous. Hence, if these events must be taken into consideration, the challenge remains considerable, even if the number of easy-to-identify, high-energy events has declined. Mr. Foster's argument would be valid if we assume that the Soviets are stupid enough to cheat by means of tamped shots. It loses much of its force if we assume that the Soviets are more clever than USACDA seems to give them credit for.

What, then, is the capability of seismic detection? Mr. Foster disclosed these facts: "None of the seismic systems proposed by the United States from 1959 on would be capable of detecting with any certainty any explosion of 3 kilotons or less, if they occurred in alluvium. Moreover, artificial decoupling might permit considerably larger yield explosions without detection."

Now let us go back to the perfect crime and let us assume that the Soviets plan their crime to consist in the clandestine decoupled testing of neutron devices. We assume that the detection system would be capable of detecting explosions of 1 kiloton (instead of 3) and that the decoupling factor is 100 (instead of about 300). In this case a test explosion of 1 kiloton would provide a signal of the equivalent of 10 tons which is clearly not detectable and which is two orders of magnitude below the threshold of detection. Yet in view of the effects radius of a neutron bomb, a 1-kiloton device is easily the equivalent of 10-kiloton fission bomb.

Theoretically, if we want to keep the signal down to the 1-kiloton level and if the decoupling factor were 300, a 300-kiloton device could be tested, but for the purposes of the neutron program such a large shot would be entirely unnecessary.

If we assume that the neutron test program could be managed to full satisfaction, with shots up to 10 kilotons (in addition to which there would be a requirement for much HE testing), and if we furthermore assume that the decoupling factor would not be larger than 100, the expected maximum strength of the seismic signals would not exceed the equivalent of 100 tons. This would be an insurance factor of 10:1 if the system were capable to detect down to the 1-kiloton level and of 30:1 if it had only a 3-kiloton capability.

An insurance factor of this magnitude should easily accommodate the various hazards which could occur, e.g., signal strength variations.

Incidentally, the signals produced from neutron devices may be much less than those from fission and fission-fusion weapons and telltale radioactivity would be vastly less. Hence much of what we now assert about detection capabilities will not be correct if the system were to operate against a neutron test program.

But we have not yet reached the crucial point: Earlier treaty drafts stipulated that inspection would apply only to signals of a strength of 4.75 or larger, on the earthquake scale, i.e., to tamped shots of 20 kilotons or higher. If the signals remain below this intensity, we would, according to these early drafts, not be entitled to inspect. The area below this magic figure of 4.75 or 20 kilotons was placed under the regime of a gentlemen's agreement: we would have taken the Soviet's word of honor that they are not testing.

In other words, in order for us to be entitled to inspect and to have a chance to verify evasion, the Soviets would have to shoot at about 20 kilotons without decoupling or 2 megatons or more, with decoupling. Shots of such magnitudes are entirely unnecessary in the neutron program.

The lower threshold of 4.75 was eliminated from current draft treaties: theoretically we would be free to inspect any signal which we consider suspect. In reality, of course, the threshold had been suggested because of many practical considerations, including the ambiguity and frequency of the weaker signals. For all practical purposes, inspection will continue to apply mainly to the larger signals, although it may be granted that absence of a precise lower threshold figure would allow greater flexibility.

But the point is still this: A large percentage of neutron tests could be carried out on the fractional kiloton level and would not even require decoupling. The few larger tests which might be necessary would require only moderate decoupling. The program can be concealed, even with larger yields, below the threshold of actual detection—provided decoupling and possibly additional camouflage, concealment and deception techniques are utilized. These facts dispose of Mr. Foster's point that though single tests "might sometimes escape detection by seismic means a test series would be far more difficult to hide. Yet, little progress can ordinarily be made with individual, isolated tests." There is no need whatever for the Soviets to restrict themselves to isolated shots.

The conclusion is clear: a systematic, full-fledged neutron test program can be carried out in its entirety by clandestine underground explosions. It is not excluded that our detection system would produce indicators and that through intelligence, we might become suspicious of what was going on. Yet we could not prove the violation and we would have no legal justification in cancelling the treaty. The test ban thus would be an excellent cover for the neutron program. In this case the perfect crime seems to have a high degree of feasibility.

"THE TEST BAN: AN AMERICAN STRATEGY OF GRADUAL SELF-MUTILATION" CHAPTERS IX, X, XI, AND XII, BY STEFAN T. POSSONY

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from New York [Mr. GOODELL] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

Mr. GOODELL. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to include at this point in the

RECORD chapters IX, X, XI, and XII, of an article entitled "The Test Ban: An American Strategy of Gradual Self-Mutilation," by Stefan T. Possony of the Hoover Institution:

CHAPTER IX

The test ban: The need for weapons systems tests, new weapons systems and peacetime nuclear explosives

The discussion on the test ban usually centers on the implicit assumption that a continuation of tests is necessary only to insure technological progress. Whether or not technological and design experimentation is the most important aspect of testing, the fact remains that additional types of testing are mandatory for the security of the Nation.

Few people realize that though we are entrusting our security to ICBM's, we never have tested a full assembly of such a missile, i.e., we have not launched an ICBM together with its warhead, nor destroyed a target with an ICBM-launched warhead. There is no particular reason to assume that our ICBM's won't function when the dire moment arrives, but the fate of the Nation is far too serious a matter to be entrusted to mere, albeit persuasive, assumptions.

Similarly, much can be achieved in testing weapons like anti-ICBM's without nuclear warheads. But at one point it will become necessary to test the whole assembly. Indeed, we might be well advised to launch an anti-ICBM together with its warhead, in order to determine whether or not we are developing our anti-ICBM's the hard way. The President intimated that the Soviets had been conducting such tests. It is quite probable that through nuclear tests we could accelerate our anti-ICBM work—and what could be more desirable for the physical security of our Nation.

Some experts argue that from time to time a weapon, for example, an ICBM in its silo, or a bomb in the bay of a B–52, must be shot off in order to determine readiness and reliability. After all, we are checking on all other aspects of our readiness posture—is the business end of a weapon not its most important part? Before World War II our torpedoes were not tested but were assumed to be battle ready. We found out in combat, very much to our chagrin, surprise, and detriment, that many of those torpedoes proved to be duds. We could very easily lose a war if we did not continuously check on the reliability of our weapons.

Secretary McNamara already has been quoted with reference to the need of determining the effects of high altitude explosions on radars and communications, as well as possibly on antiballistic defense designs. We have fired a few high altitude shots but a little reflection will show that the phenomenology of such explosions must vary with yield and altitude of the detonations. Yet we tested only up to certain yield limits and we restricted ourselves to few selected altitudes. In other words, much needs still to be learned about the effects of nuclear explosions in the upper atmosphere and in near space.

Furthermore, we need considerably more knowledge about the effects of nuclear weapons on material, equipment, artifacts, vegetation, etc., notably we should test out shelter designs and the effectiveness of the hardened missile silos. The ability of our hardened sites to withstand nuclear blasts presently can be only estimated. Granted that these estimates reflect the best available professional judgment. However, this judgment is derived from extrapolations and is quite hazardous with respect to blasts of very high yields.

If the effectiveness of hardening were presently underrated, we would be spending too much money; at the same time we could assume that our hardened missiles are far less vulnerable than postulated in our defense planning. If, by contrast, the effects of hardening were overrated, our missile force would be at greater jeopardy than we have calculated, especially if the enemy were in possession of reliable data on our sites. This is a subject where guesswork should be entirely taboo.

From the technological point of view, testing is needed to increase our nuclear efficiencies in order, for example, to provide smaller missiles like Minuteman and Polaris with far greater yields than they presently possess. Secretary McNamara recently testified about Soviet hardening and suggested that it may be increasingly difficult for us to attack Soviet missile sites. Surely, it is self-evident that as hardening increases, yields must grow. But the boosting of yields must be accomplished within the constraint that the size of delivery vehicles must be reduced; this is a formidable challenge which cannot be met by occasional shots. Apparently we are unwilling to face up to this problem.

The Soviets presumably are staking much of their fortune on big yields. Conversely, they may use their nuclear efficiency to employ ever smaller ICBM's without losing firepower. In fact, if they want to attack the United States effectively, they need small—and cheap—ICBM's, perhaps several thousands of them. In terms of fission-fusion technology, the warheads of these missiles must have the maximum yield that can be packed into the nose cone. This is not all they need, but let us suppose the Soviets beat us in the race for nuclear efficiency; in this case, given numerical equality or even superiority on our part, they would be able, in addition to optimizing their posture for surprise attack, to exceed, force by force, the punch of our light as well as our heavy ICBM's.

Perhaps it is pertinent in this context to remember that Khrushchev withdrew his missiles from Cuba because, as he admitted by implication himself, the United States was capable of delivering far more firepower on the Soviet Union than the U.S.S.R. was capable of visiting on America. This firepower was vested, almost exclusively, in our SAC and fleet bombers, while the firepower of our long-range missiles hardly exceeded 5 percent of the total. Since firepower obviously is not the only factor that must be considered, this statistic is in no manner an objection to missiles. Yet the requirement for heavy firepower remains. The elimination of bomber aircraft whether justified from the aeronautical point of view or not, calls for more than a mere substitution of delivery vehicles: it also is necessary to prevent a precipitous decline in firepower.

To illustrate this point just a little further: assume our present SAC bombers average a firepower of 15 megatons per plane and assume that 15 percent of the planes would be able to execute 2 missions: This would give 1,600-odd SAC bombers the capability to deliver approximately 28,000 megatons of destruction. If this firepower were to be carried in 2-megaton missiles, about 14,000 light ICBM's would be necessary and even if we were to decide on 10-megaton missiles, we would need 2,800 heavy ICBM's. These are infeasible numbers which demonstrate the impracticability of an all-missile strategic force. These figures prove also that nuclear efficiency must be boosted considerably in order to insure that tomorrow's missile, in terms of firepower, will be a weapon that, at least in some missions, will be reasonably equivalent to today's bomber.

To return to other weapons requirements: We need clean weapons to be able to fight tactical wars effectively in densely populated areas—a clean technology is almost a prerequisite to holding the NATO alliance together. We also need optimal weapons for ground-to-air and antiballistic missiles; for a variety of reasons, including cleanliness, all-fusion warheads may fit the bill best. Tactical weapons must be of a high order of nuclear efficiency and will be required in large numbers. Hence to keep overall costs down, they must be small and cheap. The development of devices which in addition to being clean also are effective and economical is a tall order.

By contrast, if the Soviets were to show up with all-fusion devices, notably in antimissile and tactical weapons, and we would be stuck with the old technology—in addition to which we might have kept low or even cut down the number of such weapons in battle order—we might find ourselves in a very critical situation.

In the age of the Polaris submarine it is almost unbelievable that the Soviets would forgo developing nuclear missile and torpedo warheads, as well as bombs and possibly depth charges to satisfy the ASW requirement. We, too, must have nuclear tests to develop effective antisubmarine weapons, including some weapons with a relatively large lethal radius.

In addition, we need tests for weapons which would be peculiarly effective within the framework of our military tasks in Europe. For example, in order to facilitate the holding of forward positions on the ground, we should develop nuclear land mines. Nuclear sea mines would have their uses in defending positions like offshore islands and landing beaches. We may need nuclear explosives to destroy installations from which our forces have to retreat.

Very small nuclear weapons may help stay-behind forces to defend themselves for long periods and they may give immense strength to resistance movements in occupied countries.

It is all very well to worry about escalation of limited wars and to argue, with considerable propagandistic exaggeration, that even the use of a 0.1 kiloton device against, for example, secret police headquarters in a recently conquered country, would unleash a global thermonuclear war at the 10 to 100-megation level, i.e., cause escalation by an order of magnitude of 100,000 to 1 million on a single shot basis, however, the contingencies of war are unpredictable. To prepare weapons for certain uses does not mean that such weapons will be used, but that they can be used if they are needed. The chances are that escalation will be prevented most effectively if a whole spectrum of nuclear weapons were available. If we allow the enemy to become superior in the tactical nuclear field, we either will be losing limited local wars or to stave off defeat, will be compelled to escalate by our own initiative. Moreover, the absence of adequate tactical nuclear capabilities invites local aggression.

Despite wishful thinking about the exclusively civilian uses of space, sooner or later space will become a decisive military medium. Hence there exists the requirement for developing types of weapons and firepower which are effective in the vacuum above the atmosphere. It is apparent that neutron devices would be particularly useful in the space medium.

Testing also has a bearing on space propulsion. It is generally agreed that the Orion project—which is designed to use small nuclear "bombs" to propel a space vehicle—would allow the lifting of maximal payloads into orbit and permit the deepest penetration into the solar system. Of all propulsion systems it would provide for the most effective utilization of space. However, so far it seems impractical, because of radioactivity, to launch an Orion assembly from the ground; unfortunately, by using Orion propulsion only from orbit, much of the system's utility would be lost. An all-fusion technology would eliminate the radioactivity and thereby open the road to getting really important payloads into space.

Should the Soviets decide to move into space as a decisive military medium, they may employ Orion techniques even before they are able to eliminate the radioactivity. Actual Orion shots, in all likelihood, would be detected but the testing of the propulsion unit may be done on test stands which, by their very construction, could provide a great deal of decoupling. The required yields would be small in comparison with weapons. On balance it is likely, for various practical reasons, that the Soviets would base their Orion propulsion on all-fusion devices. By the same token, a requirement for effective space utilization might induce them to develop the all-fusion technology on a high priority basis.

As usual, the skeptics find it difficult to visualize the possible advantages of this new technology. But skepticism always opposes any new approach. Many decades of experience in weapons planning should have taught us to distrust the emotional opposition of scientists who are only superficially familiar with the new concept. Security would be served better if we were to rely more heavily on the cautious optimism of those scientists who really have explored the new possibility and found it attractive. The brutal twin facts which we cannot circumvent are that space utilization requires maximum energy releases and that nuclear explosions are the method through which maximum energy releases can be produced—and produced most cheaply.

In earlier years, some people hoped that radioactive substances could be used for military purposes. These expectations, so far, have been disappointed and perhaps radiological warfare remains impractical. Nevertheless, if radiological weapons could be perfected they would offer some possibilities of humane warfare. For example, a factory could be made inoperative by covering it with radioactive substances of suitable half-lives; if so, it would not be necessary to destroy the installation and in the process kill the working crews and the population living within the vicinity of ground zero. This sort of denial weapon also would make it unnecessary in case of retreat, to carry out scorched earth destructions; hence postwar recovery would be facilitated. Surely, the prospect of fighting war with less casualties than was heretofore possible merits some attention.

The aforementioned Russo-German military dictionary talks about radioactive weapons (boyevyye radioaktivnyye veshchestva) as though they do exist in the Communist arsenal, and states that radioactivity can be propagated in the form of powders, liquids, and smokes delivered from rockets, aerial bombs, artillery shells, and mines. It is added that radioactive substances can be used in combination with gas warfare. Is this another capability which we abandon unilaterally to the enemy?

Finally, there is the possibility of using nuclear explosions for industrial and civilian purposes, as envisaged in the Plowshare program. While this program has been continuing, it is allowed only a very low momentum and its vast potentialities are still unconvincing to those skeptics who are skeptical on a priori grounds and because they sense that Plowshare invalidates the basic concept of the test ban.

But the United States, who is over its neck in foreign aid, can ill afford to forgo modern technology in operations abroad (or at home, for that matter). For example, if a second Panama Canal were built by nuclear explosions rather than by conventional methods of earth moving, something like $8 billion could be saved, according to one estimate. Surely, this sort of money could be used to transform the economy of the Caribbean area. Instead of commenting further on the potentials of Plowshare, I refer to the book by Dr. Ralph Sanders of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, where the possible impacts of this technology on our security and economy are spelled out, with the exception of the possible developments in the chemical industry.

Plowshare explosions may be required for the building of stations on the moon. It is indeed self-evident that to establish anything like a useful environment on the moon, or later on some planets, a great deal of "earth" moving will be required. Hence we would have to transport vast amounts of energy into space, which would be impossible unless we can package the energy into minimum weights. Again, the nuclear explosive—of the all-fusion variety—provides the solution.

These various requirements do not necessarily have to be satisfied within the next few years. But ultimately they will have to be met. Hence it is not surprising that the United States, as appears from Mr. Foster's statement, envisages the possibility of a sudden cancellation of a test-ban treaty by the Soviets. In other words, we do not anticipate a permanent but merely a temporary test ban. This anticipation would be justified even if we assumed that the Soviets would like to stick to the ban, simply because some of these requirements will catch up with us. Peace may descend on this earth (which unfortunately is not very likely) but to maintain it in the face of rising populations and expectations as well as of raw material shortages, the utilization of Plowshare techniques will become mandatory; hence the all-fusion techniques must be developed. Lord Curzon once said in the House of Commons: "I do not exclude the intelligent anticipation of facts even before they occur."

In any event, the administration has not provided answers to these questions: if the test ban, by its very nature, can be only temporary, why try to achieve it in the first place? But even if a temporary ban would make sense, why shoot for it now? And why try to apply a test ban to the development of neutron and all-fusion devices when tests of such devices cannot be policed at all and when furthermore such tests would not produce significant fallout?

When the United States went into its first moratorium, it was generally assumed that our test organizations and crews would be kept together so that testing could be resumed almost instantly. It turned out that while we were able to conduct underground tests a few weeks after the Soviets broke the moratorium, almost 9 months were required to get ready for atmospheric testing. Now, it is promised again that if there were another moratorium or even a full-fledged ban, our test capabilities would be kept intact and on an instant readiness basis. These promises are unrealistic unless the American political behavior pattern changes. Even if the budgets were available—and in reality they won't be—the best talents would leave our weapons laboratories and test organizations, and perhaps the recruitment of younger physicists would become difficult. The Soviet Union which controls its scientific manpower does not suffer from a similar handicap. Hence a test ban would be disadvantageous to ourselves even if the Soviets were to observe it for the time being. At one point or the other, the test ban, which can only be temporary in nature, will come to a close, be it through detection of cheating, through cancellation, or through the action of nonsignatory states. On the day of expiration of the agreement, the Soviets would be in a far stronger position to resume operations than the United States.

CHAPTER X

The test ban: The jaws of the trap

According to a recent argument, the difficulties of policing a test ban were exaggerated by those who emphasized the potentialities of underground testing. It is alleged that the scientists who warned about the feasibility of cheating in underground test sites contradicted themselves when, after the resumption of testing by the United States, they called for atmospheric tests and voiced their discontent with our own underground testing program. This, it is argued, proves that underground testing gives only marginal results. Therefore, if a test ban does nothing else but force a would-be violator into ineffective testing, it would serve its purpose.

As so many arguments which have been produced ad hoc in the test ban debate, this particular line of reasoning is superficial, illogical, and to a large extent demagogic.

No one has ever claimed that underground testing can do all the jobs required in an effective testing program. By definition such matters as the phenomenology of high-altitude and deepwater shots and the vulnerability of ground equipments may have to be determined through atmospheric tests. This also holds true for the proof testing of high-yield battle order weapons, and finally for strictly technological testing at high yields.

In comparison with atmospheric testing, underground technological testing has several advantages (e.g., independence from weather and wind, and avoidance of fallout), but it also has a number of disadvantages. There are limitation on instrumentation, possibly modifications of effects, and vexatious restrictions on yield. If the underground tests were to be kept secret, yield limitations might be considerable, or else very large test sites must be constructed. Very large weapons, of course, never could be tested underground at their full yield.

During 1961 and 1962, therefore, when our test organization was hamstrung by many political limitations and when it was working feverishly against the danger that a new moratorium may be proclaimed, insistence on atmospheric tests was justified. But it is also noteworthy that the AEC, which at first evinced dissatisfaction with underground testing, on the basis of its experience during 1962, changed its mind and now considers underground testing favorably. Obviously, underground testing is an art and skills can be improved through learning.

This concrete situation has very little relevance for evaluating the potentialities of a stratagem aiming at a test ban and its evasion.

The trick the Soviets are trying to perform is to negotiate a test ban which would allow us the shadow of an inspection system and provide the Soviet Union with the substance of an effective clandestine testing capability.

Depending on how much inspection they would have to concede, clandestine test series can always be constructed in such a way that they will forever remain below the threshold of discovery and verification.

The frequent changes in Soviet policy, their unwillingness to grant even platonic concessions and the resultant postponement of the day when the United States will fall into the self-made test ban trap can be explained best by assuming that the Soviets have not yet decided how far they should go toward marrying American shadow to Soviet substance. Perhaps they do not feel they have yet reached the stage where adequate further progress can be insured by an exclusively underground program of several years duration. Once they have the super-yields they want and once they accomplish an anti-ICBM warhead, they may be ready for a clandestine underground program—at that moment American disarmament apostles, for a short while, may find that their prophecies on Soviet intentions are coming true.

Of course, the question is not whether underground and space testing is superior to atmospheric testing (which, for many cases, clearly, it is not), but whether clan-

destine testing allows more significant and rapid advances in weapons design than no testing at all, which equally clearly, it does, especially if the main challenge is to develop neutron devices.

Even if it were, on balance, not very probable that underground and space cheating alone would give sufficient results to allow the would-be aggressor to forgo other tests entirely, it can be argued that atmospheric test actually can be dispensed with for a protracted period, especially during periods when the other chief signatory of the ban does not test at all.

Obviously, a secret test program, even if it were restricted in scope, will in due time allow numerous improvements in weapons design, with the result that the balance of nuclear power gradually would shift to the violator.

Whether such a shift would occur with slow or rapid speed and how soon it might make a significant strategic difference, depends on many variable and unpredictable factors, including the ability of the violator to hit on unforeseen techniques through which the control system could be further degraded.

But even granting that testing would lead the violator only to a certain point. Assume he has achieved a new design but assume also that he feels he cannot just scale up but must test at full yield. In this case, he could risk a space shot, which may not be much of a risk after all. He also might produce a very deep and large underground cavity—in fact he may have used earlier underground shots to dig such a mammoth hole—and test the full yield underground. The rationale would not be that such a test would necessarily remain undiscovered but rather that the risk of detection is small, that attempts at verification will remain fruitless, and that more time will be gained in this fashion than by an open violation in the style of 1961.

The test ban danger can be understood most clearly if we do not overemphasize the question of whether shots can be detected and verified, but analyze the problem within the framework of a technological race in time. The Soviets may not be chiefly concerned about the danger of discovery. Their chief problem, as I see it, is to gain time advantages over the United States. It is only in this context that they must prevent premature discovery.

Naturally, time planning for the test program is part of their overall strategic time planning. Assume they estimate, after 8 years of cautious clandestine testing, that they probably gained the technical advantages they were seeking; assume that they decide to go to war after 2 more years. Since probably a fairly large number of atmospheric tests at full yield would be required to check the overall reliability of their battle order weapons, they should resume atmospheric testing on D-day minus 1 year. Even if the United States resumed testing within the year, the Soviets could have reaped great strategic benefits. Naturally, the proof tests may show that the weapons function less well than had been anticipated, in which case the stratagem may have failed in part. The odds are, however, that while yield predictions and the like may not be entirely accurate, serious and noncorrectable failures will not occur.

CHAPTER XI

The test ban: its strain on free world alliances

In all this pressure for the test ban, the United States has shown willingness, or so it seems to many outside observers, to subordinate the interests of the NATO alliance to the chimera of a Soviet-American test ban. If such a ban were concluded, it would amount to a quasi-alliance between the two hostile superpowers, especially if it were accompanied by a proviso that the nuclear club would remain closed to new applicants. The implications of such an agreement would be far reaching. Even in the present phase when the agreement is merely being discussed, the alliance has been weakening politically and militarily, and Europe has remained disarmed in terms of a future war. In the end, if the test ban were to stick, it would constitute a reorientation of the entire foreign policy of the United States. The effect of this policy would be, whether this is the intent or not, to divide the globe into an American and a Soviet orbit—until the day when the Soviets will see fit to grasp for it all.

Naturally, the proviso against the enlargement of the nuclear club cannot be enforced unless we or the Soviets, or both, were to threaten and even attack nations acquiring nuclear capabilities. Yet the Soviets hardly could afford to attack China. Khrushchev's recently commented: "When we will throw the last shovelful of dirt on the grave of capitalism, we will do it with China." In view of this attitude, it is very plausible to expect that the Chinese, once they get around to testing under moratorium conditions, actually would be acting as proxies for the Soviets. Similarly, the United States cannot prevent the French from pursuing their atomic program, and we have announced—and reiterated—that we won't interfere.

In this connection it is to be noted that the Soviets repeatedly stated they would stick to the principle that for each Western shot, they would fire a shot of their own. Hence, so long as the French continue their tests, the Soviets, irrespective of what they sign with the United States, will not consider that they are obligated in any manner by the discontinuance of American testing.

The incongruity of our policy can also be seen from the fact that we only recently offered to France Polaris missiles without warheads or submarines. This offer, which was refused, for good and sound reasons, was predicated on the assumption that the French would develop their own atomic warheads for that missile. It is fantastic to expect that the Polaris missile which has been in service for 2 years, will remain so desirable that still in 1970 it should be introduced into the French arsenal, i.e., at a time when the Soviets may be in the second generation of their antimissiles. Certainly, Polaris would be the wrong missile if by 1970 neutron technology were mastered, and missile as well as submarine could be reduced in size. By offering just one element of an entire weapon system, we are ignoring the main lesson in arms design since 1940: Weapons must be designed as systems; hence if we want the French and the British to have a nuclear submarine force, we had better get together and negotiate about the system in toto.

The French have yet to prove mastery of fusion techniques and surely a fission warhead on Polaris makes no sense at all. Irrespective of whether it is sound to expect that the French can have a truly effective Polaris warhead by 1970, if the United States were to enter into a test ban, we would expect the French not to engage in any tests. How then could the French acquire the warhead for the missile which we are offering to them? Would we not feel compelled to withhold the missile if they did not adhere to the moratorium—and to withhold it also if they did observe the moratorium, because they could not use the missile?

Truly, the United States has been maneuvering itself into an untenable position. While we have been chasing the will-o'-the-wisp of a test ban designed to initiate a series of arms control or disarmament agreements, or failing in this most illusory objective, to pursue a strategy of nuclear stalemate rather than deterrence, we have not even attempted to make some real progress for the benefit of mankind. The whole agitation about the test ban came about because of fears that fallout would endanger human health. It might have been feasible to conclude an international agreement for the control of the amounts of radioactivity released into the air every year. Such an agreement could be patterned, for example, after the international whaling convention or provisions for the control of epidemics. Perhaps the Soviets would have been unwilling to forgo their stratagem and substitute a beneficial measure. But the pursuit of a useful public health convention, instead of a strategic boomerang, would conform both to American security interests and to its traditional concern for human welfare.

It is distressing that the United States has gradually been slipping into a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament, on the one hand, and illusions and duplicity on the other. Major strategic decisions in a democracy should be based upon a proper democratic debate. Instead, secret diplomacy abounds, the Government manipulates the news and abuses security provisions by withholding information to which the American public is entitled, especially since the pertinent information is known to the Soviets. The absence of regular reports on the nuclear race bespeaks a fear that the American people may become apprehensive of Soviet nuclear advances and consequently demand the initiation of a serious and continuous American test program.

A democracy cannot function without an effective opposition. It would seem as though in many vital security areas, but especially in the nuclear field, there has been a de facto suspension of the democratic procedure within the United States.

The voice of those who oppose the folly of the test ban has been stifled effectively and it remains to be seen whether this particular intra-American iron curtain can be pierced before the security of the United States is permanently imperilled. In a democracy the opposition is expected to be loyal. But it is a vital element of its loyalty to the Nation that the opposition must fulfill its functions of opposing false policies, even at the price of a loss in popularity. An opposition which keeps silent throws away its chances and forfeits the future of the Nation.

CHAPTER XII

The test ban: an American retreat from supremacy

The test ban is one important step in the many unilateral measures which the United States has been taking toward unilateral nuclear disarmament. The Soviets have carried out more tests at high yields than we have, and when they announced that they would use 100 megaton devices in their weapons, we stuck to bombs and warheads of far lesser firepower. We are reducing the total megatonnage of our strategic delivery system. If we allow a firepower gap to develop according to present trends, we would simply make the Soviets a present of the greatest blackmail potential ever possessed by an aggressor.

We are holding back with the development of warheads of optimal usefulness in anti-ICBM's. It is utterly incomprehensible that Disarmament Agency Chief William C. Foster lists as an advantage of the test ban that "the development of antimissile systems would be slowed down on both sides." There can be no advantage in such a slowdown for a second-strike power. International stability would be enhanced through a better balance between offensive and defensive weapon systems. Mr. Foster's statement, however, discloses the true attitude of the administration to antimissile defense: they just don't want it.

There has been a recent downgrading of the utility of low-yield tactical weapons and

a great eagerness to strengthen the conventional firepower of the ground forces rather than their nuclear capability. We are more afraid of rash acts by our own troops than of enemy aggression and have put our nuclear weapons under so many controls that it will be a miracle, should aggression eventuate, if they can be used before the storage and launch sites have been hit. To top all this, we are relying on weapon systems which were never fully tested and whose reliability is not checked at regular intervals.

It is apparent that by contrast, the Soviet Union is trying to maximize its nuclear capabilities for all weapon systems useful in a modern war.

The solid strategic result, so far, of 5 years of unpoliced test moratorium, test-ban negotiation, and somewhat desultory U.S. testing has been that the Soviets caught up and possibly overtook us in the yield of strategic weapons as well as in high-yield nuclear efficiencies. Presumably, to judge from Mr. Foster's statement, we still enjoy advantages in smaller and tactical weapons—but this seems to be irrelevant in view of the fact that the administration plans to stop production of tactical weapons and makes every effort to downgrade the utility of these weapons, be it even at the price of further undermining NATO.

Hence we don't really need a second test-ban round to help the enemy because we are conceding the tactical weapons to the Soviets anyway. But the second round, in all likelihood, would provide the Soviets with a monopoly in neutron weapons. In any event, a test ban which by definition cannot be used to police tests on neutron weapons and which would be observed unilaterally by the United States because we don't want to develop the neutron technology, would provide the Soviet Union with an optimal condition to achieve military supremacy.

Has Khrushchev forsaken nuclear war? Perhaps, but for how long? How long will he stay in power? He anticipates that as a result of his peaceful coexistence strategy, major crises will develop. What he plans to do when a crisis occurs was stated by him in blunt language on January 16, 1963: "If a revolutionary situation has arisen, the working class, led by its vanguard, must utilize this situation for seizing power * * *. The people have the right to use the most decisive means including armed struggle, in the interest of the victory of socialism."

Impregnable Troy fell to a primitive ruse. The test ban is a highly sophisticated stratagem, but it is really based on an elementary point of observation: Americans are so highly susceptible to high-sounding propaganda that they can be persuaded to commit political suicide. The trick is to disarm us and make us die by an infinite number of small steps. The test-ban stratagem is the most effective psychological warfare campaign of the century, a real breakthrough in the art of psychological warfare, just as radar, the fission bomb, the missile, and sputnik constituted technological breakthroughs. But of all these breakthroughs, the test ban has the optimal cost-to-effect ratio.

Shall we be extinguished because we are listening to Kipling's prophets "of the utterly absurd, of the patently impossible and vain?" Odysseus knew how to behave when he encountered the Sirens; we are eager to be charmed by their sweet songs. "Around them the bodies of their victims lie in heaps."

APPLICATION OF POWER REVENUES FROM RECLAMATION PROJECTS FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE PUBLIC DEBT

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. LANGEN] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

Mr. LANGEN. Mr. Speaker, when the Government makes a profit on a Government-owned business, those profits rightfully belong to the people of the United States. With this in mind, I am introducing a bill that would provide for the application of power revenues from reclamation projects to the reduction of the public debt.

What my bill means is that revenues derived from reclamation projects will first be used to repay the costs of such projects, but once the project is on a paying basis, additional profits would be transferred to the General Treasury and would be applied only for the reduction of the public debt of the United States.

We all recognize the value of necessary reclamation power projects, but we should also recognize that profits from such projects belong to the taxpayers. Instead of turning such profits back into the Treasury, as was originally intended, they have been used in the past to support irrigation projects that not only cannot pay their own way but even add to the already staggering surpluses of agricultural products in this country. Some do not even benefit the power customers served by the original project.

Using these power profits for unsound irrigation projects is a direct form of subsidy, paid for by the American people. The figures are juggled, however, to make it appear that they cost us nothing. My bill would put an end to this reshuffling and dealing off the bottom of the deck. The cards would then be on the table, face up, for all to see.

This bill would not only work to reduce the national debt, but would amount to a wiser expenditure of these moneys than is now being done through questionable irrigation projects. These projects would then have to stand on their own merits instead of sneaking in behind the skirts of public power profits.

The worst part of all is that these irrigation projects put new acres into production raising the same crops that we pay other sections of the country not to raise. These farms are not even capable of paying back the interest-free money they are using to get into production.

Using these power profits to reduce the national debt would be the first step taken in that direction for some time. Our Government ran $6.3 billion in the red last year, expects to run another $8 or $9 billion in the hole during the fiscal year ending June 30, and anticipates a deficit of at least $11.9 billion next year if current budget requests are approved.

If this is the case, Congress may be asked to up the debt limit to $320 billion after this June 30 to meet the spending requirements for fiscal 1964. The debt limit was $285 billion in 1961, which means we are on the threshold of increasing it by the whopping total of $35 billion in just 3 years.

If reclamation power profits had been returned to the Treasury under the terms of my bill in the past, our public debt would now be around $4 billion less than it is. This may seem insignificant in these days of $100 billion budgets, but at least it is a first step toward a goal of fiscal sanity.

My bill has three major purposes, to reduce our impossible national debt, to eliminate a practice that results in increased farm surpluses at taxpayer expense, and to make wiser use of these moneys at a time when the fiscal strain is big enough to begin with.

HOW STRONG IS THE DOLLAR?

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from New Hampshire [Mr. CLEVELAND] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, on March 7, 1963, I made a statement on the floor entitled "How Strong Is the Dollar?" This statement called attention to one facet of our balance-of-payments problem.

On March 13, 1963, I read into the RECORD, page 4106, an editorial from the Wall Street Journal, "Ignorance or Intent?" This article demonstrated the close relationship between our balance of payments and the administration's budget handling.

Calling attention to the need for maintaining confidence in the U.S. dollar, the Wall Street Journal advocated reduced Federal spending as the best way of stimulating healthy economic development.

On March 19, 1963, the distinguished minority leader of the Senate issued the following statement:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR DIRKSEN, MARCH 19, 1963

The Kennedy administration's highly questionable proposal to increase the national debt so that the Federal Government can spend more while the people pay less in taxes offers so many dangers to our economy that it is difficult to list them.

Certainly one of the greatest dangers is further inflation which means rising prices. The American people, who saw their money cheapened by nearly 50 percent under the Truman administration, understand this danger and it is one of the reasons they doubt the wisdom of President Kennedy's proposal to increase spending while cutting taxes.

But there is a much less understood danger—the threat the President's program presents to an already bad economic problem, the flow of gold from this country to foreign lands.

In 1962, the United States paid to foreign creditors $2.2 billion more than it received in the balance of payments and it is already estimated our deficit position will be equally bad this year. As a result of the 1962 payments, our shrinking gold holdings were reduced $911 million, meaning our foreign creditors demanded gold instead of accepting our dollars more than 40 percent of the time.

It is a fact of economic life that the demand for gold by foreign holders of dollars will step up sharply if the Kennedy program should result in additional inflation. Foreign economists and financiers recognize the inflation potential in the proposed Kennedy deficit and just their fear of it could produce increased difficulties in our flow of gold problem.

We, the members of the Joint Senate-House Republican leadership, feel it impera-

tive to point out that higher prices which inevitably follow inflation could only mean less export of American goods and more export of gold to pay for the increased imports of goods made by cheaper foreign labor. Instead of helping solve unemployment, Mr. Kennedy's planned deficit very conceivably could increase unemployment and worsen our gold position to boot.

The creation of jobs is our No. 1 problem and we believe any tax-and-spend program which weakens confidence is likely to worsen rather than solve the problem.

The Senator from Illinois has done a commendable job in linking our balance-of-payments problem to the planned budget deficit proposed by this administration.

Until a year ago, balance of payments was a subject with which Americans were largely unconcerned. In the last 2 years foreign creditors have been demanding gold instead of accepting our dollars. If this situation continues, balance of payments may become as well known as Mickey Mantle's batting average.

W. A. SHEAFFER PEN CO.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. SCHWENGEL] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Speaker, this year marks the golden anniversary of one of my State's major industrial enterprises—a company whose name in the short span of 50 years has become known to many millions of people throughout the free world.

I refer to the W. A. Sheaffer Pen Co., incorporated in 1913 in Fort Madison, Iowa, by the inventor of the lever-fill fountain pen, and now directed by the two grandsons of the founder.

When W. A. Sheaffer began production of writing instruments a half-century ago with a staff of six employees, his "factory" was a 12- by 14-foot room in the back of his small jewelry store on the main street of this southeast Iowa community.

Today, in the same city, Sheaffer Pen Co.'s three modern plants cover an area of several blocks and contribute substantially to the economy of the area by employing more than 1,400 of Fort Madison's 15,000 citizens.

In addition, there are hundreds more employed in Sheaffer facilities in Canada, Australia, South America, and Europe—evidence of the opportunities for growth and expansion under the American free enterprise system.

I am proud of the accomplishments of this Iowa firm that for 50 years has adhered unswervingly to the philosophy of its founder: build quality products, charge a fair price for them, and sell them with pride. In the years ahead I am sure that Sheaffer management and employees will have as their goal even greater service to the fundamental area of personal communication as a force for international understanding and well-being.

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CURTIS] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, last year I had extensive correspondence with the Reverend Stanley Stuber of Jefferson City, Mo., and the chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALTER] regarding the use of information provided by the committee from its public files. This exchange originated when I received a letter from Dr. Stuber calling for the abolition of the committee because of certain "abuses" of which he, and others, contend the committee have been guilty.

In following up on his complaints, which centered around the publication by certain individuals and groups in Missouri of committee material concerning him, I believe some important questions of procedure were raised. This correspondence appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, volume 108, part 3, pages 3776–3779, volume 108, part 13, pages 18279–18282, and volume 108, part 14, pages 19503–19505.

A further instance has been brought to my attention by Dr. Stuber of the use of committee materials dealing with him. Once again, I believe that this subject is of such importance to the Congress and the country in evaluating the work of the committee that I am placing the correspondence dealing with it in the RECORD.

First is a letter which I received from Dr. Stuber enclosing a copy of a memorandum circulated by the Reverend Alfred Thornton of the Bible Baptist Church of Jefferson City to all members of the Missouri State Legislature. My reply follows:

MISSOURI COUNCIL OF CHURCHES,
Jefferson City, Mo., January 28, 1963.

The Honorable THOMAS B. CURTIS,
Old House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN CURTIS: Enclosed is another documentation of how the listings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities are being used to smear Americans who may believe in the National Council of Churches and the United Nations.

You will note that the Reverend Mr. Thornton claims that he received the listings from Chairman WALTER and that this information is directly from the official records in Washington.

This is very serious business, since this document was sent to all the members of the house and senate of the Missouri Legislature.

I certainly hope that you will find time to follow up on this matter, and discover some way of keeping the files of the House Committee on Un-American Activities from the hands of those who want to use the great influence of a congressional committee for their own personal purposes of smearing those with whom they do not agree.

Sincerely yours,

STANLEY I. STUBER,
Executive Director.

BIBLE BAPTIST CHURCH,
Jefferson City, Mo.

DEAR LAWMAKER: A copy of this letter is being put in the hands of all senators and representatives of our State legislature. It concerns the Reverend Dr. Stanley I. Stuber of Jefferson City.

Dr. Stuber is executive secretary of the Missouri Council of Churches with headquarters here in the capital city. You will be hearing from this man for he will be using his position as head of a large council of churches to influence certain legislation. Please notice very carefully the following information about Dr. Stuber.

I have a personal letter from the Honorable FRANCIS E. WALTER, Chairman of Committee on Un-American Activities. Mr. WALTER enclosed the following data.

"1. In 1950 and 1951 Dr. Stanley I. Stuber sponsored the National Committee To Repeal the McCarran Act. (The Internal Security Subcommittee said that this organization was subversive.)

"2. Dr. Stuber was secretary-treasurer of the Inter-Church Committee of The American Russian Institute. (That organization was listed as subversive by the Attorney General of the United States Senate Judiciary Committee, and Internal Security Subcommittee.)

"3. Dr. Stuber was connected with the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship. (This organization was declared subversive by the Committee on Un-American Activities, Attorney General of the United States, Internal Security Subcommittee, and Subversive Activities Control Board.)

"4. Dr. Stuber was a sponsor of The Call for a National Emergency Conference. (That organization was declared subversive by the Committee on Un-American Activities.)

"5. Dr. Stuber was a sponsor of the American Committee for Spanish Freedom. (This organization was declared subversive by the Attorney General of the United States, Committee on Un-American Activities.)"

In recent weeks Dr. Stuber has been reported in the local newspapers as opposing the House Un-American Activities Committee making known publicly the names of persons found to belong to Communist-front organizations, and that he and his Council of Churches would officially favor legislation to abolish the death penalty in Missouri.

Dr. Stuber will probably deny this report—he has already in the past, but I remind you this information is directly from the official records in Washington. If you should like a photostatic copy of this report from Washington I will be happy to provide you with one. If for any reason you should want to contact me further, my telephone numbers are Jefferson City 635–1970 or 635–1097.

By the way, the above report on Dr. Stuber is only fragmentary. There are other men in Missouri who know more on him than I do. Their names and addresses are available for you.

With every good wish, I am

Yours sincerely,

Rev. ALFRED O. THORNTON,
Pastor.

FEBRUARY 5, 1963.

STANLEY I. STUBER, Th. M., D.D.,
Executive Director, Missouri Council of Churches, Jefferson City, Mo.

DEAR DR. STUBER: I wish to acknowledge your letter of January 28, 1963. It is obvious to me that the Reverend Thornton is referring back to the incident which I checked into where Congressman WALTER released the unevaluated material in the committee's files under the caveat the committee employs. I do not condone what was done and I have endeavored to persuade the House Un-American Activities Committee not to permit this kind of thing to happen.

On the other hand, it is quite obvious that Reverend Thornton is misusing this material as he does not call attention to the caveat of the House Un-American Activities Committee which accompanies this material. Quite the contrary, Reverend Thornton seeks to create innuendoes the other way. This is a matter of Reverend Thornton's actions, however, not the House Un-American Activities Committee. It does demonstrate, however, the point you sought to make of the manner in which House Un-American Activities Committee material can be misused when placed in the hands of certain people.

I still find it strange, however, that you do not have your explanation of your association with these various groups adjudged to be subversive firmly placed in the House Un-American Activities Committee files. The House Un-American Activities Committee points out that they have asked you for this statement several times and have assured you that this becomes just as much a part of the files as the derogatory material.

I have no knowledge of any new incident of the House Un-American Activities Committee releasing unevaluated material to a member of the public, or even to another Congressman, who then made it available.

Sincerely,

THOMAS B. CURTIS.

Next is a letter which I received from the Missouri Convention of American Baptists, written in an attempt to clarify the situation and put Reverend Thornton's memorandum into proper perspective. Again my response follows:

MISSOURI CONVENTION OF AMERICAN BAPTISTS,
Columbia, Mo., February 4, 1963.

Hon. THOMAS B. CURTIS,
Webster Groves, Mo.

DEAR MR. CURTIS: I have reason to believe that you have received a communication from the Reverend Alfred O. Thornton, pastor of the Bible Baptist Church, Jefferson City, Mo., which seeks to cast suspicion on the patriotism of the Reverend Dr. Stanley I. Stuber, executive director and Ecumenical Minister of the Missouri Council of Churches.

I am privileged to serve as the official representative of the American Baptist Convention in Missouri and Dr. Stuber is an ordained minister of this denomination. It is in this capacity that I am writing to call your attention to two things:

1. I have in my files photostatic copies of letters from the staff director of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, and from one of the members of the committee, stating that there has never been a hearing nor an investigation of Dr. Stuber and that he has never been identified as a member of the Communist Party.

2. The statement regarding the practice of the House Committee on Un-American Activities making public the content of their files is a reference to and consistent with a resolution adopted by the Greater Council of the American Baptist Convention and submitted in writing to Members of the Congress by the American Baptist Convention.

I have taken the liberty of writing because I believe that Mr. Thornton, through misinformation which has come to his hands, has possibly cast one of American Baptists' respected leaders in an unfavorable light.

I shall be pleased to discuss this further with you if you should care to request it.

Respectfully,

JAMES HAVENS,
Executive Secretary.

FEBRUARY 19, 1963.

MR. JAMES HAVENS,
Executive Secretary, Missouri Convention of American Baptists, Columbia, Mo.

DEAR MR. HAVENS: Thank you for sending me a copy of the letter you are sending to people who may have received communications from Rev. Alfred Thornton, pastor of the Bible Baptist Church of Jefferson City, in respect to Rev. Dr. Stanley Stuber.

I think this goes a long way toward putting this matter in the proper light. This is a way much preferable to that of castigating the Congress and its committees, as was done in the unfortunate statement to which you make reference in point two of your letter.

The phrase "unevaluated and limited" information should be used in place of the word "misinformation" contained in the next to the last paragraph of your letter. The House Un-American Activities Committee did not give out misinformation, as Dr. Stuber himself acknowledges, only unevaluated and limited information, which could be and was used by Reverend Thornton to draw or to suggest unwarranted conclusions.

Sincerely,

THOMAS B. CURTIS.

A copy of my reply to Mr. Havens was directed to the attention of Reverend Thornton. He took issue with my contention that his "Dear Lawmakers" memorandum drew or suggested "unwarranted conclusions" and asked for an explanation of my statement. Here, I feel, is the crux of the matter; in this can be found the responsibilities of the various interested parties to safeguard the personal reputations of those about whom the committee has material in its public files.

In its form for providing requested information from its public files on specific individuals and groups, the committee prints a caveat stating that the information which follows is not evaluated and contains only material which has been received by the committee, not results of any investigation by it. It goes on to say that the information set forth is "not, per se, an indication that this individual is subversive, unless specifically stated."

This caveat is as much a part of the committee's information as the material which follows it. Yet, there are those, like Reverend Thornton in the case at hand, who republish this material, often edited and always leaving out the explanatory caveat. We can hold open for discussion whether there should be files of the committee open to the public and whether the committee should cooperate with those interested in this material to the extent of reproducing it and sending it on request. A case could be made either way on this, and should be made.

Nevertheless, the committee in responding to requests for information of this nature takes the very commendable precaution of making sure the caveat noted above goes with it. Then we come to the responsibility of those who receive and republish the material from the committee. If they follow the procedures which Reverend Thornton has, they ignore their responsibility to the people who are subjects of the committee files and to the people to whom their reports are sent. If their purpose is to smear, they can use the edited committee file material, just as they can any other half-truth, and make what appears to be a damning case. To turn back for a moment to the basic issue which brought me into correspondence with Dr. Stuber, is this adequate reason for abolishing the committee? Clearly not. It may indicate a need for a better procedure on the part of the committee to prevent abuses by other people outside of the Congress, but it cannot impute the motives of those on the outside to the committee.

The letter of Reverend Thornton asking for a clarification of my statement and my response follows.

BIBLE BAPTIST CHURCH,
Jefferson City, Mo., February 23, 1963.

The Honorable THOMAS B. CURTIS,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CURTIS: Thank you for sending me a copy of your recent letter to Mr. James Havens, executive secretary, Missouri Convention of American Baptists.

In the last paragraph of your letter to Mr. Havens you say, "The House Un-American Activities Committee did not give out misinformation, as Dr. Stuber himself acknowledges, only unevaluated and limited information, which could be and was used by Reverend Thornton to draw or to suggest unwarranted conclusions."

I would appreciate very much your explaining simply what you meant by the last clause of that paragraph, quote: "which could be and was used by Reverend Thornton to draw or to suggest unwarranted conclusions." I am completely in the dark as to what you meant by that and since I am directly involved I assure you of my sincere desire for an explanation.

With every good wish, I am,

Sincerely yours,

ALFRED O. THORNTON.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., March 7, 1963.

REV. ALFRED O. THORNTON,
Pastor, Bible Baptist Church,
Jefferson City, Mo.

DEAR DR. THORNTON: I am happy to comply with your request that I explain what I meant by the last clause of the paragraph you refer to in my letter to Mr. James Havens: "which could be and was used by Reverend Thornton to draw or to suggest unwarranted conclusions."

Your "Dear Lawmaker" letter addressed to all Missouri State legislators stated, "Please notice very carefully the following information about Dr. Stuber.

"I have a personal letter from the Honorable FRANCIS E. WALTER, chairman of Committee on Un-American Activities. Mr. WALTER enclosed the following data:"

This data was typed on the standard form employed by the House Un-American Activities Committee which has a printed caveat preceding the information set out. This caveat reads as follows:

"This committee makes no evaluation in this report. The following is only a compilation of recorded public material contained in our files and should not be construed as representing the results of any investigation or finding by the committee. The fact that the committee has information as set forth below on the subject of this report is not per se an indication that this individual, organization, or publication is subversive, unless specifically stated."

You did not print this caveat in your letter or in any way warn the people you were writing to that this was unevaluated material and that deductions should not be drawn from it that a person is or was subversive.

As a matter of fact, you edited the material from the House Un-American Activities Committee files.

Item 1. The House Un-American Activities Committee files state that the Daily Worker "reported" Dr. Stuber to be a sponsor of the Committee to Repeal the McCarran Act and a circular and petition of this committee listed him as among "prominent

Americans" who urged the repeal of the McCarran Act.

Your letter states baldly that Dr. Stuber sponsored this national committee. This is drawing an unwarranted conclusion. I remind you the sole authority for drawing the conclusion is the Daily Worker, which, according to my standards, and I suspect yours, is a very unreliable authority.

Item 2. The House Un-American Activities Committee file merely says that a letterhead, received in 1949, listed Dr. Stuber as secretary-treasurer of the Inter-Church Committee of the American-Russian Institute.

You draw the unwarranted conclusion that "Dr. Stuber was the secretary-treasurer * * *." A letterhead at most is some evidence of this fact, not conclusive proof. Furthermore, you very neatly have edited out of the House Un-American Activities Committee report references to dates, except in your item 1, dealing with the National Committee to Repeal the McCarran Act—and there you put in the years in which the Daily Worker and the committee said Dr. Stuber was active in this but failed to note that the earliest citation of this committee as subversive was in 1956. Dates become very important in evaluating membership in organizations. An organization can start out perfectly sound and be subverted at a later date. It is for this reason that the House Un-American Activities Committee files give the date when the organization under question was declared subversive and by which governmental agency. In this instance, the Inter-Church Committee of the American-Russian Institute, the dates were 1949, 1952, and 1956. There is no statement as to when the letterhead might have been printed. The House Un-American Activities Committee statement is limited and quite clear, "the letterhead was received in 1949."

Item 3. The files state the Daily Worker reported in 1947 that Dr. Stuber was among many signers of a statement sponsored by the organization in question. Two pamphlets of the organization said Dr. Stuber was among the signers of a statement and appeal sponsored by it. You draw the unwarranted conclusion that "Dr. Stuber was connected with" the organization. This is an indication of some connection, but not proof of it. The dates of the statements are not listed so we have no way of knowing whether they were issued before or after the organization in question was found to be subversive.

Item 4. The files state that the call for a National Emergency Conference May 13, 14, 1939, "named Dr. Stuber as a sponsor." You draw the unwarranted conclusion that he was a sponsor. Maybe he was, but this is only an indication he was. The organization was not declared subversive until 1946 and 1949.

Item 5. The file states that Dr. Stuber's name was on a letterhead (no date) of the American Committee for Spanish Freedom which was declared subversive in 1946 and 1949. The date of the Spanish Civil War suggests that the letterhead, whatever it signifies, probably was printed about 10 years earlier. You draw the unwarranted conclusion that "he was a sponsor."

I have pointed out specifically where you have drawn unwarranted conclusions. Let me now point out where you suggest unwarranted conclusions. Your final paragraph is as follows: "By the way the above report on Dr. Stuber is only fragmentary. There are other men in Missouri who know more on him than I do." Now what do you mean "know more on him" unless you are suggesting that all the secondhand, quoted out of context, rephrased material you have previously set out is something "on him," that is, against him.

What indeed is the entire purpose of your letter if it is not to draw and suggest unwarranted conclusions about Dr. Stuber?

Now let me conclude by saying this. I have no brief for Dr. Stuber. I don't believe I have ever met him, although I may be in error on this. I am at considerable odds with him on many important matters including his actions and attitudes toward the House Un-American Activities Committee, which I believe is doing a very difficult task under very trying circumstances with a reasonable record of fairness. I have criticized and still criticize the House Un-American Activities Committee for certain specific things, but I try to make my criticism constructive and I am also guided by the thought that I may be the one in error.

I believe that freedom of thought and the freedom to express one's thoughts is very basic to our way of life. It is because the Communist ideology would deprive our people of these freedoms—and our other important freedoms as well—that I am so strongly opposed to communism. However, we must not in combating communism and its attempt to infiltrate our society (and this threat is not a figment of the imagination) sacrifice the very freedoms we are fighting to protect. The end cannot justify these self-defeating means.

I am satisfied that if we are careful and fair we can combat communism effectively. Communism thrives on unfairness, excesses and carelessness with the truth; it withers in the light of honest debate and true seeking after facts. I do not believe the material which you circulated has helped in the fight against communism.

With best wishes,

Yours very truly,

THOMAS B. CURTIS.

There is a final level of responsibility which I feel deserves mention in this area. It is the responsibility of men like Dr. Stuber, leaders in their communities, to those who look to them for guidance. I am placing a letter which I have written to Dr. Stuber below, but I should like to point up its major thrust. As a preface to my letter is a letter which Dr. Stuber has written to the committee, in response to their invitation and request, stating his comments on the listings which the committee has dealing with him in its public files. I am pleased that Dr. Stuber has done this and, I might note, committee procedure is that this statement will be made part of the file of material on Dr. Stuber and will be with the file material to those who request such material.

In joining, supporting, or lending his name—if indeed he did—to the various organizations which are mentioned in the committee's files, Dr. Stuber placed the prestige of his person and his office behind these organizations. Because of this prestige which Dr. Stuber has, it is incumbent upon him, just as it is incumbent upon every Member of this body, to use care in giving support to groups which seek it. His giving support is not a private thing; it is an act which the recipient organization will publicize and upon which those who respect Dr. Stuber and have faith in him can rely. He owes it to the public to make the full extent of his connections an open matter—if he does support a cause, he should be glad to say why and, if the cause has been found subversive, to explain why he feels he can still cooperate with it in the best interests of the country or, on the other hand, announce that he no longer gives it his support. Just as Reverend Thornton has failed in his responsibility, Dr. Stuber, too, has helped create what I believe is a very unfortunate situation.

FEBRUARY 21, 1963.

The Honorable FRANCIS E. WALTER,
Chairman, House Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN WALTER: At your suggestion I am making the following statement to be used in connection with the public file dealing with my name: "Dr. Stuber Not Connected With Communism."

In view of the above listing I want to state that it is entirely misleading and has absolutely false implications. I have never been a member of any Communist or Communist-front organization. Neither have I paid membership dues to any such organizations nor attended any of their meetings. All during my public ministry I have been opposed to communism and to other totalitarian groups. What I have said and done have been inspired by Christian convictions and have had no connection with communism. As an American citizen, believing in our Bill of Rights, I feel that it is not un-American to speak out boldly for what I believe to be Christian principles. I am perfectly willing to be judged by my Christian position. I am unwilling to be associated to any degree with communism.

The Reverend Dr. STANLEY I. STUBER.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., March 13, 1963.

STANLEY I. STUBER, Th.M., D.D.,
Executive Director, Missouri Council of Churches, Jefferson City, Mo.

DEAR DR. STUBER: In reviewing your recent letter to Chairman FRANCIS WALTER of the House Un-American Activities Committee and the statement which you have prepared for inclusion in the public file of material dealing with you, I felt compelled to write further carrying on our exchange on this matter.

I am very happy that you have chosen to accept the invitation of the committee to give this statement. I regret that you did not do so earlier. You have attained, and I am sure earned, a position of great respect in your community—a community which, I might say, extends far beyond the bounds of Jefferson City and the State of Missouri. Many people look to you for leadership and respect the opinions which you express.

With this prestige which you enjoy goes a duty to those who rely upon you. I feel I have the same duty. I cannot give my support to an organization without knowing that with it I lend whatever prestige my name carries to the organization as well. My support for an organization, and yours, is not a private thing; it thrusts this relationship out into the public eye, with all of the personal satisfaction and problems which this implies.

With the relationship public, the duty attaches to one who has lent his prestige to an organization to assure that the reliance placed in him is not misdirected in support of the organization. The duty can be met by letting those who rely upon you know the details of your connection with the organization and, if you disagree with the organization, your duty compels that you do whatever you can to make this disagreement known.

The content of your statement to the committee should reassure everyone of your beliefs. It does nothing to meet your duty to those who rely upon you to bring to light your connection, if any, with the organization with which your name is linked in the committee public files.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

THOMAS B. CURTIS.

AREA JOB RETRAINING PROGRAM

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentlewoman from New Jersey [Mrs. DWYER] may extend her remarks at this point in the RECORD and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

Mrs. DWYER. Mr. Speaker, on Monday, March 18, the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. SICKLES] inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD a statement in which he discussed the operation of the Area Redevelopment Administration's job retraining program in Hagerstown, Md.

The net effect of the gentleman's statement was to absolve the agencies involved of any responsibility for a situation in which Federal funds were used in this program to train workers, directly and indirectly, for the benefit of a company, Mack Trucks, Inc., which relocated one of its plants from Plainfield, N.J., to Hagerstown, Md.

I must respectfully take exception to the gentleman's conclusion.

The gentleman's statement in the RECORD, Mr. Speaker, was generally factual—so far as it went. Not only did he omit some pertinent considerations, however, but he also placed an interpretation on the situation which I believe runs directly at variance with the facts he concedes.

He concedes that Mack Trucks, Inc., is a runaway plant, that its removal from Plainfield, N.J., to Hagerstown, Md., was a clear case of a relocation of industry; that the Area Redevelopment Act contains a clear bar against using Federal funds for a relocating industry; that an application was filed for Federal funds under the Area Redevelopment Act to set up a program for retaining workers as machine tool operators at the Mack plant in Hagerstown; that, even though this specific application was denied, three different programs for training machine tool operators were established in the immediate area; and that a total of about 60 or more workers retrained in these programs with Federal funds were employed by Mack Trucks.

In one very important respect, however, the gentleman's recital of the facts is, I believe, incorrect. He states that "as soon as this situation"—the direct referral of 15 graduates of the first retraining program to the Mack Co.—"came to the attention of officials in Washington, the Hagerstown Employment Service Office was reminded of the bar against aiding relocating industries, and no future references were made to Mack."

According to my information, Mr. Speaker, at no time during this period did officials in Washington remind the Employment Service Office of this prohibition. The Courier-News of Plainfield, N.J., which first revealed the situation on March 7, following an extensive, firsthand investigation in Hagerstown and Washington, quoted the director of the Maryland Office of Employment Security in Hagerstown as stating that he does not recall anyone ever telling him to stop referring people to Mack.

If this were the whole story, Mr. Speaker, it would represent a clear violation of the spirit and specific provisions of the Area Redevelopment Act, whether intentional or a result of poor administration. These additional facts, however, which the gentleman from Maryland ignores, makes the violation even more obvious.

The Federally subsidized retraining programs were established in Hagerstown and vicinity in full knowledge of the fact that Mack was the area's biggest employer and the source of the largest demand for machine tool operators.

Those who established the program knew, too, that the demand for machine tool operators by other employers was a direct result of Mack's policy of "pirating" skilled employees from these other employers through the promise of higher wages.

Therefore, those who established the retraining programs had every reason to know that most of the demand for machine tool operators was created, directly and indirectly, by a relocating industry, and that the principal purpose of the retraining programs, financed by Federal funds, was to meet the demand created by this relocating industry, Mack.

Not counting those workers undergoing retraining who went to work for employers other than Mack, because Mack had previously raided those employers, the direct cost to taxpayers of retraining the 60 or so workers employed by Mack totaled $50,000.

Part of this $50,000 of tax receipts was paid by the 2,000 or more former employees of Mack in Plainfield, N.J., who lost their jobs when Mack moved to Hagerstown. Therefore, those who became unemployed by virtue of a runaway plant were forced to help support the training of workers to take their places in this same runaway plant.

It is this fundamental injustice, Mr. Speaker, that led Congress to write a forceful antipiracy provision in the Area Redevelopment Act. The Mack experience suggests this provision is either being administered inadequately or is incapable of enforcement.

The gentleman from Maryland seems to imply that the law cannot properly be enforced. He dismisses as an "inadvertance" the fact that workers were trained for employment in a relocated plant. He writes off as "a fact of life" the inevitability that other retrained workers, not specifically referred to the relocated plant, will eventually go to work for the relocated plant in answer to widely advertised employment opportunities for workers retrained as machine tool operators. And he further defends the use of a federally subsidized retraining program to supply workers to industries which have lost employees to the relocated plant.

If this is a proper interpretation of the manner in which the Area Redevelopment Act should be administered, or if the act is in fact being so administered, I feel certain the news will come as something of a shock to many Members of Congress who voted in favor of the act. As a member of the Banking and Currency Committee which considered the legislation and reported it favorably, I can say with some assurance that this was not the understanding at the time the act was approved. On the contrary, no other provision of the act received more extended and careful consideration than the antipiracy clause. Everything possible was done to make this provision airtight, to guarantee that Federal assistance would not be used in any way to aid, abet, or encourage the relocation of plants from an industrially developed area to a labor surplus area, or to otherwise benefit such plants. I do not believe the Area Redevelopment Act could have been passed if there had been any reasonable doubt that the administration shared this understanding and was prepared to administer the act accordingly.

The reasonableness of a strict interpretation of the antipiracy provision is, I believe, self-evident. First, it would be the grossest kind of injustice to require displaced workers, who are also taxpayers, to help finance a tax-supported program providing benefits to the company which caused his unemployment by relocating its plant. Second, it is obviously uneconomic for a Federal-aid program to function in such a way that it benefits the act of exchanging unemployment, and this is clearly the effect of relocating existing industrial plants. The new employment created by the new plant is often more than matched by the unemployment caused by closing the existing plant. While private companies have a right, of course, to relocate their facilities, they have no right—either in reason or law—to expect the Federal Government to provide assistance of any kind in connection with the relocation. The purpose of the distressed area program is to help create new job opportunities by encouraging establishment of new and expanded industrial facilities, not by relocating plants already in existence.

Consequently, Mr. Speaker, I must respectfully but vigorously disagree with our colleague, the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. SICKLES], with respect to the responsibility for permitting Federal funds to be used to benefit the Mack Co.'s relocated plant. The assistance the Mack Co. received was both direct and indirect. It was substantial. It was provided knowingly in a situation in which the Mack Co. was both the chief cause of the Federal-aid project and its principal beneficiary. And it was provided in violation of a specific provision of law.

Under these circumstances, accountability cannot be waived. Whether it is the Area Redevelopment Administration or the Department of Labor, someone is responsible for permitting Federal funds to be used to assist a relocated plant. Congress has an obligation to look into the situation thoroughly and determine whether such violations of the antipiracy provision of the Area Redevelopment Act can be prevented or whether this provision cannot be enforced adequately.

I have discussed this matter, Mr. Speaker, with several of my colleagues on the Banking and Currency Commit-

tee, including the chairman of the committee. I have written to the Secretaries of Commerce and Labor asking them to investigate and provide us with a full report. The Secretary of Commerce has assured me it will be looked into carefully and a full report furnished in the near future. I have not yet heard from the Secretary of Labor.

Mr. Speaker, I am sure our colleagues, especially those who represent industrial areas as I do, will agree that this situation is extremely serious.

If the Area Redevelopment Act is not being administered in accordance with the spirit of the law and the clear intent of Congress, then we must take appropriate steps to insist on proper administration. If the antipiracy provision of the act is ambiguous or inadequate in any way, then Congress ought to tighten it up. If the antipiracy provision cannot be enforced as Congress intended, or if the act cannot be so administered as to prevent the use of Federal funds to aid relocated plants, then I believe the entire act should be repealed or drastically revised and a fresh start made to find a more workable way of aiding distressed areas.

Otherwise, we shall be permitting, indeed encouraging, the Area Redevelopment program to be used as a lure to companies interested in relocating their plants when they can get something for nothing. The people we represent, many of whom are potential victims of such piracy, would not be likely to agree that this is a proper use of Federal funds.

FREEMAN'S POLICY FIGURES ON WHEAT REFERENDUM

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FINDLEY] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, all of us have been confronted during the past 2 years by the paper curtain—the New Frontier-style barrier through which only officially slanted news is permitted to come to public view.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture has its own paper curtain, and this is particularly true of the deceptive propaganda being fed to farmers about the wheat referendum.

Officials of the Department, from Secretary Freeman down to county ASC office managers, are declaring that the referendum is a choice between $2 wheat and $1 wheat.

This is false and grossly misleading. It is made for an obvious reason: It plays on the price-depression fears of farmers. But neither the $2 figure nor the $1 figure is accurate.

Price is only one of several important considerations in the referendum. But considering price only, the choice is not between $2 wheat and $1 wheat. It is between wheat at about $1.85 the first year and, under the worst circumstances, $1.25 wheat if the referendum fails.

Where the $1 figure originated is anybody's guess. It did not come from anything in the lawbooks. If the referendum fails—and if Congress should fail to pass new legislation—wheat would be supported at 50 percent of parity. This means price support at $1.25 a bushel. Of course, no one seriously suggests that Congress would fail to act if the referendum fails.

Consider the facts. Mr. CARL ALBERT, majority leader of the House, represents a major wheatgrowing area. Would he block new legislation if farmers vote down the certificate scheme. Of course not. Indeed he would be in the front ranks hustling to get a new bill passed.

With the 1964 election just around the corner, is President Kennedy apt to put the clamps on voters who grow wheat just because they turned down the bill to establish mandatory acre-and-bushel controls? He is not about to, and all the threats to the contrary will be smothered in wide smiles once the referendum tally is counted.

Does a car salesman refuse to deal with a customer just because he will not buy one particular model? Of course not. He is back quicklike with another one—probably the same day.

That is why I say that only under the worst circumstances wheat would be supported at $1.25 if the referendum fails. Those circumstances just will not come to be, particularly with a politically sensitive President in the White House.

Now, the promise of $2 wheat if the referendum carries. Probably the least understood portion of the proposal is that if a farmer stays within his allotment he gets a certificate for only a portion of the production. The portion is determined by the Secretary of Agriculture on the basis of the national quota. Secretary Freeman has indicated farmers staying within their allotments would get a 70-cent certificate for between 80 and 85 percent of their normal production. Note the word normal.

This means the farmer would average about $1.85 per bushel—not $2—since he would sell the balance of his production—some 15 to 20 percent—under the $1.30 per bushel support level.

If the farmer heaps on the fertilizer and gets a bigger-than-normal yield, the extra yield would go under the $1.30 support too, and thus the average per bushel would drop below $1.85.

The new legislation would give the Secretary vast discretionary authority.

Suppose the wheat harvest is good in 1964, and stockpiles rise. Under the new legislation the Secretary would have the authority—and the responsibility, for that matter—to cut back the bushelage quota still more. It is anybody's guess what the per bushel average price for wheat might then be in 1965 and beyond.

The new legislation provides that wheat used for food at home and such portion of wheat exports as the Secretary determines, would be supported at between 65 and 90 percent of parity. The Secretary is directed to consider eight factors in making this determination.

Previous legislation provided a minimum price support at 75 percent of parity for all wheat produced within the allotment.

Now wheat not accompanied by certificates would be supported at a still lower level than 65 percent of parity, again to be determined by the Secretary. He has announced that wheat not accompanied by certificates on farms that stay within their allotments will be supported at $1.30 a bushel, or a shade over 50 percent of parity.

Under the law the Secretary could have gone much lower and related the price support to feed grains. This lower support would be possible, of course, after 1964. Budget troubles might force such action.

All the erroneous talk about $2 versus $1 wheat obscures other dangerous features of the new legislation.

For example. No payment for diverted acres after 1965, and payment at the Secretary's option in 1965.

Let me explain. Under the new legislation the old 55-million-acre minimum national allotment would be eliminated. In its place would be a billion-bushel minimum marketing quota. This quota, on a bushel and acre basis would be divided among wheat farmers.

As technology improves, this could mean sharp acreage cuts in years beyond 1964. As yields go up, allotments and quotas go down.

You might assume that as acreage allotments are cut, farmers will be paid for the diverted acres. Payments are authorized only for 1964 and 1965. After 1965, no payments are authorized. Secretary Freeman has already announced that farmers will receive a diversion payment for 1964 on a 10-percent mandatory cut at 30 percent of the normal yield. In 1965 he may make it substantially lower or eliminate it altogether. Here again budget problems may govern policy.

Here is something even more serious, a strange new penalty never before applied in commodity programs. The new legislation provides that after 1965 the diverted acreage must go into conserving or certain special crop uses, but no payment is authorized for this diversion. If the farmer fails to place this acreage in conserving uses, he becomes ineligible for price supports or certificates and is subject to high marketing-quota penalties. All this, even though he stays within his wheat allotment.

As I said, this is something new: truly a straitjacket within a straitjacket.

This is a good time for the wheat farmers of America, and particularly those in my home State of Illinois, to stop, look, and listen.

Somehow they must pierce the paper curtain and get the facts—before it is too late.

BRAZIL THREATENS TO QUIT TAKING OUR MONEY

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FINDLEY] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, if we are not careful we will make some of the foreign countries so mad they will quit taking our money.

This occurred to me when I read in the March 18 Evening Star this Associated Press story, the first three paragraphs of which are reprinted here:

BRASILIA, March 18.—President Joao Goulart has reacted angrily to U.S. assertions that Communists had infiltrated his government. A big new obstacle arose to harmonious relations between the two countries.

Mr. Goulart demanded that President Kennedy personally clarify the charges made by the State Department in a published statement to the House Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs.

The President issued an order to his finance minister, Francisco San Tiago Dantas, to suspend his negotiations in Washington for more U.S. aid. Informed sources said, however, that Foreign Minister Hermes Lima persuaded Mr. Goulart to withdraw the order.

Mr. Goulart was really going to get even with us, was he not? The moral of it: if we want our foreign aid program to keep going full blast, we had better quit complaining about such incidentals as Communist infiltration in the countries on the receiving end.

COLLEGIATE NURSING EDUCATION ACT OF 1963

Mr. MARSH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Rhode Island [Mr. ST GERMAIN] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Virginia?

There was no objection.

Mr. ST GERMAIN. Mr. Speaker, the measure I am introducing today authorizes a 5-year program of grants and scholarships for college training in the nursing field. The legislation is designed to help alleviate the pressing need for more and better trained nurses which exists in our Nation today.

This need is reflected in the present shortage of public health nurses, industrial nurses, and school nurses, as well as in the chronic shortage of nurses to staff hospitals and nursing homes. If we are to properly provide for the long-range nursing needs of this country, the time for action is now.

The Collegiate Nursing Education Act of 1963 has three main parts:

The first section provides matching grants for nursing school construction and specifies that no school could receive more than $500,000 in the 5-year period.

The second section authorizes funds for teaching assistance and states that no institution can receive over $25,000.

The third section makes scholarships available to both entering students and to graduate nurses with a 3-year hospital diploma.

I am pleased to advise the House that the Rhode Island State Nurses' Association and other nursing organizations are solidly behind this measure.

Nursing is a great vocation which seeks to serve those who cannot serve themselves. In order to close the gap which exists between the supply of qualified nurses and the demand for them, and to further upgrade the nursing profession, I urge enactment of the Collegiate Nursing Act of 1963 at this session of Congress.

A COGENT ANALYSIS OF THE PATENT PROBLEM

Mr. MARSH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. DADDARIO] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Virginia?

There was no objection.

Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Speaker, an important aspect of the present scale of economic growth in the United States arises from our need to see that we make the best possible use of the inventions which are developed in laboratories across the country. This is a complex problem, relating to the way we disseminate the results of technical and scientific research and the way in which we encourage the best brains and the best talent to apply itself to solutions of difficult technical problems.

An element of this problem is the handling of patents in such a way as to stimulate the progress of science and the useful arts. This area has provoked a great deal of discussion in recent years as some who are fearful of monopoly in any form have challenged the patent system, even though the Congress has established legislation to be invoked whenever antitrust situations appear.

As chairman of the Subcommittee on Patents and Scientific Inventions in the last Congress and a member of its predecessor, I have had occasion to study this controversy at some length. The House, on one occasion, has indicated its belief that a flexible patent policy with regard to inventions under the Space Act should be adopted by passing legislation which so stated and, on a second occasion, the Committee on Science and Astronautics overwhelmingly recommended such a statement.

There is no question that the Space Act should be amended to speed and improve our national space program and to give the Administrator of the National Space and Aeronautics Administration more flexibility with which to carry out his congressional mandate to use the full resources of the United States in achieving his goals. This will require legislative action.

The conflict in patent policies and theories has been brought to the attention of the President on a number of occasions and, in the early months of the present administration, there was a major attempt to urge Executive action which would take this policy out of the hands of the Congress. Wisely, the President recognized the complexity of this problem, and indicated at a press conference last year, in response to questions, that he would submit any proposal for a solution to the Congress.

Considerable study was given this question by the executive branch. Much of the study centered in the Office of Science and Technology, which is headed by Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner and which has very grave responsibilities in the shaping of science policy for the Nation. The Office is a staff arm of the President to advise and assist him in these matters.

Dr. Wiesner testified on March 14 at a hearing of the Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate Small Business Committee which has held hearings on patent policies within the Federal Government. Dr. Wiesner discussed the complexities of this problem, and I found his remarks most significant and useful. I believe they should be given wider distribution and should be brought to the attention of all Members of Congress, who should gave an interest in what he had to say.

In essence, Dr. Wiesner's statement sets forth a philosophy which evaluates the importance of the patent issue to the future of research and development and its relation to our national goals. From this, he draws certain guidelines for any real solution to this difficult problem. I was especially pleased to note that it concurs generally with the principles developed by our subcommittee last year.

Thus it seems apparent that, after extensive study of the question of the ownership of patents developed by industry in whole or in part with Federal research funds, Dr. Wiesner and his associates have arrived at most of the same conclusions which our committee recommended last year and which we reported to the House as House Resolution 12812 on August 12, 1962.

It is clear from Dr. Wiesner's testimony that he has found a definite need for flexibility in approaching the matter and that there are many instances in which title to inventions should remain with private enterprise as well as some in which title should become the property of the Federal Government. Dr. Wiesner emphasized that the Government should always retain a royalty free irrevocable license on these inventions for use by the Government. I believe it is implicit in his testimony that, for the most part, such license is sufficient protection of the public interest except in cases where the Government has been the chief instigator and financer of the inventions in question.

Mr. Speaker, I believe the views expressed by Dr. Wiesner show that the administration has looked into this question carefully and identified the equities which must be protected. I believe they also show clearly the need for a change in the present Space Act if we are to obtain the equity and flexibility toward which Dr. Wiesner is striving—and toward which we on this committee have been working for a number of years.

As things now stand, the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 so restricts administrative procedures that NASA cannot deal with industry on a completely equitable basis. Where NASA is now compelled to demand ownership of inventions developed by contractors during the course of their research, subject only to possible waiver, the change which we have recommended would leave this matter to the discretion of the administrator who may choose that course

which is in the best interests of the United States.

Evidence submitted to our committee overwhelmingly supported a change to provide much needed flexibility and thereby speed and improve our space program. Facts show that the rigid nature of the present law has resulted in a paucity of truly meaningful scientific disclosures to come thus far from NASA's research and development program. It is my hope that this matter can be rectified during the present Congress, after which the extreme partisans on this patent question may find themselves able to converge on a common meeting ground.

I am submitting Dr. Wiesner's remarks for publication in the RECORD.

STATEMENT OF JEROME B. WIESNER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, BEFORE THE MONOPOLY SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE SMALL BUSINESS COMMITTEE, MARCH 14, 1963

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before your committee to discuss policies concerning patents resulting from federally financed research and development.

Some months ago my office undertook an examination of the patent practices of the Federal agencies with respect to the allocation of patent rights under their contracts with private organizations. We examined the need for Government-wide uniformity of patent practices; explored the rationale behind current practices; and looked into the feasibility of developing a set of common criteria that would guide agency judgment in the handling of patent rights.

I am not speaking as an expert on patent law or on the intricacies of patent procedures in the several agencies. Rather, I am presenting observations from the vantage point of the Office of Science and Technology which is a staff arm of the President to advise and assist him in the coordination of science and technology functions. I am concerned with patent policy from the standpoint of its effects on the conduct of research and development and on the contributions of research to national objectives. Since the office of Science and Technology does not conduct research and development, I am not here to state or defend a particular policy position. We have analyzed this complex and tangled situation from a neutral corner and have conscientiously attempted to assess what the public interest requires, taking into consideration the many relevant factors, both public and private.

There are as many different patent policies and practices within Government as there are agencies engaged in research and development. In the course of our inquiry, we worked with some 20 different departments and agencies and found their attitudes in this matter full cooperative and constructive. Some of their practices are required by legislation; others have been developed through experience over the past 20 or more years. Each agency feels that its own policies are consistent with the public interest and its own mission. The present diversity of policy is due in part to the differing objectives of the Federal agencies and in part reflects differences in the principal industries with which they do business. Some like Agriculture and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare support research of a type that might normally be tackled by nongovernmental research organizations were there sufficient private resources and motivation. Others like the Department of Defense engage in research and development where the occasional civilian byproducts are incidental to the main object of developing new hardware for governmental purposes. Some fields, such as atomic energy, have largely been developed at public expense. In certain areas of military and space technology, the Government agencies are drawing on extensive industrial experience and know-how developed at both public and private expense.

There can be little disagreement as to the national needs that Government patent policy should serve: the need for maximum creativity and inventiveness in solving scientific and engineering problems; the need to attract the Nation's most competent scientists and engineers and technical management teams to Government research and development tasks; the need for expeditious development and civilian use of any resulting inventions which are practicable for civilian use; and the need to promote healthy competition in industry.

Despite general agreement as to the objectives of Government patent policy, there are divergent views as to the extent patent incentives are required to accomplish these objectives where the work is financed by the Government. I would like to explore this in more detail; there is need for much better public understanding of the issues involved.

Unquestionably, the Government should acquire at least an irrevocable nonexclusive royalty free license with respect to all inventions made in the course of any contract of any Government agency. The questions that have been raised relate to the commercial exploitation of patents. Under what circumstances should the Government take title to inventions made under Government contracts? What are the circumstances where the public interest would be served by leaving exclusive rights with the contractor?

We can delineate several categories of research and development activity carried out for the Government in which a strong case can be made that it would be contrary to the public interest to permit the contractor to acquire exclusive patent rights under the contract. These are categories of scientific and technical work where the widespread availability of the results would be better served through publication and complete freedom of use; where the retention of exclusive rights by the contractor might unfairly put him in a dominant or preferred position. I have in mind the following situations:

First, where a principal purpose of the contract is to create products or processes which are intended to be used in the civilian economy, or which are otherwise intended to be available for use by the general public at home or abroad. Similarly, where the use of the product is required by governmental regulations, the Government should acquire the principal or exclusive rights.

Second, where a principal purpose of the contract is for exploration into fields which directly concern the public health or public welfare, such as the development of a new drug, a medical instrument, or an agricultural chemical.

Third, where the contract is in a field of science or technology in which there has been little significant experience outside of work funded by the Government, or where the Government has been the principal developer of the field. In these situations, the Federal Government should acquire the principal rights where the acquisition of exclusive rights by the contractor at the time of contracting might confer on him a preferred or dominant position.

Fourth, where the services of the contractor are for the operation of a Government-owned research or production facility; or where the contractor is hired to coordinate and direct the work of others. In this situation the acquisition of exclusive rights by the contractor would be inconsistent with the purposes of the contract.

There are other circumstances in which a strong case can be made that would permit the contractor to retain exclusive rights for nongovernmental purposes. Such circumstances must clearly arise in the situation where the work is in an area where the contractor has an established nongovernmental commercial position and has demonstrated technical competence indicated by know-how, experience, and patent position. For example, consider the case of a pump manufacturer who has, over a period of years, invested considerable private resources in the development of new techniques for pumping fluids. In the course of research and development for the Federal Government in developing a pump for liquid fueled rockets, the contractor draws on his extensive background and know-how. Does the possibility that the improvement in the pump may have potential for commercial uses require the Government to obtain title to patents on the improvement?

We are familiar with the points made within and outside of the Government on both sides of this question.

On the one hand it has been advocated that since the Government pays for the research, it should own all the rights; that retention of exclusive rights by the large contractors would undesirably restrain competition and could lead to undesirable economic concentration; that the contractor receives exclusive patent rights without taking financial risks in the research; that the patent incentive is not needed to attract the most competent industries to Government work; that the contractor would be in position to exploit the invention at unreasonable charges or could withhold it from commercial use; that the patent incentive might result in withholding of information until patent applications are filed.

It has been just as vigorously alleged that in these circumstances there is greater likelihood of public availability of the invention if exclusive rights are left in the contractor as an incentive to encourage substantial private investment in product development, production, and establishing a market; that companies with independent investments in know-how and patent position will be reluctant to contract with the Government or to draw upon this background if their inventions were to be made available to competitors; that fewer, not more, contractors would perform important Government work; that there are likely to be fewer inventions reported as such under contracts where the protections and incentives of the patent system for public disclosure of the invention will not be available; that making inventions available for public use destroys the incentives of a privately owned patent; that the Government would be acquiring more rights than it needs for carrying out governmental functions.

The balance of wisdom between these two positions is difficult to reach. There is some validity to points on both sides. Some of them rest on conflicting assumptions. Some go beyond the narrow question of invention under Government contracts and seem to go to the philosophical foundations of the American patent system. I believe that many of the arguments advanced have weak factual foundation, and overgeneralize the actual situation. There is regrettably little fact on which to formulate policy in this difficult area of public administration.

I do not believe that the commercial value of patent rights arising under Government contracts in the past has been such either to support concerns about unjust enrichment or economic concentration, or to lend substantial force to claims that such rights provide an important incentive to attracting industrial firms to undertake federally sponsored research and development. The survey of defense contractors conducted by the

Patents Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary revealed quite limited commercial exploitation. The importance of patent incentives will vary from industry to industry and may also depend on the size of contractor. In the electronics industry with which I have had firsthand experience, the ownership of patent rights can be an important nutrient for the establishment and growth of small companies, and the lack of such rights poses a serious hazard. I know of several instances in which a small company struggled for years to establish a new product only to have a large company then come along and take advantage of the market when it became attractive. Patent protection in such instances would be most important. Therefore, in considering the allocation of patent rights under Government contracts, appropriate weight must be given to the views and unpredictable response of the large number of subcontractors on which the vitality of our military and space program heavily rests.

It has been the practice in some of the Government agencies to accord exclusive rights to contractors in the last-mentioned situation after the invention has been identified; that is, where the contractor has a nongovernmental commercial position, and where the commercial use of the invention is incidental to the primary object of the contract and is not of a type that would fall in one of the four public-interest categories previously described.

The Department of Defense feels strongly among other things that the performance of its mission requires the ability to assure the contractor at the time of contracting that he will retain commercial rights to his ideas, in order to assure the unrestrained participation by the most competent elements of American industry in the defense programs. There is concern that such unrestrained participation cannot be achieved without giving heavy weight to the contractor's commercial position and past investment in the field of his specialization in according exclusive patent rights. It is impossible, of course, to prove this contention short of trial by experience, although the views of many industrial firms large and small in support of the defense position are well known. Whether or not one agrees with the concern, it is real. There are grounds for caution lest a change in longstanding defense policy to insist that all rights to such inventions be retained by the Government in all cases result in research and development of lesser quality, of greater costs, or of longer times required to produce the desired results. A middle ground might be found to give particular weight at the time of contracting to the contractor's commercial position and his prior investment. The central question is not primarily whether experienced contractors could be found to accept more restrictive patent clauses. It is whether the terms of the contract will encourage the contractor to apply his full technical background and experience to the Government work. These considerations also apply to contracts of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The national interest requires greater uniformity between DOD and NASA patent practices since they are drawing on the services of the same sector of industrial research and development competence.

Despite the wide apparent variations in agency practices at the present time and the fact that there has been a difference of view within the Congress, within the administration, and between industry and Government for well over 15 years, I feel that a reasonable basis for framing a government-wide patent policy can be found. It seems important for the Government to move in the direction of a more consistent policy that will eliminate the unhealthy confusion and instabilities that attend the present situation. Such a policy should provide for the Government to retain title in the range of circumstances that I listed earlier; but it is necessary to recognize that, because of the problems of the type that concern the Department of Defense and NASA, any policy, to be realistic, should enable industry to retain exclusive rights in certain circumstances. As I have already indicated, the nature of the work involved, the commercial background of the contractor, and the extent to which the contractor would be expected to work the invention in the public interest would be significant factors in permitting contractors to retain exclusive commercial rights. Of course, where agencies now feel it necessary to acquire greater rights for the Government, such requirements should continue.

I think that any concern regarding such exclusive rights might be further alleviated if a further step were taken to assure the protection of the public interest. I have in mind the possibility that whenever the principal rights remain in the contractor, the Government would reserve the right to require the granting of a license on a nonexclusive royalty free basis unless the contractor or his licensee has taken effective steps within a limited period, as for example 3 years, after a patent issues on the invention to bring the invention to the point of practical application, or unless he has made the invention available for licensing royalty free or on reasonable terms. This would preserve the patent protection for a reasonable period in this time of rapid technological advance, and increase the incentives for expeditious commercialization and public use of new inventions while eliminating the possibility that commercial use of such inventions could be suppressed.

A Government policy along the foregoing lines could be adopted on a trial basis. At the same time I would urge the marshaling of facts by the Government agencies with respect to the development, reporting, and use of inventions made under Government contracts in order to provide a sounder basis for the formulation of future policy. Through my office and the Federal Council for Science and Technology, I would propose to develop by mutual consultation and coordination with the agencies a common approach to the implementation and further development of policy in this area, consistent with existing statutes.

I hope that various interests of the Federal agencies in stimulating and promoting the making and utilization of inventions under research and development contracts can converge in a common objective to serve all of the elements of our society and reinforce the partnership between Government and industry in accomplishing the many jobs required in the national interest.

NEED FOR HOUSE COMMITTEE ON CAPTIVE NATIONS

Mr. MARSH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FLOOD] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Virginia?

There was no objection.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Speaker, a resolution proposing the establishment of a House Committee on Captive Nations, known as House Resolution 211, was submitted to the 87th Congress, first session, more than 2 years ago. The fact that it has not moved a step forward and had to be resubmitted to this Congress as House Resolution 14, is directly attributable to the State Department's opposition. Secretary Dean Rusk, in his famous letter to the distinguished chairman of the House Committee on Rules, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. SMITH], dated August 22, 1961, mentioned two arguments against such a committee:

(1) The establishment of such a committee might be taken as a pretext for actions by the Soviet Union which would interfere with the resolution of the present crisis over Berlin;

(2) The U.S. Government's position would be weakened by any action which places the U.S. Government in the undesirable position of seeming to advocate the dismemberment of an historical state—

Meaning the Soviet Union, which hardly may be termed an historical state since it was established but 40 years ago. But to continue quoting Mr. Rusk, he also would oppose any action that "confuses the rights of formerly independent peoples or nations with the status of areas, such as the Ukraine, Armenia or Georgia, which are traditional parts of the Soviet Union."

However, Mr. Speaker, it has come to my attention lately that the State Department is using a third argument to defeat the establishment of a Committee on Captive Nations. I quote from a letter, dated February 16, 1962, and signed by Mr. Frederick G. Dutton, Assistant Secretary of State:

The creation of a specialized committee to operate in one sector of our foreign relations, without responsibility in the broader area of foreign affairs problems, would ignore the fact that our efforts on behalf of the captive nations can only be effective if they are made within the context of the overall Soviet threat as well as of our national interests and capabilities.

Mr. Speaker, the spokesman for the State Department in this case committed a basic error. Congressional committees are not established to operate in any sector of the executive branch of Government. Mr. Dutton's fear of competition is groundless. The congressional committees are established to conduct studies and investigations of matters properly coming before the Congress and make recommendations thereon. Congress examines such recommendations against a much broader background of its responsibilities than those of the State Department, and either accepts, modifies, or rejects the recommendations.

But what the State Department really wants is to preclude any congressional committee from exercising its constitutional duty of investigation within the sacred preserves of the Department. Taking the captive nations as an example, the State Department would like to deal with their problem the way it sees fit.

The Assistant Secretary of State makes no mistake about it. He says:

We will continue our efforts on behalf of the captive nations, and we are confident that the established bodies responsible for these matters are able and determined to give them the full attention which they merit.

However, Mr. Speaker, I must stand corrected on one point. The State Department, as indicated in Mr. Dutton's letter, condescendingly agreed that "the

House Foreign Affairs Committee was taking a special interest in the question of the captive nations within the broader framework of the responsibilities of that committee."

The recognition would be too good if it were true. It is not. I understand the State Department has vetoed the establishment of a Subcommittee on Captive Nations under the Foreign Affairs Committee. Such a measure was recommended in the committee's "Report on Hearings on Captive European Nations," dated October 26, 1962. Evidently, the Foreign Affairs Committee was taking too much interest in the captive nations. Too much, that is, to the State Department's liking.

Mr. Speaker, do I hear the State Department tell us, "Hands off the captive nations," and are we going to take its dictates lying down? I hope we are not.

TAXES

Mr. MARSH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from New York [Mr. MULTER] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Virginia?

There was no objection.

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, it was my privilege to testify on March 6 before the House Ways and Means Committee on the subject of the revision of our tax structure.

The following is the text of my statement and the questions and answers which were asked concerning it:

STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN ABRAHAM J. MULTER BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 6, 1963

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today to comment on the President's proposal to revise our tax structure.

In dealing with legislation as important as this and covering as wide an area, it is unlikely that we will find many people who will agree with every facet of the President's recommendations. I assure you that I do not envy the tremendous burden which you must assume in performing the task of bringing out a bill that will be acceptable to a majority of Members of the House. I do trust that my comments will prove helpful and not further confuse an already complicated problem.

In the interests of time I will not discuss the general principles underlying these tax recommendations but will address myself to specific parts thereof. I would like, however, to make this one general statement, to wit, the enactment of the bulk of the President's recommendations should redound to the benefit of the entire economy of our country and more particularly to the benefit of the small businessman and to the lower income groups.

I address myself first to the matter of treatment of itemized deductions from personal income.

The proposed new treatment of these deductions by limiting them to that in excess of 5 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income is in my opinion the wrong way to tackle this problem. This would hit hardest at the lower income groups whose deductions while small dollarwise are most meaningful to them. There certainly will be no incentive to anyone to meet their civic and charitable obligations by saying to them that they can get no tax deduction or credit until after they have paid 5 percent of their income. It works an even greater hardship to say to them that the first 3, 4, or 5 percent of their gross income which they actually expend for medical expenses is not deductible. I could never understand the theory by which only the excess over these percentages was deductible.

The recommendation as to minor casualty losses so as to exclude all deductions up to 4 percent of the taxpayer's income would merely create another incentive to cheat. This is analogous to insurance policies which provide that the first $25 or $50 of loss is not payable by the insurance company. Insurance carriers will tell you that this results in most people getting bills for double the amount of the loss in order to cover the excludable portion thereof. The same thing will undoubtedly occur if this provision should be enacted. The Internal Revenue Service couldn't find a force large enough to investigate and check upon those items. It would undoubtedly cost the Government many times more to unsuccessfully attempt to collect the taxes for these deductions than the deductions themselves would aggregate.

Any attempt to remove the exemption from interest on mortgages and the real estate taxes on homeowners' properties would be nothing less than a breach of faith by our Government. Thomas Jefferson wrote, "The small landowners are the most precious part of a State." For years our Government has been urging our citizens to become homeowners. The latest statistics show that almost 60 percent of our families own their own homes today. One of the greatest incentives to the acquisition of homes was the fact repeatedly stressed that interest on mortgages and real estate taxes were deductions from gross income for tax purposes. I urge that we do not change that exclusion.

Another recommendation that I oppose is the repeal of the $50 and 4 percent deduction on dividend income. This exemption was to have been a first step toward the elimination of the unfair and inequitable double taxation on earnings.

In considering what should be done with this recommendation I urge that this committee do not consider how much tax can be received by our Government but rather, do we have a right to tax earnings twice? Once the earnings of a corporation have been taxed, the net amount belongs to the stockholders and, while there might be some logic in taxing a corporation for failure to pay those earnings as dividends to the stockholders, we cannot justify taxing those identical earnings a second time when they are distributed to the owners therof.

With reference to capital gains, I urge that you will decrease the net revenue payable to the Government on capital gains by extending the period from 6 months to 1 year in order to qualify for a long-term capital gain. It is my opinion that the capital gains taxes payable to the Government would increase two or three times if instead of increasing the period we decreased it to 3 or 4 months. By decreasing the period to 3 or 4 months these capital assets would turn over that much more frequently and each time they were sold there would be a capital gains tax paid.

I heartily endorse the recommendation to tax as earnings and not as capital gains the moneys realized on stock options. But I suggest that that tax be payable not on earnings in connection with stock options granted after enactment of the law but on all earnings received after the enactment of the law, regardless of when the stock option was granted. The proposed changes of the rate of taxation will apply to all earnings thereafter received and any change in the tax structure should equally be made to apply to all earnings thereafter received regardless of when and where contracted for.

The President has recommended an additional tax credit of $300 for all people age 65 or over regardless of the source of their income. This credit is to replace both the extra exemption allowed to older people and the retirement income credit. Our senior citizens are greatly in need of tax relief since the annuities which they receive are usually not enough to live on. I believe that the Committee should consider the exemption from Federal income tax of annuities received by individuals age 65 and over. As a partial step in this direction I have introduced H.R. 4182, which would exempt amounts up to $2,400 in annuities, pensions, or requirement benefits paid by local, State, or Federal governments.

I strongly urge that as recommended in H.R. 4182 all annuities paid by State, local, and Federal governments be exempt from Federal income tax.

I recommend that the provisions of my bill, H.R. 525, to assist small business and persons engaged in small business by allowing a deduction from Federal income tax for additional investment in depreciable assets, inventory, and accounts receivable, should be included in any new tax bill enacted.

I also urge the inclusion of the provisions of my bill, H.R. 530, which would amend the Internal Revenue Code to assist small and independent business by permitting individuals and partnerships filing income tax returns for small businesses to revoke an election to be taxed as a corporation; to provide a normal tax rate of 20 percent for taxable years after June 30, 1963, and to increase the surtax exemption; to provide a growth, expansion, and modernization exemption on net taxable earnings; to liberalize the income tax treatment of losses incurred through loans; to provide an exemption for goodwill in the determination of the value of an estate and to provide family-sized farmers an exemption for the improvement, modernization, and renewal of buildings or equipment used in the production, care and marketing of farm products, and to provide family-sized farms the same exemption.

I believe that these last two items will greatly stimulate small business.

Thank you for your time and attention.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr MULTER, the committee appreciates you presenting your views to it.

Any questions?

Mr. KEOGH. Mr. Chairman, it is a source of constant marvel to me, the scope and depth of my distinguished colleague's activities and this morning is another example of it.

I would, however, like to ask you a question with reference to your proposal concerning stock options. You used in your formal statement the word, "earnings." What did you mean by that?

Mr. MULTER. Stock options, as granted today, are in lieu of additional salaries or compensation to officers and employees of companies. I am not talking about the stock option that would be given to the run-of-the-mill employee where he is actually buying the stock and paying for it on the installment plan, but I am talking about the alleged incentive that big business gives to employees and officers, usually, in the top, higher echelon, to buy stock at less than market value at some future time.

The usual procedure is to offer the stock option at anywhere from 80 to 90 percent of the current market value at the time of the issuance or granting of the option which will be exercised at some future time when the stock is selling at a price two or three times the market value at the time of granting the option.

This, in my opinion, is earnings. It is compensation, and should be taxed as such when

the profit is received on the sale of that stock.

In other words, I am granted this option to buy at 85 percent of market value and 2 years from today I exercise that option and buy the stock at 85 percent of today's market value but sell it at twice that price. The difference between what I pay then and what I get for it on resale at that time is earnings to me.

Mr. KEOGH. I see.

You mean earnings to the holder of the option. Is it your recommendation that the difference between the sale price and the option price should be taxed to him as ordinary income in the year received?

Mr. MULTER. Yes, sir; that is what I am suggesting.

Mr. KEOGH. You are, in effect, disagreeing with the proposal of the Treasury Department in that area that the individual be given the 5-year averaging?

Mr. MULTER. I am in agreement with the averaging provision. I would not pay the full tax in the one year if the provision for averaging is enacted as part of the law. I think that is a very essential part of the tax recommendation.

Mr. KEOGH. My reaction to your statement as you delivered it was you were placing a greater burden on the individual who exercises the stock option than even the Treasury and the President have proposed in the message and testimony?

Mr. MULTER. You had a right to draw that conclusion from my statement standing alone without further explanation.

Mr. KEOGH. You referred to the bill, H.R. 4184, and indicated, at least gave me the impression, you were increasing the retirement income credit to the recipients of public retirement systems, local, State, and Federal. Is that the purpose of the bill?

Mr. MULTER. Yes.

Mr. KEOGH. Well, would you accord the same treatment to those who receive retirement annuities from private pension plans?

Mr. MULTER. Yes. The point is, the income that has been used to buy those annuities whether privately or from Government by deposits or withholdings in a Government pension system, has been income to the payer in the first instance on which he paid the tax.

Mr. KEOGH. Not for the share of the employing agencies that the Government contributes and in the case of the Federal retirement system not for the difference between the percentage contributed and the benefits that the Congress have voted the Federal employees which represents to those individuals a virtual tax free gift, not of 52-cent dollars like in the corporate plans but of tax dollars?

Mr. MULTER. You are quite right. To that extent, my plan would be a subsidy to that pension or annuity. But I say we must do it because these pensions and annuities have been bought on the basis of what they were worth many years ago and for persons getting $2,400 pensions today they can hardly live on it. When they originally sought to buy that pension or annuity, it was enough in those days. Today it is not.

Mr. KEOGH. Well, with the personal exemptions and with the retirement income credit accorded those individuals under existing law, in my opinion the tax burden of an annuity of $2,400 a year is not very heavy.

Mr. MULTER. It hits hardest the single person, the widow or widower, who gets the smaller exemption.

Mr. KEOGH. Well, there are sociologists who will argue that perhaps they should bear a greater burden.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions? We thank you, Mr. MULTER.

Mr. MULTER. Thank you.

VICIOUS ATTACK ON COACH PAUL BRYANT

Mr. MARSH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. SELDEN] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Virginia?

There was no objection.

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, as an alumnus of the University of Alabama, I condemn the vicious and irresponsible March 23 Saturday Evening Post attack on Coach Paul Bryant.

The charges contained in the Post article are little short of ludicrous. Those of us who know Paul Bryant and his devotion to the best interests of the University of Alabama and collegiate athletics generally are amazed and shocked that any magazine could sink to this low level of journalistic irresponsibility.

The Saturday Evening Post article is replete with half-truths and vicious innuendo, based on the flimsiest of testimony. That the magazine published this material without so much as contacting Coach Bryant tells us a great deal about the Saturday Evening Post's type of reporting.

Dr. Frank Rose, president of the University of Alabama, and the university board of trustees early this week responded to the Post's attack by expressing complete confidence in Paul Bryant. These expressions of confidence followed an investigation of the charges made by the magazine article, and I believe they reflect the feeling of the people of Alabama regarding this unwarranted attack.

DECLARATION OF CENTRAL AMERICA

Mr. MARSH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. SELDEN] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Virginia?

There was no objection.

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, on Monday of this week, President Kennedy began a 3-day visit to San José, Costa Rica, for the purpose of meeting with the Presidents of Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. It was my privilege to attend this meeting at the invitation of the President along with my colleague from the House of Representatives, the gentleman from California, Representative MAILLIARD, Republican; and with Senators FULBRIGHT, Democrat, of Arkansas; Senator MORSE, Democrat, of Oregon; and Senator HICKENLOOPER, Republican, of Iowa.

As a member of the bipartisan congressional group at the San José meeting and as chairman of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, I was especially concerned with the need for action to curb the Communist subversive threat in Central America.

The final Declaration of Central America issued by the heads of state in attendance calls for an April meeting of the ministers of government "to develop and put into immediate effect common measures to restrict movement of their nationals to and from Cuba and the flow of material, propaganda, and funds from that country."

The declaration also states that the April meeting is to take specific action toward increasing air and sea surveillance and interception of any Cuban Communist movement of money, propaganda, material, or arms to any area of Central America.

These points closely follow the recommendations made by the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs in its recent report dealing with subversive activities and traffic.

Should this implementing action follow in April, an important step will have been taken toward reducing the Castro Communist subversive threat to the hemisphere.

In addition to the proposed April meeting, the declaration contains pledges on the part of both the United States and participating Central American governments designed to further the creation of a Central American Economic Community.

As press reports have indicated, the President and his party were enthusiastically received in San José. Despite unprecedented Communist propaganda aimed at undermining inter-American confidence in our leadership, it was most encouraging to find in Central America obvious and sincere friendship for the President and the people of the United States.

PROTECTION FOR SMALL BUSINESS IS IMPORTANT, TOO

Mr. MARSH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from California [Mr. ROOSEVELT] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and include a news item.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Virginia?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Mr. Speaker, together with other members of the Select Committee on Small Business, I have been gratified at the decision of our able chairman, the gentleman from Tennessee, the Honorable JOE L. EVINS, to proceed at once with hearings by the full committee concerning the impact of international trade upon the American small business community. This is a most important matter, one that holds deep implications for the prosperity of not only small businesses, but, indeed, for all of America.

Much has been said about the opportunities offered the small businessmen of the Nation by increasing their markets in foreign lands. As trade is a two-way street, the opportunities also exist for smaller firms through the importation of foreign goods.

An example of this has been the use of imported steel wire rod by several hundred small processing and fabricating firms. Steel wire rods have been in short supply domestically. Prices charged for wire rods have, in some instances, been higher than those charged by the steel mills for mesh wire fabricated from the rods, according to charges filed with the Federal Trade Commission. Further, there have been allegations by some small businessmen that prices on wire rod have been kept high while finished product prices were slashed for the express purpose of squeezing out these small, independent firms.

Many of the steel mills of the Nation are engaged in dual distribution of a great number of products. As an example, they manufacture wire rod, which they sell to small processors. In addition, they also fabricate the same products made by these processors and sell them in direct competition with the products of their customers.

A news item from the March 19 issue of the Wall Street Journal indicates that the Treasury Department has recently ruled that these wire rods are being imported at cutrate prices in violation of the U.S. antidumping law, the matter has been referred to the Tariff Commission for decision as to whether U.S. steelmakers are being harmed. I submit that of at least equal importance is the question of whether the banning of these imports would not do irreparable damage to the small businesses presently purchasing the imported rods. Particularly so, since it appears that these small firms cannot afford to purchase domestically produced rods, regardless of whether the importing continues or not.

This is the kind of question upon which much light can be shed by the hearings recently announced by Representative EVINS.

It seems to me that, as a condition precedent to the banning of further imports of steel wire rods at present prices as sought by our domestic steel mills, the question of the price squeeze tactics apparently being used by the domestic steel industry to the detriment of independent small businesses must be fully resolved. To this end, it is my intent to fully investigate this matter as part of the hearings on dual distribution which will be held by the Subcommittee on Distribution next month. If our domestic steel mills are guilty of the tactics with which they have been charged, it is clear that the banning of these imports could serve only to snuff out a number of small business concerns.

Chairman EVINS will, I am sure, at the hearing on foreign trade by the full committee, fully investigate all aspects of the tariff problem involved here. As an adjunct to this, my subcommittee will attempt to determine what impact upon small business the dual distribution of products manufactured from wire rod, such as mesh wire, is having upon the small businesses manufacturing these products.

I insert the news item, mentioned above, at this point in the RECORD:

[From the Wall Street Journal, Mar. 19, 1963]

The Treasury Department upheld the complaint of U.S. steel mills that hot-rolled carbon steel wire rods are being imported from Belgium at cutrate prices in violation of the U.S. antidumping law.

The Treasury referred the case to the Tariff Commission, which must decide whether the imports are injuring U.S. steelmakers. If it decides they are, the Tariff Commission is empowered to boost customs levies to bring the imports in line with domestic goods.

A controversy has long been simmering between U.S. producers of wire rods and domestic users who have been buying the product from foreign mills. These users insist the steel industry's effort to reduce the wire-rod imports, if successful, could put some of the fabricators out of business.

TO CONSIDER OTHER COMPLAINTS

Under the antidumping law, the Tariff Commission has 3 months to decide the Belgian rod case. Treasury officials said they hope to use the time to rule on other sections of the complaint involving steel rods imported from West Germany, France, Luxembourg, and Japan.

Six U.S. steel mills participated in the original charge against wire-rod imports. They were Bethlehem Steel Corp., Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., Republic Steel Corp., Armco Steel Corp., and Detroit Steel Corp. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Corp. joined later.

In their complaint, filed last September, the companies alleged that Belgian rods were being sold in the United States at from $24.95 to $25.85 a ton below the indicated value in the Belgian market.

WELL BELOW EUROPEAN LEVEL

The Treasury, in ruling that the Belgian prices had violated the antidumping law, computed a weighted average price for steel rods sold in Belgium and made a similar computation for the price paid by importers in the United States.

The average import price, a Treasury official said, was well below the European level. The official added, however, that Department rules forbid publication of the price figures used in the comparison.

An official of one of the U.S. mills that participated in the complaint said of the Treasury ruling, "We're glad to have some results, but we had hopes that the European countries would be considered together rather than separately." He said the Common Market mills operate as a single entity, through the European Coal and Steel Community, and joint consideration would have eased the investigation. Members of the Common Market, in addition to Belgium, are West Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

Other sources, however, observed that U.S. mills had pushed for joint treatment by the Tariff Commission because it would have been easier for the mills to prove injury from the combined imports of all foreign nations, instead of one by one.

The impact of wire rod imports has been significant. According to industry data, foreign producers sold 645,000 tons of the product in this country last year, up from 451,000 tons in 1961 and only 54,000 tons in 1957. The imported volume in 1962 accounted for 39 percent of the U.S. wire rod market.

The Treasury estimated the value of wire rods imported from Belgium last year at $1.8 million.

Imported rods have sold for as little as $95 a ton in recent months. Prices, however, have moved to $105 to $115 a ton, still well below the U.S.-made price of generally $140 to $145 a ton.

IMPORTERS SEE DISMISSAL

Despite the price differential, U.S. importers of the foreign-made goods insist there is no violation of the antidumping law. Declared Ernest Wimpfheimer, president of the American Institute for Imported Steel, a New York trade group representing importers:

"We think that the dumping charge has no merit and the sooner we have a chance to present the evidence the sooner we can get a determination and dismiss the complaint. There is every reason to assume that this case will be dismissed by the Tariff Commission with a findings of no injury to the American steel industry."

U.S. fabricators said they have been buying the imported rods because they can't afford the higher priced domestic goods. Many contend that even if U.S. mills are able to force higher prices on imports, this won't mean more business for domestic steel makers. The fabricators said they still won't be able to afford the U.S. rods.

Nearly 300 small companies process wire rods into such products as wire staples, chain link fence and nuts and bolts, and a large percentage of them use imported steel. Some said they would try to pass higher import prices along to customers, but most insisted the market wouldn't stand this and that it would mean a sharp pinch on profit.

Some users of wire rods and drawn wire have even charged that U.S. mills have refused to cut the price of rods or wire, but have slashed prices on some finished wire products in recent years to put a squeeze on these smaller companies with which they compete for wire product business. One Texas maker of wire mesh used to reinforce concrete said it has filed complaints with the Federal Trade Commission and the Texas attorney general that U.S. mills charge more for wire used to make the mesh than they do for the finished mesh itself.

An attorney for makers and importers of European steel said some wire-rod users plan to testify at any Tariff Commission hearing that U.S. mills are squeezing these customers by selling wire products at a relatively small markup over the rod prices, or even at the same prices. The counsel also said he plans to offer evidence aimed at showing U.S. mills are pricing their wire rods more than $50 a ton above the cost of making them.

OTHER DUMPING CHARGES

A Midwest maker of chain-link fence and wire mesh used to reinforce concrete for such uses as garage floors, delivers the mesh to customers at Grand Island, Nebr., for a price equal to 8 cents a pound. The company currently pays about 6 cents a pound for Japanese wire rods, giving it a 2-cent spread to prepare the rods, draw the wire, fabricate the mesh and ship it to Grand Island.

But this concern said it would have to pay 7½ cents a pound for domestic rods, and freight charges to Grand Island alone would be more than that half-cent spread. If imported rods climbed another $10 a ton, or a half-cent a pound, "we'd just have to throw reinforcing mesh in mothballs," a company official said.

An eastern rod user said it would have to pay nearly $145 a ton for domestic rods, but sells its wire product for an average of only $150 a ton and has operating and overhead costs of more than $30 a ton. The company currently pays about $105 a ton for foreign wire rods and said that if the price got up to around $115, "we'd have a difficult time keeping our head above water."

An eastern make of wire for items from paper clips to fasteners for aircraft construction had a loss of nearly $100,000 last

year. The company buys 30 percent of its wire rods from abroad and says a $10-a-ton increase in rod prices would add $60,000 annually to its costs. "An increase of $10 a ton over the present level of foreign rod prices would put a certain number of people into a marginal situation, and a $20 rise—if it lasted for long—would have better than 50 percent of the people who are using imported rods operating at a loss," a Florida maker of drawn wire and reinforcing mesh said.

WOULDN'T SWING TO U.S. RODS

U.S. steel mills in the past 6 months also have filed antidumping complaints against European and Japanese producers of standard pipe, Japanese makers of hot-rolled sheet, and Canadian producers of reinforcing bars.

Many wire-rod customers insist higher foreign rod prices wouldn't swing them to domestic rods, which would still be too high in price unless U.S. mills abandon their policy of not cutting rod prices to meet import competition.

The eastern company that buys 30 percent of its rods from abroad said that as foreign-rod prices rise, "the saving on the 30 percent we buy is less effective. We could not afford to do other than buy a larger percentage from abroad to keep our average cost of supply down." Many rod users contend the antidumping drive seems so pointless that U.S. mills must be waging it for some reason such as attempting to create a general hostility toward imported steel.

OUTCOME IN DOUBT

Domestic steel mills that make wire rods say they don't know what the final outcome of their antidumping drive will be. But some feel that if import prices are boosted a bit, and they can count on these prices staying there, then the U.S. mills will be able to trim their own prices enough to win back some business. "Until the antidumping law is enforced, it's impossible for the domestic mills to know what we are going to do to get this business back. We have got to decide where we stand first," one major producer said.

Steel mills deny any effort to put a squeeze on their wire rod customers. A few insist they have at times offered price concessions on rods. And while most mills concede they haven't tried to bring the price of rods down to meet import prices, they insist these prices are far too low to attempt to compete with them and they have no assurance they wouldn't go still lower if they did make the try.

Some steel sales officials said they have met price reductions on many fabricated wire products but not on wire rods because there seemed more justification for adjustment on fabricated wire products. Less drastic cuts were needed on the fabricated products and a greater profit margin was available to play with, they said. "Unlike rods," said one official, "you have a chance to be competitive with the going price on mesh."

Mills don't deny they have, in past years, been unable to provide all their customers with desired wire rod tonnages because of short supply. One steel executive says, however: "I wish we were short today—I'll take all the orders we can get."

And while wire rod users are unhappy about the steel industry's antidumping drive, they aren't necessarily opposed to the principle of dumping charges. One Eastern wire mesh maker has filed charges with the Customs Bureau that Belgian and French wire mesh producers have dumped their product in this country. The concern says the Bureau threw out the Belgian case, but hasn't ruled on the French case.

A PLEA FOR CORRECTION OF AN UNFAIR POLICY

Mr. MARSH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. JOELSON] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and include a letter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Virginia?

There was no objection.

Mr. JOELSON. Mr. Speaker, I am inserting in the RECORD a copy of a letter which I have written to Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara. It brings to light a most unfair situation which cries out for correction:

MARCH 20, 1963.

Hon. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA,
Secretary, Department of Defense,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I want to call to your attention a situation which I believe merits your careful consideration. Admiring your performance in office as I do and realizing how overburdened you are with work, I hesitate to add to your workload. However, I feel impelled to write to you because of a policy which I feel to be unjust and definitely detrimental to servicemen's morale.

The policy to which I refer is one under which servicemen are required to reimburse the Government for damage to Government property which was caused in the line of duty. As I understand it, these charges are assessed even though the damages are not caused through any willfulness or recklessness. Within the past week, two such cases involving constituents have been called to my attention.

In the first case, a private on duty who while driving a jeep became involved in an accident, has been required to pay damages of $276 which are being deducted from his monthly paychecks. I might add that the serviceman claims that he did not have a driver's license when he entered the service, but was taught to drive while in the Army.

The second case, although even more glaring, is obviously the result of some type of administrative error. In that case, a young serviceman was a passenger on a vehicle which was in an accident in Germany. This resulted in his sustaining a depressed skull fracture lacerating the brain. He now has practically no vision in his right eye and severe neurological disturbances which I need not specify here.

The serviceman was discharged from service and granted a 70-percent total disability rating. Shortly thereafter he received a letter advising him that he was "pecuniarily liable to the United States of America in the amount of $1,619.86 to cover the damage to the truck." Since the serviceman was merely a passenger in the truck at the time of the accident, the assessment of damages against him was obviously an administrative error, but my point is that it is unfair to assess such damages even against the driver if the accident was not due to negligence of a wanton or willful type.

Servicemen cannot control their assignments and should not, therefore, be held accountable for damage to equipment upon which they are ordered to work.

I do not question the need for economy in the armed services, but surely in view of the huge amounts expended by the military, there must be a better starting place than these charges to our servicemen which can cause severe hardships to the men and their families.

Sincerely,

CHARLES S. JOELSON,
Member of Congress.

AMERICAN WORKING WOMEN

Mr. MARSH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. SICKLES] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Virginia?

There was no objection.

Mr. SICKLES. Mr. Speaker, at the present time, there are almost 25 million women in the work force of our Nation. There are 3 million American families who depend almost entirely on the earnings of a woman. There is scarcely a major American industry which does not depend in some measure on the skill, training, intelligence, and efficiency of its feminine employees.

The American woman has traveled far from the era when she was considered the property of her husband, only slightly more valuable than his cattle. However, there are still areas where—through ignorance, prejudice, or crass-profit interests—she is denied fair treatment. Women who work find that time after time the choicest jobs go to men no better and sometimes less qualified than themselves. In case after case, men doing the same work, with the same skills, and the same qualifications receive higher pay. National differentials range from 42 percent among salesworkers to 68 percent among clerical workers.

I think we all agree that women are entitled to their full rights as American citizens. Failure to guarantee these rights works hardships not only on the women themselves, but on the families they support. It unnecessarily and unreasonably lessens purchasing power at a time when increased buying is a needed stimulus to our economy. It prevents the full utilization of workers' skills thereby adversely affecting production, as well as morale.

I believe that we need every national asset functioning to its fullest extent. We cannot afford the waste produced by this discrimination against our working women. In line with this, I am introducing an equal pay bill similar to the measure introduced by Representative EDITH GREEN to help remedy the situation by prohibiting discrimination on account of sex in the payment of wages by employers involved directly in interstate or foreign commerce. It sets up procedures for complaints, investigations, and, where violations are found, enforcement. It authorizes the Secretary of Labor to act to correct violations by informal, or if this fails, legal means.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

Mr. CONTE, for 15 minutes, today.

Mr. PRICE, for 30 minutes, today.

Mr. ASHBROOK (at the request of Mr. HALL), for 15 minutes, today.

Mr. WHITENER, for 1 hour, on March 25.

Mr. RYAN of New York, for 2 hours, on March 28.

Mr. CRAMER, for 30 minutes, on Monday, March 25, 1963.

Mr. HEMPHILL (at the request of Mr. MARSH), for 1 hour on Tuesday, March 26, and Wednesday, March 27, and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

Mr. HARVEY of Indiana, for 30 minutes, on Monday, March 25, 1963.

Mr. ALGER, for 1 hour, on Wednesday, April 3, and 1 hour on Monday, April 8, 1963.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to extend remarks in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, or to revise and extend remarks, was granted to:

Mr. HOSMER in two instances and to include extraneous matter.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. HALL) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. FINDLEY.

Mr. BERRY.

Mr. ANDERSON.

Mr. ASHBROOK.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. MARSH) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. POWELL.

Mr. HEMPHILL.

Mr. GARMATZ.

Mr. BOGGS.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

Mr. BURLESON, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee had examined and found truly enrolled bills of the House of the following titles, which were thereupon signed by the Speaker:

H.R. 212. An act to amend section 904, title 38, United States Code, so that burial allowances might be paid in cases where discharges were changed by competent authority after death of the veteran from dishonorable to conditions other than dishonorable; and

H.R. 2085. An act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide that the deduction for child care expenses shall be available to a wife who has been deserted by and cannot locate her husband on the same basis as a single woman.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. MARSH. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 1 o'clock and 13 minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until Monday, March 25, 1963, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

569. A letter from the Chief Justice of the United States, transmitting an additional amendment to the amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the U.S. district courts, which was ordered printed as House Document No. 48 of the 88th Congress (H. Doc. No. 48, pt. 2); to the Committee on the Judiciary and ordered to be printed.

570. A letter from the Secretary of Agriculture, transmitting a report entitled "A Plan for Strengthening Utilization Research and Development," pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 415, 87th Congress; to the Committee on Agriculture.

571. A letter from the chief Scout executive, Boy Scouts of America, transmitting the Annual Report of the Boy Scouts of America for 1962, which represents their 53d year, pursuant to a Federal charter granted on June 15, 1916 (H. Doc. No. 85); to the Committee on Education and Labor and ordered to be printed.

572. A letter from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a report on the Dixie project, Utah, pursuant to section 9(a) of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939 (53 Stat. 1187) (H. Doc. No. 86); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and ordered to be printed with illustrations.

573. A letter from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a report on the Buttes Dam and Reservoir, Middle Gila River project, Arizona, pursuant to section 9(a) of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939 (53 Stat. 1187) (H. Doc. No. 87); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and ordered to be printed with illustrations.

574. A letter from the Secretary of Agriculture, transmitting a draft of a proposed bill entitled, "A bill to establish a Commission on Rural Life to study the changing scope of rural America, and for other purposes"; to the Committee on Agriculture.

575. A letter from the Secretary of Agriculture, transmitting a draft of a purposed bill entitled, "A bill to amend the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act" (68 Stat. 666, as amended); to the Committee on Agriculture.

576. A letter from the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President, relative to reporting that the appropriation to the Department of Labor for "Unemployment compensation for Federal employees and ex-servicemen," for the fiscal year 1963, has been reapportioned on a basis which indicates the necessity for a supplemental estimate of appropriation, pursuant to section 3679 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.S.C. 665); to the Committee on Appropriations.

577. A letter from the Secretary of the Army, transmitting the semiannual report of the Department of the Army contracts for military construction awarded without formal advertisement covering the period July 1 through December 31, 1962, pursuant to section 605 of Public Law 87-554; to the Committee on Armed Services.

578. A letter from the Director, Office of Emergency Planning, Executive Office of the President, transmitting the semiannual report on borrowing authority for December 31, 1962, pursuant to section 304(b) of the Defense Production Act as amended; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

579. A letter from the Acting Archivist of the United States, transmitting the report of the Archivist of the United States on records proposed for disposal under the law; to the Committee on House Administration.

580. A letter from the Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, transmitting a copy of the report on backlog of pending applications and hearing cases in the Federal Communications Commission as of January 31, 1963, pursuant to Public Law 554, 82d Congress; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

581. A letter from the Governor, Canal Zone Government, transmitting a draft of a proposed bill entitled "A bill to authorize the issuance of certificates of citizenship in the Canal Zone"; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

582. A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a draft of a proposed bill entitled "A bill to remove the percentage limitations on retirement of enlisted men of the Coast Guard, and for other purposes"; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

583. A letter from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice, transmitting reports concerning visa petitions which this Service has approved according the beneficiaries of such petitions first preference classification under the act, pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. O'BRIEN of New York: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. H.R. 1988. A bill to provide for the settlement of claims of certain residents of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; without amendment (Rept. No. 110). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. HALEY: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. H.R. 844. A bill to declare that certain land of the United States is held by the United States in trust for the Oglala Sioux Indian Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation; with amendment (Rept. No. 111). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. HALEY: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. H.R. 845. A bill to declare that certain land of the United States is held by the United States in trust for the Oglala Sioux Indian Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation; without amendment (Rept. No. 112). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. HALEY: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. H.R. 2635. A bill to amend the act of August 9, 1955, for the purpose of including the Fort Mojave Indian Reservation among reservations excepted from the 25 year lease limitations; with amendment (Rept. No. 113). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. JONES of Missouri: Committee on House administration. Senate Concurrent Resolution 29. Concurrent resolution to print with illustrations "A Report on U.S. Foreign Operations in Africa," by Senator ALLEN J. ELLENDER; without amendment (Rept. No. 114). Ordered to be printed.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ABBITT:

H.R. 5009. A bill to provide a uniform rate of duty for portable container locks; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. BARRY:

H.R. 5010. A bill to protect the right to vote in Federal elections free from arbitrary discrimination by literacy tests or other means; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BRUCE:

H.R. 5011. A bill to provide for the striking of medals in commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the statehoood of the State of Indiana; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

H.R. 5012. A bill to provide for the issuance of a special postage stamp in commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the admission of the State of Indiana to the United States to be celebrated in 1966; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. BURKHALTER:

H.R. 5013. A bill to authorize the Housing and Home Finance Administrator to provide additional assistance for the development

of comprehensive and coordinated mass transportation systems in metropolitan and other urban areas, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. DANIELS:

H.R. 5014. A bill to provide for the crediting for civil service retirement purposes of certain service rendered by civilian employees of nonappropriated fund instrumentalities of the Armed Forces; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

H.R. 5015. A bill to provide under the social security program for payment for hospital and related services to aged beneficiaries; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. DENT:

H.R. 5016. A bill to amend title 10 of the United States Code to authorize educational institutions to be reimbursed for facilities furnished for Reserve Officers' Training Corps programs; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. DERWINSKI:

H.R. 5017. A bill to provide for the issuance of a special postage stamp in commemoration of the 250th anniversary of the birth of Padre Junipero Serra; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. DOWDY:

H.R. 5018. A bill to protect postal patrons from obnoxious and offensive mail matter; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. FINO:

H.R. 5019. A bill to amend the Hatch Act to permit all officers and employees of the Government to exercise the full responsibility of citizenship and to take an active part in the political life of the United States; to the Committee on House Administration.

H.R. 5020. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow a deduction for income tax purposes of commutation fares paid by an individual in traveling to and from work; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

H.R. 5021. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide that any unmarried person who maintains his or her own home shall be entitled to be taxed at the rate provided for the head of a household; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. FLOOD:

H.R. 5022. A bill to authorize the Housing and Home Finance Administrator to provide additional assistance for the development of comprehensive and coordinated mass transportation systems, both public and private, in metropolitan and other urban areas, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

H.R. 5023. A bill to provide for assistance in the construction and initial operation of community mental health centers, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

H.R. 5024. A bill to improve, strengthen, and accelerate programs for the prevention and abatement of air pollution; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. GAVIN:

H.R. 5025. A bill to amend the Communications Act of 1934, with respect to the hours of operation of certain broadcasting stations; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. GIAIMO:

H.R. 5026. A bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. GILBERT:

H.R. 5027. A bill to amend the Clayton Act to prohibit restraints of trade carried into effect through the use of unfair and deceptive methods of packaging or labeling certain consumer commodities distributed in commerce, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. GRAY:

H.R. 5028. A bill to amend the Communications Act of 1934, with respect to the hours of operation of certain broadcasting stations; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. HARRIS:

H.R. 5029. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to employ aliens in a scientific or technical capacity; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

H.R. 5030. A bill to repeal section 303(b) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, relating to the water-carrier bulk commodity exemption, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

H.R. 5031. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to utilize funds received from State and local governments for special meteorological services; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. HARVEY of Indiana:

H.R. 5032. A bill to amend the Federal Trade Commission Act, to promote quality and price stabilization, to define and restrain certain unfair methods of distribution and to confirm, define, and equalize the rights of producers and resellers in the distribution of goods identified by distinguishing brands, names, or trademarks, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. HEMPHILL:

H.R. 5033. A bill to amend title II of the Social Security Act to reduce from 72 to 70 the age at which beneficiaries are no longer subject to restrictions on outside earnings; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. HERLONG:

H.R. 5034. A bill to amend section 218(d)(6)(C) so as to require that coverage by the old-age and survivors' disability and insurance program in States permitted to divide retirement systems for State and local employees shall cover a majority of the members of such a retirement system at the time the agreement therefor is entered into; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. HOLIFIELD (by request):

H.R. 5035. A bill to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes; to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

H.R. 5036. A bill to authorize appropriations for the Atomic Energy Commission in accordance with section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes; to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

By Mr. KASTENMEIER:

H.R. 5037. A bill to control the human intake of agricultural commodities containing radioactive substances, and for other purposes; to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

By Mr. KASTENMEIER (by request):

H.R. 5038. A bill to amend title 39, United States Code, with respect to postage rates on certain educational kits, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. KEOGH:

H.R. 5039. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide an increase in the amount for which a credit may be allowed against the Federal estate tax for estate taxes paid to States; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. KING of New York:

H.R. 5040. A bill to amend section 114 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 to state the policy of Congress with respect to reimbursement for certain highways on the Interstate System; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. LANGEN:

H.R. 5041. A bill to provide for the application of power revenues from reclamation projects to the reduction of the public debt; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. LIBONATI:

H.R. 5042. A bill for the relief of certain officers of the naval service erroneously in receipt of compensation based upon an incorrect computation of service for basic pay; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. McCLORY:

H.R. 5043. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide a credit against the Federal income tax for employers who hire additional employees; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. McMILLAN:

H.R. 5044. A bill to amend the act entitled "An act to provide for a mutual-aid plan for fire protection by and for the District of Columbia and certain adjacent communities in Maryland and Virginia, and for other purposes"; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. McMILLAN (by request):

H.R. 5045. A bill to authorize a grant for carrying out a project of construction for the expansion of the facilities of the Washington Hospital Center in the District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. MATHIAS:

H.R. 5046. A bill to authorize judicial officers to require the giving of evidence relating to crimes committed in the District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

H.R. 5047. A bill to amend the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act so as to provide further for the prevention of accidents in coal mines; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. MULTER:

H.R. 5048. A bill to amend section 207 of the National Housing Act to eliminate the provision presently limiting mortgages thereunder to the cost of the physical improvements involved; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mrs. MAY:

H.R. 5049. A bill to assist the States to provide additional facilities for research at the State agricultural experiment stations; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. MILLS:

H.R. 5050. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide that, in the case of gasoline used in vehicles furnishing taxicab service, 2 cents of the 4-cent Federal gasoline tax shall be rebated to the ultimate purchaser of such gasoline; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MONAGAN:

H.R. 5051. A bill to amend section 1461 of title 18 of the United States Code with respect to the mailing of obscene matter, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 5052. A bill relating to the power of the States to impose use tax assessments with respect to sales in interstate commerce; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MURPHY of Illinois:

H.R. 5053. A bill to provide for the establishment of the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. PEPPER:

H.R. 5054. A bill to amend the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

H.R. 5055. A bill to amend the Small Business Investment Act of 1958; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

H.R. 5056. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 with respect to the income tax treatment of small business investment companies; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. RHODES of Pennsylvania:

H.R. 5057. A bill to amend title II of the Social Security Act to increase to $1,800, the

annual amount individuals are permitted to earn while receiving benefits under such title; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina:

H.R. 5058. A bill to rescind and revoke membership of the United States in the United Nations and the specialized agencies thereof, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

H.R. 5059. A bill to provide for the issuance of a special postage stamp honoring William Sidney Porter who wrote under the name "O. Henry"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. ROOSEVELT:

H.R. 5060. A bill to provide for the registration of contractors of migrant agricultural workers, and for other purposes; to the committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. ROSENTHAL:

H.R. 5061. A bill to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act to eliminate the ceiling upon amounts that may be appropriated to carry out that act; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. ST GERMAIN:

H.R. 5062. A bill to authorize a 5-year program of grants and scholarships for collegiate education in the field of nursing, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. SICKLES:

H.R. 5063. A bill to prohibit discrimination on account of sex in the payment of wages by employers engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce and to provide for the restitution of wages lost by employees by reason of any such discrimination; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. SNYDER:

H.R. 5064. A bill to amend title II of the Social Security Act to include Kentucky among those States which are permitted to divide their retirement systems into two parts for purposes of obtaining social security coverage under Federal-State agreement; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. TEAGUE of California:

H.R. 5065. A bill relating to the interest rates on loans made by the Treasury to the Department of Agriculture to carry out the programs authorized by the Rural Electrification Act of 1936; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. VAN DEERLIN:

H.R. 5066. A bill to provide for the construction of a Veterans' Administration hospital at San Diego, Calif.; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. WHITTEN:

H.R. 5067. A bill to amend the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. WILSON of Indiana:

H.R. 5068. A bill to strengthen State governments, to provide financial assistance to States for educational purposes by returning a portion of the Federal taxes collected therein, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. ZABLOCKI:

H.R. 5069. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide a 30-percent credit against the individual income tax for certain educational expenses incurred at certain public and private institutions of higher education and high schools; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. BARRY:

H.J. Res. 331. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relative to equal rights for men and women; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CLARK:

H.J. Res. 332. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DANIELS:

H.J. Res. 333. Joint resolution designating the 6-day period beginning April 15, 1963, as "National Harmony Week," and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DOWDY:

H.J. Res. 334. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relative to equal rights for men and women; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts:

H.J. Res. 335. Joint resolution designating the 17th day of December of each year as "Wright Brothers Day"; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MONAGAN:

H.J. Res. 336. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to permit the use of prayer in public schools; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. O'BRIEN of New York:

H.J. Res. 337. Joint resolution extending an invitation to the International Olympic Committee to hold the 1968 winter Olympic games in the United States; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. PEPPER:

H.J. Res. 338. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relative to equal rights for men and women; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ROOSEVELT:

H.J. Res. 339. Joint resolution authorizing and requesting the President to issue annually a proclamation respecting the ringing of bells in celebration of the anniversary of Declaration of Independence; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. STINSON:

H.J. Res. 340. Joint resolution to amend title 39, United States Code, to prevent the use of stopwatches or other measuring devices in the postal service; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. WATSON:

H.J. Res. 341. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WIDNALL:

H.J. Res. 342. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States permitting the offering of prayers in public schools; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mrs. DWYER:

H. Con. Res. 117. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress that the anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence should be observed throughout the United States by the ringing of bells, requesting the President to issue a proclamation to this effect, and calling on civic and other community leaders to encourage public participation in such observance; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SNYDER:

H. Con. Res. 118. Concurrent resolution expressing the determination of the United States with respect to the matter of general disarmament and arms control; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. WILLIS:

H. Res. 296. Resolution to print as a House document, the Fourth Annual Report of the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure; to the Committee on House Administration.

MEMORIALS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, memorials were presented and referred as follows:

By Mr. JONES of Alabama: Memorial of the Alabama Legislature, known as Senate Joint Resolution 9, which deplores the exodus of continent-based textile plants to Puerto Rico to take advantage of income tax regulations indigenous only there and jeopardizing the healthy future of statewide textile and other industries and demands an equalization of income taxes between the island and continental United States; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By the SPEAKER: Memorial of the Legislature of the State of Georgia, memorializing the President and the Congress of the United States to resist any changes in the present capital gains tax laws, relating to the cutting or disposal of timber, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ANDERSON:

H.R. 5070. A bill for the relief of Branko Cule; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CHENOWETH:

H.R. 5071. A bill for the relief of the Norvell Bros. Painting & Decorating Co.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. FARBSTEIN:

H.R. 5072. A bill for the relief of Ignazio Rinella; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. FINO:

H.R. 5073. A bill to confer jurisdiction on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to hear, determine, and render judgment on the claims of Lawrence Nestor against the United States; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 5074. A bill for the relief of Valdo Santoro; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HAGEN of California:

H.R. 5075. A bill for the relief of Renzo Giretti; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HARRISON:

H.R. 5076. A bill relating to the exchange of certain lands between the town of Powell, Wyo., and the Presbyterian Retirement Facilities Corp.; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. HAWKINS:

H.R. 5077. A bill for the relief of Sun Young Choy; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. JOELSON:

H.R. 5078. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Beatrice D'Errico; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. JONES of Alabama:

H.R. 5079. A bill for the relief of Robert L. Yates and others; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KIRWAN:

H.R. 5080. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Stojanka Frankovich and her son, Zvonimir Frankovich; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. McMILLAN:

H.R. 5081. A bill to authorize the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to sell a right-of-way across a portion of the District Training School grounds at Laurel, Md., and for other purposes; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. MARTIN of California:

H.R. 5082. A bill for the relief of Herminia C. Balagot; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MONAGAN:

H.R. 5083. A bill for the relief of John Stewart Murphy; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. O'HARA of Illinois:

H.R. 5084. A bill for the relief of Ilia Vasil Karakostas; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. POWELL:

H.R. 5085. A bill for the relief of Emmanuel Georgious Sopassakis; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 5086. A bill for the relief of Giuseppe Stellario; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 5087. A bill for the relief of Fotini Selitsanou; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. PUCINSKI:

H.R. 5088. A bill for the relief of Dimitrious Lintzeri, his wife, Panagniota G. Lintzeri, and his minor children, Dina Lintzeri and Andrew Lintzeri; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. QUILLEN:

H.R. 5089. A bill to grant, posthumously to the late Gen. Robert E. Lee of Virginia, restoration of full rights of U.S. citizenship; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina:

H.R. 5090. A bill to authorize the appointment of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the grade of General of the Armies of the United States; to the Committee on Armed Services.

H.R. 5091. A bill for the relief of Eugene J. Bennett; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. RYAN of New York:

H.R. 5092. A bill for the relief of Shi Young Rhee; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 5093. A bill for the relief of Rigas Giokas and his wife, Vangelya Giokas; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SCHWENGEL:

H.R. 5094. A bill for the relief of Geoffrey Howard Smith; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. STINSON:

H.R. 5095. A bill for the relief of Yasuko Sugiura; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

70. By Mr. SNYDER: Petition of Malcolm W. Bayley and other citizens of the Third Congressional District of Kentucky to preserve the Monroe Doctrine; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

71. By the SPEAKER: Petition of Harlan Savage, president, La Habra Democratic Club, La Habra, Calif., relating to the establishment of a Scientific Constitutional Monetary System; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

SENATE

THURSDAY, MARCH 21, 1963

The Senate met at 12 o'clock meridian, and was called to order by the Vice President.

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D.D., offered the following prayer:

God, our Father, amid all life's changing scenes, make us conscious of Thy overshadowing presence. Thou art the love that will not let us go, the love that followeth us all the way.

We touch the hem of Thy garment in the human love which hallows our own lives and sanctifies our homes—love which, at its best, bears witness to Thee and the divine love which alone is the balm able to cure the hurt of the world.

In the midst of crushing cares, relentless demands, and tormenting fears which the Nation's problems bring, may the quieting peace of Thy presence restore our jaded souls. Give truth to our words, sincerity to our hearts, and courage to our deeds in these times that are testing as by fire the treasure bequeathed to us. So may we in our day make patriotism beautiful with loyalty and dedication to this free land of our love and prayer. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. HUMPHREY, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Tuesday, March 19, 1963, was dispensed with.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had agreed to the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 29) to print with illustrations "A Report on U.S. Foreign Operations in Africa," by Senator ALLEN J. ELLENDER.

The message also announced that the House had passed the following bill and joint resolution, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 242. An act to amend section 1820 of title 38 of the United States Code to provide for waiver of indebtedness to the United States in certain cases arising out of default on loans guaranteed or made by the Veterans' Administration; and

H.J. Res. 234. Joint resolution to provide for the reappointment of John Nicholas Brown as Citizen Regent of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

The message further announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills:

H.R. 212. An act to amend section 904, title 38, United States Code, so that burial allowances might be paid in cases where discharges were changed by competent authority after death of the veteran from dishonorable to conditions other than dishonorable; and

H.R. 2085. An act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide that the deduction for child care expenses shall be available to a wife who has been deserted by and cannot locate her husband on the same basis as a single woman.

HOUSE BILL AND JOINT RESOLUTION REFERRED

The following bill and joint resolution were each read twice by their titles and referred as indicated:

H.R. 242. An act to amend section 1820 of title 38 of the United States Code to provide for waiver of indebtedness to the United States in certain cases arising out of default on loans guaranteed or made by the Veterans' Administration; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

H.J. Res. 234. Joint resolution to provide for the reappointment of John Nicholas Brown as Citizen Regent of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution; to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

LIMITATION OF DEBATE DURING THE MORNING HOUR

On request of Mr. HUMPHREY, and by unanimous consent, statements during the morning hour were ordered limited to 3 minutes.

COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

On request of Mr. HUMPHREY, and by unanimous consent, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations was authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

On request of Mr. HUMPHREY, and by unanimous consent, the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry was authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

On request of Mr. HUMPHREY, and by unanimous consent, the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee on the Committee on the Judiciary was authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMISSION ON RURAL LIFE

A letter from the Secretary of Agriculture, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to establish a Commission on Rural Life to study the changing scope of rural America, and for other purposes (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

AMENDMENT OF WATERSHED PROTECTION AND FLOOD PREVENTION ACT

A letter from the Secretary of Agriculture, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act, as amended (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

REPORT ON REAPPORTIONMENT OF AN APPROPRIATION

A letter from the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President, reporting, pursuant to law, that the appropriation to the Department of Labor for "Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees and Ex-Servicemen," for the fiscal year 1963, had been reapportioned on a basis which indicates the necessity for a supplemental estimate of appropriation; to the Committee on Appropriations.

REPORT ON DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CONTRACTS FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AWARDED WITHOUT FORMAL ADVERTISEMENT

A letter from the Secretary of the Army, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on Department of the Army contracts for military construction awarded without formal advertisement, for the 6-month period ended December 31, 1962 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Armed Services.

REPORT ON BORROWING AUTHORITY

A letter from the Director, Office of Emergency Planning, Executive Office of the President, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on borrowing authority, dated December 31, 1962 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

REMOVAL OF PERCENTAGE LIMITATIONS ON RETIREMENT OF ENLISTED MEN OF THE COAST GUARD

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to remove the percentage limitations on retirement of enlisted men of the Coast Guard, and for other purposes (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Commerce.